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Abstract 
Attempting to enhance their productivity or improve working conditions, many 
businesses have adopted organizational change programs that involve a participatory 
component.  To attain a comprehensive understanding of these change programs we need 
to investigate the influence of social factors such as power, the impact of local and global 
contexts, and the role that agency plays in these programs.  Further, because 
organizational programs do not unfold linearly and the contexts in which they are 
embedded continually evolve, it is crucial to employ an approach that allows studying 
organizational programs over time.  Attending to these considerations enables the 
production of narratives of organizational change that are congruous with the dynamism 
of organizational life.   
This dissertation explores the dynamics of an organizational program in a 
particular type of occupational health and safety program, which emphasizes employee 
involvement: participatory ergonomics (PE).  Participatory ergonomics, intended to 
reduce workers‘ exposures to work-related musculoskeletal disorders, draws on the input 
of small groups of labour and management representatives called ergonomic change 
teams (ECTs) to address exposure to hazards that may lead to musculoskeletal disorders.    
The dissertation‘s examination of an organizational change program consists of an 
analysis of PE programs in two workplaces: a courier depot and a manufacturing plant.      
The dissertation‘s investigation of the PE programs is based primarily on 
observations, which were gathered longitudinally as the ECTs endeavoured to make 
ergonomic changes, and fifty-five semi-structured interviews, which were carried out 
with ECT members and other key informants who were not members of the ECTs.  Data 
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collection occurred during 48 months in the manufacturing setting; in the courier 
company, collection took place during a 30-month period.  The dissertation‘s analysis is 
informed by negotiated order and critical theory lenses.  Negotiated order considers 
social order as an ongoing process and draws attention to the activities of individuals and 
groups, and the manner in which they influence the dynamics of social life.  In regard to 
organizational programs, it rejects the idea that they unfold independently of actors‘ 
efforts; rather, it considers them as products of individuals‘ attempts to establish and 
maintain the necessary agreements to ensure their operation.  Critical theory, as it 
pertains to occupational health, identifies the constraints that shape working conditions 
and links these with the uneven distribution of power in the workplace and production 
imperatives.  The dissertation addresses the following general research questions:  What 
actions were undertaken by individuals to ensure the PE programs functioned and 
continued? How did the organizational and societal context enable or constrain the 
pursuit of PE program activities?    
The presentation of the findings begins with an account of the problem-solving 
processes used in both of the settings, an overview of the types of knowledge that were 
used, and a description of the actors‘ access to knowledge.  In each setting, design 
parameters, production pressures, the nature of the knowledge required to design 
solutions, and the differential distribution of that knowledge among workplace personnel 
influenced (a) the effectiveness of the ECTs‘ solution building activities, (b) the design 
process, and (c) the nature and degree of participation by the teams‘ worker members.   
The dissertation then proceeds to an examination of the implementation process.  It 
explores how this process is affected by the organizational context, in particular the 
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ECTs‘ limited authority as agents of change, and shows that the minimal authority they 
possessed prompted the ECTs to select an array of strategies to accomplish their work.  
These strategies often took the forms of persuasion, persistence, and enlisting the 
assistance of other personnel.    
Extending the discussion of implementation, the dissertation then focuses on the 
division of labour within the ECTs as they carried out their activities.  In both settings, 
implementation activities were unevenly distributed among the ECTs‘ membership; they 
were predominantly carried out by managerial personnel.  Both the programs‘ 
functioning and the participation of worker representatives were influenced by the 
interplay among three main factors: the type of activities that needed to be carried out, 
workplace hierarchy, and stance, or participants‘ views about their ability to act 
effectively.   
The discussion of the PE programs then proceeds to an examination of whether 
the programs were supplied with the resources required to continue over time.  The 
outcomes differed: in Courier Co. the program was discontinued, whereas in Furniture 
Co. it was maintained.  The discussions investigate how PE program continuation was 
affected by the program supporters‘ activities and shaped by conditions both internal and 
external to the organization.  Foremost among these conditions were management‘s view 
of health and safety and the occupational health and safety regulatory framework.  
The dissertation‘s examination of the PE programs over time provides evidence 
that the functioning and the degree of worker involvement in participatory occupational 
health programs are conditioned by structural and interactional elements.  The programs 
were shaped by an uneven distribution of power, limits on access to knowledge and 
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scarce resources, and actors‘ divergent interests and their capacities to act in accord with 
these interests.  
The final chapter of the dissertation reviews the key findings and examines 
common themes that arose across the workplaces.  The dissertation concludes with 
observations on several topics: the challenges of evaluating program outcomes in settings 
such as occupational health and safety; the lessons that participatory ergonomics 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION  
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Responding to competitive markets, many businesses have adopted organizational 
change programs, such as total quality management, lean production, team working, and 
information systems management (Osterman, 2000).  Prescriptions for implementing 
organizational change programs and narratives about how they have performed have been 
questioned by some sociologists.  Patrick Dawson (2003b: 39) suggests that, ―simple 
accounts‖ of organizational change in which pat causal relationships are presented to 
explain a program‘s operation and outcomes need to be thoroughly scrutinized for their 
veracity.  Questioning the sequential and linear way that the unfolding of change 
programs is often presented, Collins (1998: 90) argues that organizational transition is 
typically complex and seldom straightforward.  Simple accounts of organizational change 
often fail to address, or at least downplay, social factors such as, power, actors‘ diverse 
interpretations, and socio-historic context, all of which shape organizational change.  
Additionally, simple accounts exclude the emergent character of organizational change 
and the active role that individuals, both labour and management, play.  Dawson (2003b: 
3) states, ―To put it simply, change does not occur in a hermetically sealed bubble; rather, 
choices are influenced by values and beliefs developed and modified during a lifetime of 
interaction with family, friends and social groups, and are constrained by socio-economic 
circumstances and power relations.‖  Similarly, Vallas (2003:227) remarks that, 
―workplace change is not akin to a surgical procedure performed under anaesthesia.‖  
These authors suggest that to produce narratives of organizational change that may be 
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more congruous with the dynamism of organizational life, researchers need to incorporate 
the influence of structure and agency into their accounts. 
With an eye to social factors, some researchers have examined organizational 
change programs in workplace settings.  Research reveals that conditions at the 
organizational and the broader societal level often impinge upon organizational change 
programs in such a way that they become ineffectual, or at least, operate sub-optimally 
(e.g., Vallas, 2003: 223-224).  In some cases, change programs are hindered because of 
worker resistance (Ezzamel et al., 2002; Dawson, 2003b: 89-109).  In other cases, 
organizational change failed as key managers opposed the program or half-heartedly 
supported it (Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Buchanan et al., 2005b; Milkman, 1998; 
Zuboff, 1988).  Further, organizational change may be implemented to ensure that a 
powerful group‘s control is maintained or regained over relatively less powerful groups 
(Noble, 1979).  
In addition to the social and organizational factors they identify as affecting 
organizational change, some researchers reveal the active role of individuals, both labour 
and management, who are engaged in the operation of organizational change programs.  
These researchers, while still noting the importance of conditions that may constrain or 
facilitate a program‘s operation, go further to examine the micro-dynamics of change, 
such as negotiation, politicking, and resistance (e.g., Balogun and Johnson, 2005; 
Rouleau, 2005).  Clarke and Preece (2005) explored the implementation of an Intranet 
designed to foster idea exchange among a firm‘s workers.  They (2005: 164) found that 
Intranet use was largely the product of how different groups interpreted it:  
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[T]he emerging Intranet configuration represented different things 
to different people, was used in different ways by different people 
(and the same people over time), and was both shaped by, and in 
turn, used to shape a range of  organizational and personal 
objectives and intentions.  Some people were willing and able to 
go along with this, if not always necessarily to embrace this brave 
new world, whilst others did not have the opportunity to do so, or 
were not convinced of the net benefits to be obtained for 
themselves and/or the organization.    
McLoughlin et al., (2000), examining the implementation of a team-based 
manufacturing system, reported on the critical role that individuals played in shaping the 
adoption of the program.  The program failed, and the researchers (2000: 34) explained 
that this failure was largely because ―of the incongruence between dominant assumptions, 
knowledge, and expectations concerning the configuration of technical and human 
elements of production within the firms and those proposed by the sociotechnical values 
and beliefs expressed in the frames of the action researchers and their allies.‖  In another 
example, Garrety and Badham (1999: 279), focusing on the introduction of a 
computerized manufacturing process, examined politics, which they defined as: 
[A] collective, communicative activity that is goal-directed… The 
goals involved aspirations towards some vision of ―the good life‖ 
for oneself (e.g., career advancement, freedom from 
responsibility) and/or the group (e.g., a more efficient factory, a 
more democratic society, a stronger union).  The ―things‖ that are 
encountered by people in their daily lives may be viewed as 
opportunities or obstructions along the paths towards these goals.  
Through interactions (the production of papers and manifestos, 
meetings persuasion, manipulation, argument…), people try to 
change the meanings of things so that particular courses of action 
can become easier or more difficult, and certain or more difficult 
assumptions become routine whereas others are excluded.      
The above research adds to our comprehension of how organizational change 
programs function and unfold.  A unifying element of the research is that exploring the 
―politics of change,‖ to use Garrety and Badham‘s (1999) terminology, is of critical 
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importance to understanding how change programs function, how they evolve over time, 
and how they are shaped by contextual factors.   
A central aim of these approaches is to disaggregate the process of change; that is, 
the investigators sought to understand the actions of individuals and groups within 
specific organizational circumstance and broad historic conditions that enable or 
constrain program functioning.  To avoid excluding the consideration of pertinent factors 
that shape the change process and prioritize the actors‘ undertakings, a suitable 
sensitizing frame is valuable for investigating change.  One means of investigating what 
factors are involved in change making is to examine what Strauss (1993: 53-54) refers to 
as a ―trajectory,‖ or ―(1) the course of an experienced phenomenon as it evolves over 
time (an engineering project, a chronic illness …) and (2) the actions and interactions 
contributing to its evolution.‖  This dissertation draws on this orientation to examine 
questions regarding how a workplace change program functions in practice.  Such an 
approach allows one to focus on the micro-dynamics of change, such as the interactions 
that pave the way for change or throw barriers up to alter its course or bring about its 
demise.     
Relying on both interview and observational data, the dissertation examines two 
occupational health and safety (OHS) programs.  The analysis is particularly attendant to 
the activities of individuals and groups trying to manage the programs.  Specifically, the 
analysis considers the asymmetrical access to resources and power among actors, the 
variations in support for the programs within and among levels of management, the 
influence of broader societal factors such as the OHS regulatory climate and economy, 
and the role these latter factors played in the functioning and maintenance of the OHS 
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programs.  I show how the functioning of the programs was shaped by organizational and 
social conditions and the agency of the actors involved.       
The dissertation explores the dynamics of a particular type of OHS program 
referred to as participatory ergonomics (PE).  I expand on the definition and origins of PE 
later in the chapter but it is sufficient to say here that PE seeks to address the burden of 
work-related musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) by altering the physical workplace using 
input from workers and managers.  MSDs are injuries and disorders of the soft tissue 
(e.g., muscles, nerves, tendons), such as lower back injuries and carpel tunnel syndrome.  
Exacting a human and an economic toll (Kome, 2006), MSDs constitute a serious social 
problem whose emergence is partly linked to macro shifts in the types of work that 
Canadians are doing (Sullivan and Frank, 2000) and the conditions under which they are 
working (Rinehart, 2006).  Indeed, MSDs now account for the largest number of work-
related lost-time injury claims in Ontario, and during the period 1996-2004, MSDs 
accounted for 40 percent of all lost-time claims or reported injuries serious enough to 
warrant an employee taking time off to recover.  Financially, from 1996 to 2004, MSDs 
resulted in direct claim costs of approximately $4 billion (Kome, 2006; Ontario, 2005).
1
 
This chapter is organized as follows.  To situate these programs in a historical 
context, I begin by briefly describing the changes in the nature of work in Canada that 
have occurred over the last 30 years and the concomitant increase in the prevalence of 
MSDs. This is followed by a discussion of the emergence of PE and its underpinnings.  
Next, I outline the theoretical lenses that the dissertation relies upon.  I then discuss how I 
                                                 
 
1
  It is estimated that the indirect costs of MSDs to employers may be 2-4 times the costs of workers‘ 
compensation claims (Punnett, 1999).   
 6 
selected the settings in which the study was carried out, introduce these, and describe the 
participatory ergonomic intervention that the dissertation examines.  The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the dissertation‘s chapters.      
1.2  THE RISE AND CHALLENGE OF MSDS  
1.2.1  Changing Nature of Work and Injury  
Over the last 30 years, the types of jobs that Canadians hold have changed as 
Canada‘s employment landscape has undergone significant transformations.  Economic 
changes such as de-industrialization and the movement of industrial jobs out of Canada 
and North America to areas where production costs are lower and/or the regulatory 
climate more conducive to business (High, 2003; Krahn et al., 2007: 29) have contributed 
to a loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector.  At the same time, there has been increased 
growth in the service sector.  Indeed, the service sector has grown to be Canada‘s primary 
employer as the number of jobs in the primary (resource extraction) and secondary 
sectors (manufacturing) has decreased (Gunderson and Hyatt, 2000; Krahn et al., 2007: 
59-68).  These changes in the nature of work have contributed to what Sullivan and Frank 
(2000) refer to as the ―industrial-epidemiological shift,‖ an alteration in the prevalent 
type of workplace injury that Canadians sustain.  Canadian workers are incurring more 
MSDs than traumatic injuries such as lacerations, broken bones, and amputations than 
they had in the past.   
Employees‘ working conditions are also undergoing substantial changes, some of 
which can be linked to corporations‘ attempts to address challenges linked to increased 
competition and globalization (Anderson-Connelly et al., 2002; Gunderson and Hyatt, 
2000: 62-64; Landsbergis, 2003).  While approaches to increased competition have 
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varied, many companies have sought to introduce new technology and new management 
regimes, such as lean production.  These and other rationalization schemes have typically 
intensified employees‘ work, increased workloads, and diminished employees‘ control 
over their work.  The effects on work have been felt in various industry sectors such as 
automotive (Askenazy, 2001; Lewchuk et al., 2001; Parker, 2003; Rinehart et al., 1997; 
Yates et al., 2001), garment (Gannagé, 1995; 1999), hospitality services (Seifert and 
Messing, 2006), mining (Hall, 1993; 1999; Russell, 1999), and food processing (Novek, 
1992; Novek et al., 1990).  Characterized by fewer rest breaks, deskilling, increased 
mechanization, and rationalization, these changes in the labour process have created new 
physical demands and enhanced existing ones and thus increased workers‘ susceptibility 
to injury.  
1.2.2  Addressing MSDs:  Participatory Ergonomics 
Ergonomics, also known as human factors engineering, explores humans‘ 
interaction with their environment.  The International Ergonomics Association defines 
ergonomics as ―the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of interactions 
among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, 
principles, data and methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall 
system performance‖ (International Ergonomics Association, 2007).  One focus of 
ergonomists‘ work is on the interactions between workers and their work environment, in 
an effort to reduce musculoskeletal injuries.  Ergonomics focuses on physically altering 
the workplace through ―engineering controls,‖ or the modification, replacement, or 
removal of features of a work process that expose workers to risk of musculoskeletal 
injury (Norman and Wells, 2000).  Significantly, because it considers the source of injury 
in the work environment, ergonomics contrasts with other workplace health and safety 
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programs that address hazards by altering workers‘ behaviour, changing policies and 
regulations of work, or supplying workers with personal protective equipment.  The 
intention in ergonomics to locate and address injury in the physical work environment 
corresponds with one of the key precepts underpinning ergonomics:  that the workplace 
should be altered to suit the worker rather than vice versa (Norman and Wells, 2000). 
Participatory ergonomics is one type of injury prevention program for addressing 
work-related musculoskeletal disorders (Wilson et al., 2005).  While there are numerous 
definitions of PE, they typically highlight involvement of stakeholders, including, notably 
workers, based on the understanding that their knowledge is particularly important for 
comprehending workplace hazards.
2
  One of the most widely cited PE definitions is that 
of Wilson and Haines (1997: 492-493), which states that participatory ergonomics is ―the 
involvement of people in planning and controlling a significant amount of their own work 
activities, with sufficient knowledge and power to influence both processes and outcomes 
in order to achieve desirable goals.‖     
Connected to a larger socio-historical trend of worker involvement in workplace 
decision-making, participatory ergonomics has emerged, in Wilson et al.’s (2005) words, 
out of the ―participatory turn‖ in occupational health and safety and in production 
improvement (Imada, 1991).  Participatory arrangements, known variously as total 
quality management, lean production, and quality circles, have been introduced in a wide 
                                                 
 
2
 Although PE programs are premised on the involvement of both workers and managers in the 
identification and reduction of workers‘ exposures to the risks of injury (Van Eerd et al., 2008: 27), they 
vary widely in the degree of involvement of worker and management representatives (Haines et al., 2002; 
Moir, 2005; Wilson et al., 2005).   
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variety of organizations with the intention of improving workplace practices to enhance 
production and give employers a competitive edge (Smith, 2006).   
Another condition that ushered in the use of PE programs was a conducive OHS 
regulatory climate.  In the late 1970s, in many western countries, state health and safety 
regulatory regimes moved to a model that relied less on externally monitoring workplaces 
to one that increasingly emphasized combining state inspection with an approach 
whereby managers and workers were responsible for monitoring health and safety 
conditions (Frick and Wren, 2000: 22-25).  A significant feature of the 1970s policy shift 
was that it provided workers an opportunity to participate in OHS decision-making, 
which previously was deemed to be management‘s prerogative and seldom considered 
subject to labour-management negotiation (Frick and Wren, 2000: 22-23; Smith, 2000; 
Storey and Tucker, 2006: 160-68; Tucker, 2007; Walters, 2006).     
1.3  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this dissertation, I examine participatory ergonomics with an interest in how 
organizational programs operate and are maintained.  As mentioned, a key concern in the 
dissertation is the micro-dynamics around organizational programs.  With this in mind, I 
address the following broad research questions in the dissertation:  What actions were 
undertaken by individuals to ensure the PE programs functioned and continued? How did 
the organizational, and societal contexts enable, or constrain the pursuit of PE program 
activities?  
1.4  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The dissertation relies on two complementary theoretical approaches that, in 
combination, allow for an examination of the micro-dynamics of organizational change 
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while attending to broader structural concerns.  Conceptual material from negotiated 
order theory is used to assist in understanding how the actions of individuals in work 
settings affected the interventions.  To complement this, I employ a critical theoretical 
approach to investigate the structural dimensions of the settings.  Below, I give a brief 
overview of the theories, while a more fully developed theoretical discussion is provided 
in Chapter Two.  
1.4.1  Negotiated Order and Critical Approaches 
For negotiated order theorists, order in an organization and the rules and 
regulations within it are created and maintained through the continual interaction of 
individuals.  According to Anselm Strauss (1993:87-90), ―social organization and order 
are inconceivable without some form of negotiation between individuals and groups.‖  
Social order is a continual process in which individuals and groups work at constructing 
and maintaining the necessary arrangements through which order is produced and 
reproduced.  These arrangements are required because social units, such as workplaces, 
consist of heterogeneous groups, each of which has their own interests and interpretations 
of social life, which may be discordant with others‘.   
Although highlighting the actions of individuals and groups, negotiated order 
researchers see these activities as fashioned within and influenced by local and broader 
conditions.  For example, according to negotiated order theorists, the creation and 
maintenance of arrangements among workers in a factory may be influenced both by that 
workplace‘s culture as well market conditions, which could strain or improve relations 
among actors.  To correctly understand the order in a setting, negotiated order considers 
the multiple levels of influence in which interactions are situated.   
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As plans that may go into an organizational change are rarely comprehensive, 
easily controvertible, and usually possess different meanings for different actors, 
negotiated order theory is particularly helpful for exploring the evolution of an 
organizational change program (Strauss, 1988: 164).  The perspective draws attention 
toward the activities that individuals need to undertake to ensure that program goals can 
be accomplished.  Additionally, it considers the role that context – both local and societal 
– might have as individuals attempt to carry out tasks.  Fundamentally, the unfolding of 
programs, or their ―trajectory‖ in Strauss‘ words, is processual and affected by individual 
and group interactions within a set of circumstances over which actors may have varying 
levels of control.  As Strauss (1993: 54) points out, ―phenomena do not just automatically 
unfold nor are they straightforwardly determined by social, economic, political, cultural, 
or other circumstances; rather, they are, in part, shaped by interactions of concerned 
actors.‖    
If one makes the assumption that organizational change is emergent and dynamic, 
as suggested at the chapter‘s outset, negotiated order theory is well suited to analysing 
change.  Because negotiated order foregrounds the interactions among individuals and 
groups in its conceptualizations of organizational life, it provides the conceptual tools to 
examine the activities, or in Garrety and Badham‘s (1999) words, the politics that 
surround the execution of an organizational change program.  Additionally, negotiated 
order theorists note that organizational programs often evolve and therefore should be 
examined processually, drawing links between responses to organizational conditions and 
outcomes of these responses.  Further, the negotiated order framework‘s attention to the 
multiple and divergent interests within an organization enables a view that captures 
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influences that may be facilitative or constraining.  Finally, by considering both the 
micro, organizational, and broader societal levels, a negotiated order approach keeps the 
analysis open to influence from multiple levels, not only micro or macro.   
Critical theory also offers important insights that inform the dissertation.  I use 
critical theory to locate the analysis in the political-economic conditions that might affect 
an OHS program in the workplace.  The critical paradigm has been used successfully to 
understand OHS conditions and their alteration.  As it applies to OHS, it predominantly 
considers the influence of structure and political-economic factors involved in the 
creation of hazards and how and if they are addressed.  Using the framework, I consider 
the important role that the profit motive may play in the realization of OHS intervention 
goals and health and safety generally (Grunberg, 1983; Littler and Salaman, 1984; 
Nichols, 1997).  The critical paradigm also presents a framework for understanding 
labour and management‘s asymmetrical access to resources that affect their power, and in 
turn, how differences in power affect the capacity of each party to alter the workplace.   
To some extent, managers need to attend to occupational health and safety to 
reproduce the conditions required to produce surplus value.  Conditions need to be at 
least tolerable to labour.  The degree to which labour will tolerate health and safety 
conditions may be affected by its strength.  For example, Grunberg (1986b) and Hall 
(1993) demonstrated that in situations in which labour was strong it was able to exert 
some control over health and safety conditions; whereas, Novek (1992) reported on a 
situation in which labour was weakened and therefore unable to forestall the deterioration 
of working conditions.   
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Attention to heath and safety is affected by attendant costs.  Generally, capital 
regards health and safety expenditures as a surplus value loss (Navarro, 1982; Schatzkin, 
1984) and accordingly may be reluctant to invest money to address health and safety 
hazards.  As a result of these cost-avoidance concerns in cases in which workers have 
sought to have a health hazard addressed, employers often have tended to select 
inexpensive options even if this means not achieving the best protection for workers.  In 
one example of this, Storey and Lewchuk (2000) describe an employer‘s decision to 
address poor air quality by providing paper masks rather than more effective, though 
more expensive, ventilation.    
The critical framework also enables a consideration of the fact that management 
may not want to cede its control of work processes.  Economic imperatives encourage 
managers to maintain (or increase) their control over employees and the labour process.  
Loosening control over employees or the labour process can negatively affect the 
gathering of surplus value (Braverman, 1974; Buroway, 1979; 1985).  As Walters (1985) 
points out, it is within the context of these structural constraints that management decides 
whether it is willing to invest in occupational health and safety and to what extent it is 
willing to do so.  The critical framework, as it applies to occupational health and safety, 
is helpful in its consideration of the influence of broad social and political factors and the 
relations between labour and management in the workplace.     
1.5  THE INTERVENTION SETTINGS AND PARTICIPATORY ERGONOMIC 
PROGRAM 
Pathways to selecting a research setting are numerous and vary considerably.  
Some researchers begin with particular settings in mind that would ideally suit their 
research questions.  I did not.  The beginnings of this project – the selection of the 
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settings and decision to investigate PE programs – were not part of a carefully planned, 
well-executed research design.  Rather, they were the product of a broad interest in the 
sociology of organizations and a set of fortuitous circumstances.   
Hired to work with a university-based, multidisciplinary research team as a 
research assistant, I was responsible for collecting and analyzing qualitative data relevant 
to the unfolding of the two PE interventions over time.  The research team consisted of 
ergonomists, epidemiologists and a sociologist with extensive experience in workplace 
interventions to address MSDs.  Prior to my hiring, the team had formed an agreement 
with a corporation, Courier Co.
3
, to implement and study a participatory ergonomic (PE) 
program in one of its facilities.  Some months later, and after I was hired, the research 
team arranged with a manufacturing company, Furniture Co., to commence and study a 
PE program in its factory.  Shortly after I was hired, I realized that my employment as an 
RA with the intervention project provided an opportunity to explore the functioning of an 
organizational change program.  My experience of site selection is by no means unusual; 
in fact, the alignment of a researcher‘s broad interest and sheer happenstance often are 
the source of an individual‘s decisions about what and where to study (Berg, 2009: 205; 
Ouellet, 1994:11-12).  I expand on my involvement in the settings in Chapter Three.  
Below, I provide a brief overview of the companies and their respective industry sectors. 
1.5.1  Parcels and Parts: Description of Settings   
One setting in which the PE program was set up, Courier Co., was owned by a 
large courier company, which had customers in Canada and the United States, employed 
more than 10,000 workers in approximately 100 facilities across Canada, and had a fleet 
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 Courier Co. and Furniture Co. are pseudonyms.   
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of more than 2000 delivery vehicles.  The facility where the intervention was 
implemented employed 150 people; of these, 135 were hourly workers.  The courier 
industry is labour intensive; its production processes are largely dependent upon manual 
labour rather than a reliance on complex technology.  Courier Co.‘s financial health was 
good at the time of the intervention and in the early 2000s, it expanded and built new 
facilities.  Competition in the transport industry is intense as courier companies, which 
offer customers ―overnight or later delivery‖
 4
 services to destinations inside and outside 
Canada, compete with rival companies which offer similar services; same-day couriers, 
which operate in a restricted geographical area, such as a city; and logistics companies, 
which specialize in transporting freight that is larger and in greater volumes than couriers 
would typically ship.  Companies compete based on the services they can provide to 
customers, most importantly the speed and reliability of delivery.  Accordingly, 
companies in this sector put a great deal of emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness 
of their operations.  In response to the time sensitivity of the courier industry, Courier Co. 
monitored the quality of its service daily and the timely pickup and delivery of parcels 
were continually stressed to employees by management.   
Furniture Co. manufactures components for office furniture and home appliances 
and had 300 employees, of which approximately 250 were hourly.  Part of a larger 
company that was established in the early 1900s, it has plants in Canada, the United 
States and Taiwan and is one of the largest manufacturers of its product globally.  The 
industry is capital intensive and relies heavily on technology in its production processes.  
                                                 
 
4
  Companies that offer overnight or later delivery service to a wide geographical area tend to be large firms 
that have at their disposal fleets of delivery vehicles.  Conversely, same-day couriers, also known as local 
messenger services, are typically small firms and often are independent. 
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The industry has become extremely competitive in the last several years as raw material 
costs increased, foreign competition grew, and some customers sought overseas suppliers 
that could make parts more cheaply.  In response, Furniture Co. restructured to offset 
these challenges and remain profitable.  The reconfiguration of its Canadian operations in 
2003 included amalgamating two plants and laying off workers.  Coming in several 
waves, these lay offs typically involved 20 to 40 employees and included both hourly and 
salaried personnel.  For some employees the lay offs were temporary; for others, they 
were permanent.  Late in the study, the plant renewed its lean production program in an 
effort to shed inventory and eliminate waste in the production process.  Additionally, the 
company attempted to become more specialized in the types of products it manufactured 
and focused on producing smaller volumes of higher-end parts.  
1.5.2  The PE Program Framework and Change Team Formation  
The interventions were the collaborative effort of the research team, management, 
and the union at each site.  In each setting, the interventions were initiated by 
management, who contacted the university research team with an interest in reducing 
MSD injuries in their facilities.  This initial contact was followed by preliminary 
discussions among management, union and the research team about the workplaces and 
types and frequency of injuries.  These informal discussions led to more formal 
negotiations, in which the research team presented a detailed description of the sorts of 
activities that a participatory ergonomic program would involve, discussed the costs that 
the company would incur in implementing the program, and stressed that management 
support was essential to the program for it to be a success.  The research team also 
discussed the methods that would be used in the program, most notably the creation of a 
participatory ergonomic change team (ECT), consisting of workers and manager 
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representatives.  Importantly, the managers from both settings agreed that an ECT would 
be the agent of ergonomic change in the facilities and have the time and resources it 
required to alter the work processes.  In each facility, the ECTs membership included 
hourly workers, management representatives, and an ergonomist-facilitator who was a 
member of the research team.  Composition of the teams was based on a ―representative 
participation‖ model of participatory ergonomics (PE) (Haines et al., 2002: 311-312), 
which means that members on the teams represented their work areas within the settings. 
Before each of the interventions began, the research team gave company 
representatives suggestions about the personnel who would be needed on the ergonomic 
change teams.  Two main considerations were identified: 1) bringing together participants 
with different knowledge and skills appropriate for making ergonomic changes such as 
hourly workers, management representatives and technical specialists such as health and 
safety, human resources, and skilled trades personnel (Haines et al., 2002; St. Vincent et 
al., 2006: Van Eerd et al., 2008); and 2) the notion of a ―representative participation,‖ 
model of participatory ergonomics (PE) (Haines et al., 2002: 311-312) wherein personnel 
on a change team represent their work areas and are directly involved in the change 
making process.   
Ultimately, determination of ECT composition was the responsibility of the 
workplace parties.  Recruitment procedures differed across the settings.  In Furniture Co., 
a primary criterion for membership on the ECT‘s was past or current experience on the 
plant Joint Health and Safety Committees (JHSCs).  In Courier Co., membership overlap 
between the JHSC and ergonomic change team was intentionally avoided as there was a 
general understanding in the depot that the JHSC was ineffective and thus, a desire to 
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avoid overlap in the composition of the ECT and JHSC.  In this workplace, management 
identified potential participants and asked if they wished to serve on the ECT.  The 
selection process resulted in each of the ECTs being composed of hourly workers, 
management representatives, and an ergonomist-facilitator, who was a member of the 
University Research Team.   
1.5.3  Ergonomics Training  
Once the ECTs were formed in each setting, activity commenced with a series of 
training sessions conducted by research team members.  These sessions, held for four 
hours a day, for four days, covered the principles of workplace ergonomics, basic 
anatomy as it related to work-related musculoskeletal injury, a model for systematically 
identifying and addressing risks of exposure, and tools for risk factor identification and 
measurement.   
During the training and throughout the interventions, the research team 
emphasized two principles.  One was that the sources of musculoskeletal injuries were 
located not in the behaviour of an employee but rather in the physical features and 
organization of workstations and the production process.  This principle corresponds to 
the idea that ergonomics is concerned with how work can be adapted to the employee 
rather than fitting the employee to his/her work.  Another principle that the research team 
emphasized was that there was a ―hierarchy of control strategies‖ to reduce risk of injury: 
some strategies that altered the physical work environment were more effective at 
reducing risk of exposure to injury than others.  According to ergonomists, the best way 
to reduce injury is to alter the physical work area through ―engineering controls,‖ in 
contrast to altering work methods by attempting to change employees‘ behaviours.  
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Accordingly, in their deliberations, the hierarchy of control strategies was influential in 
determining the types of hazards the ECTs‘ focused their attention on and the types of 
solutions they devised to address hazards.     
In the training sessions, workers and managers were also introduced to a model 
for guiding their ergonomic activities.  Referred to as the ―Blueprint‖ (Wells et al., 2001), 
it was developed on the basis of a review of ergonomics literature and the research team‘s 
previous experiences in implementing workplace ergonomic interventions.  The Blueprint 
specified stages in which opportunities for change were identified, solutions formulated, 
implemented and evaluated, and then modified on the basis of the evaluations.  Although 
there are variations in the content of models used in PE programs, such as the Blueprint, 
their use is widespread (Wilson et al., 2005: 939-941) and considered by some 
researchers as a crucial prerequisite to a successful PE program (Burgess-Limerick et al., 
2007; de Looze et al., 2001; St. Vincent et al., 2006; Wilson and Haines, 1997).   
The research team provided the ECT members with several tools for evaluating 
risks of musculoskeletal injuries.  These tools enabled ECT members to develop an 
understanding of workers‘ job tasks and any pain or injuries associated with these tasks.  
As an example, one tool was designed to gather workers‘ input by means of a short 
questionnaire, referred to as ―the one-minute survey.‖  The research team also instructed 
workers to use a tool designed to quantify risk of exposure to injury by calculating the 
biomechanical forces acting on employees‘ backs.  Together, these tools gave ECT 
members a sense of the workers‘ risks of exposure to injury and where the sources of 
these injuries were.  Having described the settings and the intervention framework, I now 
provide a preview of the dissertation‘s subsequent chapters.   
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1.6  THE CONCEPTS OF CHANGE MAKING AND CHANGE 
  The objective of the PE program was to address workplace health concerns by 
establishing an ECT that addressed MSDs.  In the dissertation, the term ―change making‖ 
refers to the process whereby members of the ECTs and those they enlisted for assistance 
formulated and implemented projects in an effort to reduce MSD hazards.  I examine two 
components of change making – solution design and implementation – and their 
constituent parts in depth in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, respectively.  Throughout 
the dissertation the term ―change‖ refers to alterations to the production process.  The 
production process involves both the job tasks and technology used in the manufacture of 
a good or provision of a service.  The changes to the production processes generally 
involved alteration of a facility‘s physical layout, modification or replacement of 
equipment or tools, amendments to the speed or pace of production, and introduction or 
removal of equipment to a work area.  Changes ranged from the simple to complex; from 
inexpensive to costly; from large to small.  Typically, the scope of any given change 
affected ten or fewer people in a work area.       
1.7  DISSERTATION OVERVIEW  
Chapter Two provides a more detailed review of the theories that inform the 
dissertation.  The chapter takes the negotiated order and critical theory perspectives in 
turn and reviews their assumptions and features that are germane to the dissertation‘s 
analysis.  It also explains how each perspective helps to comprehend the functioning of 
the OHS programs under examination here and how the perspectives complement each 
other.  The chapter concludes with a list of questions that the dissertation attempts to 
answer. 
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In Chapter Three, I discuss the methodology used in the dissertation, the data 
collection methods, and the analysis.  I describe the settings in detail, outline where and 
how field notes were recorded and what they contained, and talk about how interview 
data were gathered.  Additionally, the chapter recounts some of the challenges I 
encountered as I established my role as an observer and throughout the project‘s data-
gathering phases. 
The dissertation‘s analysis follows the course of ECT activities and as such begins 
with a consideration of the solution design stage.  Next the dissertation moves to the 
implementation of solutions and then on to sustaining the PE programs.  The focus on 
these stages of change largely results from the fact that this is where I came into the 
process after being hired as a research assistant.     
In Chapters Four through Seven, the findings are presented. The findings chapters 
focus on three aspects of the trajectory of the ECT‘s work: the development of designs 
for change, the implementation of changes, and the continuation of the OHS programs. 
Chapter Four focuses on the nature of and access to knowledge during the ECTs‘ 
development of solutions to address musculoskeletal hazards.  The chapter describes how 
the availability and selection of resources affected both the production of solutions to 
address MSDs and the process for developing them.  In Courier Co., the ECT was for the 
most part able to design workable solutions.  However, later in the intervention, the ECT 
worker representatives‘ opportunities to apply their ergonomic and experiential 
knowledge were constrained by management‘s unwillingness to relieve them from their 
regular job duties to participate in ECT activities.  In Furniture Co., solution development 
required technical expertise the ECT members did not initially have, limiting their 
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capacity to design solutions.  The ECT‘s solution design problems were improved by 
adding managerial personnel with technical expertise.  However, their participation and 
changes in the way solution design was carried out limited worker representatives‘ 
involvement.   
The analysis in Chapter Five considers how the organizational contexts shaped 
the ECTs‘ implementation activities.  Additionally, it examines the ECTs‘ undertakings 
to overcome obstacles and complete changes.  The chapter‘s findings examine how the 
uneven distribution of power within the workplace affected the ECTs‘ activities.  The 
findings also enhance our comprehension of the OHS programs‘ functioning because 
they draw attention to the negotiation that ECT members engaged in to implement 
changes.  The chapter highlights the fact that implementation – far from being a 
straightforward, linear, stepwise process – involved negotiation with key decision 
makers, which often derailed the process.  Problems securing authority to make changes 
added complexity and in some cases redundancy to the process and had the common 
effect in both settings of protracting the change process.  The chapter examines the 
responses of the ECTs to problems in implementing changes that arose out of their 
respective organizational contexts.  In each setting, the activities the ECTs undertook in 
response to their problems resembled ―articulation work‖ (Strauss, 1993) – the 
establishment and maintenance of arrangements to ensure goals were accomplished.   
The discussion in Chapter Six continues the examination of the process of 
implementing changes and turns attention to the division of labour on the teams.  It shows 
that the teams‘ implementation activities were unevenly distributed among members and 
typically ECT management representatives were responsible for carrying out the ECTs‘ 
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work.  To examine the distribution of tasks I draw on the concept of ―stance,‖ (Strauss, 
1993: 88), which is actors‘ perceptions of their capacity to negotiate arrangements with 
other actors.  In doing so the chapter examines how workplace norms, team members‘ 
past interactions with non-ECT members, and the history of relations between 
management and workers limited worker representatives‘ participation in implementation 
tasks.  The findings in Chapter Six advance our comprehension of how involvement 
within the PE programs was enacted.   
The participatory OHS interventions described here were designed to continue so 
that the risk of injury would be reduced over a longer period of time.  Chapter Seven 
indicates what happened in regard to the PE programs‘ sustainability over time and then 
explores the factors that either facilitated or constrained their continuation.   
Chapter Seven describes how management‘s shifting support affected the duration 
of the interventions.  The chapter examines some of the conditions both internal and 
external to the organization that affected management‘s support.  In particular, the 
chapter describes how management‘s perceptions of the ergonomic programs‘ 
effectiveness were in part related to the government‘s OHS regulatory system.  In 
addition, the chapter explores the ECTs‘ efforts to secure management‘s ongoing support 
for the programs.  Further, I explore how efforts to secure support were influenced by 
leadership, or the lack thereof, within the ECTs.  The findings in Chapter Seven tell us 
that continuation was affected by the economic imperatives that the companies‘ faced, by 
the regulatory and compensation system, and equally important, by how the ECTs‘ 
members attempted to push for the PE program‘s extension. 
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Chapter Eight closes the dissertation.  The first part of the chapter briefly restates 
the theoretical approach and recaps the central findings.  Next, the cross-case themes are 
discussed in relation to some of the literature and theoretical frameworks.  In particular I 
reflect on access to knowledge in solution development, authority and the process of 
implementing change sustainability, and participation.  These topics are covered as they 
figure into the narratives in each chapter and are helpful in understanding participatory 
workplace arrangements and comprehending how the organizational programs function 
in practice.  In discussing these topics, the section addresses larger questions about 
participatory OHS approaches and organizational change programs.   
Following the above, I discuss the outcomes of the PE programs and some of the 
challenges of evaluating these.  The chapter‘s penultimate section consists of a discussion 
of the dissertation‘s contributions to participatory ergonomics.  A large part of this 
discussion focuses on what practitioners may take away from the study‘s findings.  To 
conclude the chapter I briefly discuss some possible avenues of future research. 
This chapter has introduced the dissertation‘s focus, described the settings and 
type of organizational change programs that will be looked at, and offered an overview of 
the chapters that follow.  I now proceed to Chapter Two, in which I discuss the 
theoretical orientation in the dissertation.   
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CHAPTER TWO  
THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS  
2.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines two theoretical frameworks that are used in the dissertation 
to understand the functioning of the OHS interventions.  Negotiated order theory helps 
comprehend the agency of actors attempting to make changes and the processes that 
actually constitute change making.  Critical theory gives insights into the structural 
constraints on the introduction, maintenance and functioning of OHS programs, such as 
economic imperatives.  Together, the orientations let us see both the constraints and 
activities of those carrying out the OHS programs.   
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I briefly review the assumptions of 
negotiated order theory, an approach that considers both structure and agency, and how 
the theory might inform an investigation into workplace OHS interventions.  Next, I 
review the main elements of critical theory as it applies to analyses of occupational health 
and safety.  As I examine these theoretical approaches I discuss their relevance for 
examining organizational change programs specifically.   
2.1  NEGOTIATED ORDER THEORY 
Practice-based theories that consider the role of structure and agency are able to 
capture the reality of workplace interventions and, because they are attentive to change 
and activity, are particularly well-suited to guide the dissertation‘s examination of the 
acts of those engaged in OHS interventions.  In this section of the dissertation I focus on 
one of those theories: negotiated order.  
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Negotiated order theory emerged in the 1960s in part in reaction to the 
determinism of structural functionalist and critical theories.  Its origins lie in the symbolic 
interactionist tradition.  There are some central tenets that underpin interactionist 
thinking.  One set of premises that serve as a nice encapsulation of the interpretative 
orientation is provided by Prus (1996:15-18): (1) people communicate using symbols 
(e.g., language) and their shared understandings of these arise through social interaction; 
(2) individuals and groups may possess multiple perspectives; (3) people have the 
capacity to consider the others‘ point of view of them; (4) people engage in activities; (5) 
people have the capacity to influence and oppose the influences of others; (6) people 
develop ties and associations with others based in part on shared interests, and, (7) social 
life is ongoing and is not static.   
Anselm Strauss (1963) and colleagues were the first to use the phrase ―negotiated 
order.‖  Strauss (1978; 1993), Fine (1996), and Maines (1982) can be counted as 
proponents of the theory.  Studies employing the negotiated order framework have been 
carried out in a variety of organizational settings, including restaurants, television 
networks, hospitals, schools, and prisons.   
At the heart of the negotiated order framework is, ―an understanding that social 
organization and order are inconceivable without some form of negotiation between 
individuals and groups‖ (Strauss, 1993: 46).  For negotiated order theorists, structure 
does not exist objectively.  Instead, negotiated order theory suggests that actors 
perpetually enact and re-enact organizational structures.
5
 In his comparison with other 
                                                 
 
5
 I am referring to organizational structure here. 
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perspectives on organizations, Reed (1992: 120) points out, negotiated order theorists 
view  
organizations as much more precarious and fragile collections of 
negotiated agreements and arrangements that are always open to 
renegotiation and reconstruction. It presumes that structure is 
something that has to be continually worked at and reproduced 
through social interaction rather than treating it as a transcendent 
object or entity imposed on social actors by the environmental 
imperatives they face. 
2.1.1  Organizations and Structure
6
  
The negotiated order framework rejects the notion that organizations or the 
environments in which organizations are embedded determine actors‘ behaviours.  In 
negotiated order theory, actors play a key role in ―shaping and reshaping organizational 
arrangements‖ (Reed, 1992: 86).  How individuals act, according to negotiated order 
theorists, is less a product of organizational and social structure than it is of individuals‘ 
interpretations of their circumstances (Fine, 1984: 243).  The assumption that individuals‘ 
interpretations are at the centre of activity means that multiple avenues of action are 
possible and that structural configurations do not, ―automatically direct or lead the actor 
to one course of action‖ (Altheide, 1988: 343). 
The negotiated order framework suggests that structure exists insofar as 
interaction among organizational actors gives rise to it and maintains it.  In this way, 
organizations and their structures ―are historically and temporally embedded and they 
will be reviewed, re-evaluated, revised, revoked or renewed over time‖ (Reed, 1992: 85).  
                                                 
 
6
 Maines (1982) and Strauss (1978: 98-99) distinguish among negotiative (or immediate) contexts, 
organizational context and structural context.  I use terms organizational structure and social structure to 
differentiate between local and broader social constraints.    
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Rather than treat key features of organization – such as goals, 
structures, technologies, socialization mechanisms and control 
systems – as supra-individual or collective forces which impose 
themselves on social actors, the negotiated order framework is 
based on the belief that these factors only take on meaning and 
significance in so far as they are recognized and utilized by actors 
in the source of their negotiating activities (Reed, 1992: 85). 
Although the negotiated order perspective stresses actors‘ abilities to reflect on 
their circumstances and make changes accordingly, it considers these actors embedded in 
both organizational and social structure, which they may have limited ability to control.  
The significance that negotiated order theorists place on individuals‘ perspectives of the 
surrounding conditions does not mean that they dismiss structural influences, 
organizational rules, regulations, and so forth.  According to Strauss (1993: 42), 
negotiated order theory rejects both conceptions of human behaviour in which structure is 
deterministic and conceptions in which structure has no influence on behaviour.  While 
structure is fluid in the sense it can be revised, it remains influential on peoples‘ 
activities.  Rules, regulations, division of labour, and hierarchies can exert constraint over 
activities, but ultimately, for negotiated order theorists, they are alterable and are not 
objective in the sense they are ―structural givens which determine action processes‖ 
(Reed, 1992: 86). 
Negotiation, according to the negotiated order framework, is influenced by 
multiple contexts, including the immediate circumstances and broader social structures.  
As Fine (1996: 3) points out, ―Specific negotiations are contingent on the structure of the 
organization and the field in which the organization operates.  Negotiations follow lines 
of power and communication and are patterned and non-random.‖  For example, in a 
manufacturing setting, the local context might include the fact that there are scarce 
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resources, which affects managerial negotiations to invest in new machinery.  The 
broader context may be the economic conditions, which in a recession may create a 
dearth of company resources.  Moreover, Hall and Spencer-Hall (1982: 346) note that 
organizational features such as the distribution of power, the size of an organization and 
the degree to which power is centralized affect the degree of negotiation and that these 
―delimit the negotiative context and the consequent form of negotiation.‖   
There is little disagreement among key negotiated order theorists about the fact 
that structure should be taken into account.  Fine (1984: 241) is unequivocal about this 
point, noting, ―Despite the way in which the negotiated order approach has been 
caricatured … its advocates do not claim that structures do not exist or affect other 
relationships, nor do these theorists believe that formal rules make no difference.‖ Strauss 
suggested that the relationship between structure and agency was not to be denied and 
connections were to be made between macro and micro levels of analysis.
7
    
2.1.2  Power 
While negotiated order theory emphasizes actors‘ abilities to influence order, the 
theory also recognizes the significance of power in constraining actors‘ agency.  Reed 
(1992: 90) notes that for the negotiated order perspective the importance of power is 
linked to the fact that actors have divergent interests; within organizations, these different 
interests are connected to different intentions, which need to be worked out through 
negotiation among actors.  As Reed (1992: 87-88) points out, in negotiated order theory, 
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 As Strauss (1993: 42) explains, ―there is no great strain between recognizing constraints on action while 
also emphasizing that actions cannot possibly be completely determined by economic, cultural, biological, 
ideological, political, etc., conditions.‖  …..―be both structural and processual in their explanations‖  which 
Strauss points out is captured in the notion of ‗structural process‘, first used by Glaser and Strauss (1968: 
239-42).     
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―Power is approached as a capacity to control the course of events and the actions of 
participants so that the negotiation process reflects the preferred outcomes of certain 
individuals and groups over others.‖  Power, for negotiated order theorists, is historically 
and situationally rooted, or in other words ―contingent upon the conditions prevailing 
within an organizational setting over a particular period of time‖ (Reed, 1992: 88).   
The angle that negotiated order theorists take on power suggests that its 
distribution may change over time.  As conditions change internally or externally to an 
organization, opportunities may arise for those with less power to gain more.  Negotiated 
order‘s take on power also suggests that although differences in power are an important 
shaper of negotiative processes, the sources of power are not limited to those who are 
formally recognized as having it, such as managers and professionals in work settings.   
2.1.3  Social Worlds  
As a means of talking about different groups that inhabit settings, negotiated order 
theorists talk about ―social worlds.‖ According to Garrety and Badham (1999: 280),  
Social worlds are self-organizing units that share resources, 
information, assumptions about what is important, and about what 
sorts of activities are desirable and worthwhile.  They consist of 
things as well as people – documents, buildings, and 
configurations of technology that facilitate work and 
communication within worlds. Although many worlds coincide 
with formal work structures (factories, laboratories, committees, 
departments) many do not.   
Strauss notes that an organization may be constituted of a web of multiple sub-
worlds (Strauss, 1993: 209-221).  The notion of social worlds reflects the fact that there 
are multiple groups with potentially different perspectives on a situation.  They subscribe 
to different values and beliefs and these different perspectives shape how they act in 
regard to other social worlds (See Star, 1991).    
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2.1.4  Examining the Concept of Work and its Reliance on Interaction  
Throughout the dissertation I rely on Strauss‘ conception of work to describe the 
activities of those attempting to alter the workplace.  Strauss‘ (1993) use of the term work 
is not limited to paid employment.  He applies the term to a broader range of activities.  
For him, work may involve both activities that one does which are associated with jobs 
but also those associated with recreational pursuits, such as hobbies or sports.  In this 
study, the concept of work can be applied to the activities that the ECTs undertook to 
carry out changes in their workplaces.  Importantly, Strauss‘ (1993: 52) conception of 
work focuses on interaction.  By this he means that work is accomplished through a set of 
―coordinated collective acts.‖  The coordination of separate acts is dependent upon 
securing agreements among different groups and individuals.  Additionally, Strauss‘ 
conception of work focuses analytical attention on the practices of work.  Given that one 
of the central questions motivating the dissertation is, ―how do those involved in OHS 
programs work to achieve their goals,‖ of particular importance is a conceptual frame for 
how actors make changes.   
The focus on how work is carried out leads us to consider interactions among 
participants and suggests examining the sorts of agreements actors are making and the 
conditions that affect these agreements.  These interactions are necessary in any instance 
in which a goal is to be accomplished.  According to Strauss (1993: 40-41), ―The 
multitude of sequential actions involved in any interactional course requires a constant 
aligning (lining up) or articulation of these actions.‖  Strauss (1988: 43) highlights that 
even for seemingly simple activities the alignment work that goes into its 
accomplishment can be complex:  
 32 
The necessity for this [alignment work] can be seen, for instance, 
even during simple projects such as two couples deciding to meet 
for dinner at a restaurant. What day? What hour? Where? Not 
there, it‘s too far or too expensive or too formal, so why not at 
another place? A complex project like the ascent of Mount 
Everest by a team involves thousands of acts that need to be 
articulated in order to carry it off.  
Negotiated order theorists stress the linkages among those in a setting that are 
required to accomplish work.  Work is not merely the immediate act or task but the 
procession of activities leading up to the task and even a consideration of those tasks that 
follow.  In this regard, work is about making necessary linkages with individuals or 
groups to accomplish a task.  Strauss (1988: 45) points out,  
The accomplishing of tasks requires the alignment of workers‘ 
actions: that is, the process by which workers fit together their 
respective work–related actions…Even when a task is carried out 
by a single worker, it usually involves some interactions before 
and after to articulate it with the other specific tasks on which it 
depends or which depend on it.   
Strauss‘ conception of work as constituted by several activities has particular 
relevance to the analysis presented here.  According to Strauss (1993), carrying out work 
may involve the following: (1) articulation, (2) arrangements, (3) stance, and (4) working 
it out.  The first element, articulation, refers to the coordination of lines of work (Strauss, 
1993: 87) and entails creating and maintaining linkages between units and departments 
that enable work to take place.  If actors have not been successful at aligning various 
steps in an interdependent chain then goal achievement is impracticable, if not 
impossible.   
The amount of articulation work may contract and expand over time, depending 
on the arrangements that actors in the setting have created and whether (and the degree to 
which) actors have been successful in maintaining these.  As Strauss et al., (1985: 267) 
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point out, in some cases there is extensive time and energy that goes into securing 
arrangements among individuals and groups; in other instances expenditures are minimal:   
The most complicated unquestionably takes place when the 
representatives of multiple worlds and organizations are 
intersecting, for then at first nothing is routinized and virtually 
everything must be ―worked out‖ later to be reassessed, 
reordered, in a word, reworked. Since those complex intersections 
are likely to lead to further segmentation within the organizations 
and social worlds of the respective participants, the negotiative 
work spawns further negotiations.  
The work of negotiating and arrangement making is not over once articulation is 
secured.  Articulation is dependent upon the maintenance of arrangements.  If these are 
altered by participating parties, for instance because conditions outside an organization 
force them to, then actors must endeavour to articulate lines of work again.  Indeed, over 
time aligned lines of action may be ―disarticulated‖ (Strauss et al., 1985:163-82) or break 
down if those in the setting fail to fulfill a bargain they have brokered with others.  In 
response, actors may attempt to ―rearticulate‖ lines of action to ensure that work can be 
successfully accomplished.  
The second element that may be looked at when examining the performance of 
work are arrangements, which are the agreements among actors concerning who is 
responsible to do what and the manner in which those responsibilities are to be fulfilled.  
These arrangements concern the scheduling of tasks, recompense and the standards which 
actors need to meet while completing tasks (Strauss, 1993: 87).  Settlement of these 
understandings is necessary for a task‘s successful completion.   
Arrangement making, according to Strauss (1993: 89), is partly influenced by a 
setting‘s history:   
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Each arrangement making process is built also upon history, 
including personal histories, and the history of the organization, 
the interactions within and between departments, the power 
distribution within the organization, and the past experiences with 
both the current arrangements and similar ones.  
Additionally, arrangement making is conditioned by an organization‘s environment, 
which is constituted by other organizations.  In the case of a business, for example, its 
environment may be made up of competing businesses, parent companies, subsidiaries, 
suppliers, and regulatory bodies. 
The third element that warrants consideration in examinations of aligning work 
tasks is an actor‘s stance.  Stance, according to Strauss (1993:88), refers to the ―position 
taken by each participant toward both the working-out process and the work itself.‖  The 
importance of stance is its attention to the ―perceived power‖ of those attempting to make 
arrangements ―for gaining control over the broader structural and organizational 
conditions upon which the arrangements stand‖ (Strauss, 1993: 88).  In other words, 
stance is partly based upon actors‘ expectations of what the outcomes of their attempts at 
negotiating agreements will be.  The more control actors have over the structural and 
organizational conditions, the better positioned they may be to create arrangements that 
are in their interest (Corbin and Strauss, 1993).   
An actor‘s stance is also affected by her/his biography, or the collection of 
personal experiences, which may be relevant to the work at hand, and/or other 
experiences that have little relation to the current work.  It may also be related to her/his 
understanding of the work, and past interactions with those in the setting (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1993).  Further, arrangement making is also affected by the history ―of 
interactions within and between departments, of power distribution within the 
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organization, and past experiences with both the current arrangement and similar ones‖ 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1993:72; see also Prus, 1999). 
The fourth element involved in carrying out work is what Strauss (1993) refers to 
as ―working things out‖ or the collection of ―interactional strategies‖ and counter 
strategies that actors use in their attempts to make and maintain linkages that will enable 
the execution of work (Corbin and Strauss, 1993: 74).  Interactional strategies vary 
considerably and they may include such actions as manipulation, persuasion, coercion or 
various combinations of these.   
Interactional processes include persuading others (such as the 
company president), teaching relevant others about the value or 
feasibility of the project, or negotiating some exchange that will 
make the project seem worthwhile to them. At least two other 
interactional processes may be involved, even at this early phase.  
The first is manipulation (such as not revealing anything about the 
goal or plan); the second is coercion or the threat of coercion.  
These interactional processes are essential to articulating people‘s 
work and getting work done despite the inevitable impediments to 
the workflow, even when major disturbances arise (Strauss, 
1988:166). 
Understanding arrangements and articulation work are central to comprehending 
the accomplishment of work.  Corbin and Strauss (1993: 74) provide the activities of a 
nursing staff as an example of the centrality of arranging and articulating in work:    
The work that a nursing staff must do in hospitals requires 
coordinated and cooperative arrangements with physicians and 
other departments (engineering, surgery, central supply, X-ray, 
and other labs). Without arrangements the nursing staff would 
have no way of ensuring that treatment plans were available and 
up- to-date, medications would not be on the unit when needed, 
and that patients would be fed and could be operated on, rooms 
kept clean, sufficient manpower and supplies would be on hand 
and that equipment was kept in working order. 
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Strauss (1988; 1993) points out that disruptions or contingencies are always 
possible in the accomplishment of work and they may nullify or alter agreements to the 
extent that articulation is not possible.  In the case of participatory ergonomics, 
contingencies, depending on their severity, may hinder or completely disrupt a project 
from being completed or workflow from proceeding.  As Strauss (1993) points out, some 
contingencies are routine and easily handled by actors but others are non-routine and 
pose significant threats to work and maintenance of alignment.  The latter may therefore 
cause actors to rearrange how work is carried out and re-establish arrangements so that 
articulation is once again possible.  
2.1.5  Studies Employing a Negotiated Order Framework.  
A number of studies have employed negotiated order theory to explore work 
practices.  Investigating the work of scientists in a cancer research laboratory, Fujimura 
(1987) focuses on how scientists attempt to maintain continual research output by 
aligning their experiments with multiple social worlds, including granting agencies, the 
scientific community, and the university which hosts their laboratories.  Failure to do the 
articulation work necessary to line up these different social worlds behind research 
endeavours means a potential disruption in the funding that is integral to achieving 
research goals.  
In a different setting, Allen (1997) and Svensson‘s (1996) studies of hospital 
order examined the negotiations between nurses and doctors.  Allen (1997) and Svensson 
(1996) found that though doctors had authority over much of the work that went on 
within the hospital units, the nurses were able to assert control over their own work and 
to a certain degree over the doctors‘ work.      
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Garrety and Badham (1999) examined how a group of employees attempted to 
develop a computerized manufacturing process.  In their analysis, the researchers draw on 
Strauss‘ (1993) notions of social worlds, trajectory, and Star and Griesemer‘s (1991) 
notion of ―boundary work.‖  In this case, Garrety and Badham were concerned with the 
relations among divergent parties as one group attempted to include human factors 
principles into the technology‘s design.    
Greenberg et al.‘s (2005) study drew on negotiated order to examine activities 
undertaken by employees to side-step management control in a television broadcasting 
facility.  The actors used inaction as a means of resisting managers‘ control over the 
content of what a television station could broadcast.  
Fine (1996) applies a negotiated order approach to restaurant work.  Fine‘s 
research is particularly significant in the context of the present research because, like the 
work presented here he ably draws links between the everyday work of kitchen staff and 
the local and broader economic circumstances in which restaurants are located.  
2.1.6  Utility of the Negotiated Order Approach for Studying OHS Programs 
The negotiated order approach has great utility for explaining the activities 
involved in OHS programs.  The functioning of OHS programs is not solely the product 
of a program‘s inherent properties.  The negotiated order perspective would suggest that 
it is actors‘ agency as well as how the structures in the setting are maintained that shape 
the functioning of an OHS program.   
OHS programs are embedded in work organizations, which are in turn located in 
the capitalist mode of production and characterized by differential access to resources, 
including time, and power, sets of rules and regulations, labour process and production 
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pressures.  These contexts may shape the actions of those associated with the programs 
but do not determine their behaviour.  The consciousness of actors, their agency and their 
ability to respond to the features of the settings play an important role in explaining the 
program‘s operation and its continuation.  According to the negotiated order framework, 
those in the setting can create and recreate critical arrangements, which need to be intact 
to meet program objectives.   
2.2  CRITICAL THEORY 
The critical paradigm has its origins in the writings of Karl Marx (1867 [1976]) 
and, when applied to work settings, theorizes that workplace conditions are the product of 
relations between labour and capital.  Central to the critical paradigm is a concern with 
employers‘ control over the means of production, or the raw materials, as well as 
technology, capital investments, and labour power
8
, that is employees‘ capacity to work, 
used in the production process.  Sociologists using a critical framework suggest that 
labour and employers‘ interests are incompatible or at least in conflict and that the 
organization of work is contested (Buroway, 1979; Edwards, 1979).   
A central concept in understanding the organization of work is the social relations 
of production; that is, the formal and informal relationships that emerge from ownership 
over the means of production.  Ultimately, because of employers‘ ownership over the 
means of production the form the relations of production take is that workers are 
accountable to and directed by management and the latter has final say in decisions 
concerning the work processes and workplace conditions.  However, the relations of 
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 Marx differentiates between labour, the people doing the work, and labour power, employees‘ potential 
capacity to carry out work.  Struggles over control of the workplace, workers, and the production process 
are often about management‘s attempts to ensure they are getting the most labour power from employees.  
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production take on a slightly different form in every workplace.  The particular form the 
relations of production take are partly a product of the distribution of power, which is 
conditioned by labour and managers‘ access to resources.  When workers are in a 
relatively powerful position they are more likely to call for better work conditions, 
whereas in a weakened position to demand, they are less apt to call for better conditions.   
Investigations into occupational health and safety that use a critical framework are 
concerned with the generation and prevention of workers‘ exposures to risk of illness and 
injury, such as musculoskeletal disorders, and how these are affected by relations 
between labour and capital.  In particular, researchers using a critical framework consider 
the relationship between injury and the control employees have over work organization 
and conditions.  Few comprehensive theoretical articulations of occupational health and 
safety using a critical theory exist.  Some examples of the use of the theory include 
research by Theo Nichols (1997; 1999), Eric Tucker (1992; 2003) and Vivienne Walters 
(1983; 1985).  I unpack the assumptions that underpin a critical theory of occupational 
health and safety in greater detail below.   
2.2.1  Worker Health and the Labour Process  
The critical paradigm considers work organizations as embedded in larger social 
structures.  Reed (1992: 94) points out that in the critical paradigm, organizations are 
formed and maintained by dominant power holders in capitalist economies. ―The 
structural arrangements and managerial practices typical of formal or complex 
organizations are determined by these wider configurations of domination; the latter also 
control the extent to which organizations reproduce the ideological and political 
constraints in which they are embedded‖ (Reed, 1992: 93).   
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For critical theorists, formal organizations are a means by which dominant classes 
establish, defend, and replicate class relations (Reed, 1992: 95).  The relations of power 
are contested though, and thus while organizations are places of reproduction they are 
also sites of struggle where capital attempts to ensure its power is maintained and labour 
attempts to alter the conditions under which capital accumulation occurs.  Given these 
struggles for control, Reed (1992: 121) points out that, ―Of considerable importance for 
the critical paradigm are ‗the mechanisms of control‘ that are necessary to regulate 
endemic conflicts of interest and value between contending groups.‖   
 It is within this context that health and safety issues are dealt with.  The drive to 
maintain and increase capital accumulation affects the extent to which health is taken into 
consideration and how it is addressed.  Typically, employers must continually increase 
capital accumulation to remain competitive in the capitalist mode of production (Littler 
and Salaman, 1984: 29-35; Nichols, 1997: 98-99).  Generally, the process of altering 
work organization begins as alternatives to existing means of production emerge.  Labour 
process transformation may come in a variety of forms including alteration of a 
managerial style or production equipment (Nichols, 1997: 99).  An example of the 
adoption of a new managerial style is the utilization of post-Fordist techniques in the 
1980s and 1990s by employers.  One such technique is lean manufacturing, which 
emphasizes standardization, efficiency, and management‘s strict control over quality.  In 
many recent instances, the outcomes of adoption of post-Fordist techniques have been 
increased control over quality and quantity of production and in general the 
intensification of work (e.g., Landsbergis, 2003).  One way employers achieve this is by 
altering the labour process, or the way workers‘ labour power and machinery are used in 
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the transformation of raw materials into commodities (e.g., Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 
1979; Edwards, 1979; Marx, 1867/1976; Nichols, 1997).      
2.2.2  Contradictions of Capital Accumulation  
Occupational health and safety in the capitalist mode of production is, in part, the 
product of contradictions produced in the labour process.  On the one hand, to remain 
profitable, employers attempt to maximize employees‘ labour power, or their capacity to 
work, and restrict investment in workers‘ welfare, including investment in health and 
safety.  On the other hand, employers and managers need to provide conditions for the 
reproduction of labour power.  Employers‘ provision of these conditions may diminish 
capital accumulation. 
A critical framework suggests that employers cannot completely disregard worker 
health, as they need to ensure the conditions of production are reproduced.  The 
production process depends upon obtaining the consent of able-bodied workers to 
exchange their labour power for a wage.  Once employers negate worker health to the 
extent that workers‘ capacity to labour is diminished, production and capital 
accumulation may be hindered.  In this way, alterations to the labour process that create 
unacceptable levels of illness and injury among workers may actually conflict with 
capital accumulation (Grunberg, 1983; Hall, 1993; Navarro, 1982; Novek, 1992; Walters, 
1983; 1985).  This helps to explain why management would be willing to alter the work 
conditions and incur costs in an effort to prevent worker injury.  Walters (1985: 413-414) 
describes how injurious work can potentially reduce workers‘ labour power:  
In order for capital accumulation to occur labour power must be 
renewed or reduced, for it is the sale of workers‘ labour power 
that makes possible the appropriation of surplus value.  One 
aspect of the reproduction of labour power is the physical 
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maintenance of workers and this will include the physical health 
of labour force… To the extent that the labour process created 
illness and injury it destroys the physical health of workers and is 
therefore destructive of labour power.  In this sense there is a 
contradiction between the requirement of capital accumulation – 
which leads to a primary emphasis on the profitability of new 
technologies and materials – and the requirement of reproduction 
of labour power.   
As injuries and illness increase, workers‘ labour power, or their capacity to work, 
(i.e., to create surplus value) is reduced.  This inverse relationship may reduce employers‘ 
ability to extract surplus value and subsequently, accumulate capital.  In this way, 
employers‘ attempts to maximize workers‘ labour power to accumulate capital conflicts 
with their need to maintain a relatively healthy workforce.  Maintenance of worker health 
may be especially salient in situations where workers are highly skilled and are difficult 
to replace and/or during labour shortages.  To maintain a minimal level of health for 
workers, employers must invest to a degree in health and safety (Walters, 1985: 58).  This 
investment may take the form of creating return to work programs, training workers in 
health and safety, hiring health and safety personnel and providing rehabilitation for 
injured workers.  
The second aspect of the reproduction of labour power is that employers must 
create and maintain the ―relations of consent‖ (Burawoy, 1979:15-16; Edwards, 1979; 
Edwards, 1986; Hall, 1993; Littler and Salaman, 1984).  In order for workers to exchange 
their labour, they must be relatively satisfied with, or at least, consent to the conditions 
the employer provides.  In part, the relations of consent are contingent upon the provision 
of a satisfactory level of health.  Unhealthy working conditions potentially create discord 
between workers and management, which jeopardize the consent required for labour 
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power to be transformed into labour and, in turn, into surplus value (Eakin and 
MacEachen, 1998; Hall, 1993; Walters, 1985).  
The establishment of a ―satisfactory‖ level of health is best conceptualized as the 
product of negotiation or contestation between labour and employer.  One important 
result of these negotiations concerns the attention or investment in health, which is part of 
what Novek (19) refers to as the ―wage/effort/ health bargain.‖ The wage/effort/health 
bargain is a tentative agreement between labour and management about how much wage 
a worker receives for a specified amount of work and the working conditions, including 
the health conditions, that the work is to be carried out under.  The health conditions and 
how these may be altered if deemed unacceptable to one of the parties is an outcome of 
the ongoing negotiations between workers and managers and may be altered as the labour 
process is changed or as the power of capital and labour shifts.  The health bargain that is 
arranged between workers and employers is, to an extent, open to ―negotiation… and 
should reflect the balance of power in the workplace between management and labour‖ 
(Novek, 1992: 19).  Therefore, if workers‘ bargaining position is weak, and they have 
little leverage to contest the state of health conditions, they may tolerate the conditions 
under which labour power is exchanged even though they became unhealthy.  
Conversely, if workers are in a relatively powerful position vis-à-vis an employer, they 
can demand better working conditions (Grunberg, 1983; Navarro, 1982; Nichols, 1997; 
Storey and Lewchuk, 2000).  Grunberg (1983: 623) aptly captures the negotiation 
concerning health and safety in a manufacturing setting:  
…the actual effort [intensity of labor] expended will be 
determined by the extent to which workers can encroach upon and 
limit the prerogatives and power of capital to determine the social 
conditions of production. In concrete terms the struggle will 
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revolve around the degree to which management can 
independently decide upon manning levels, the speed of the line, 
noise and heat levels, the length of rest breaks, the allocation of 
tasks and the movement of workers across tasks, and on the 
freedom management has to discipline and fire workers. 
It should also be noted that employers can draw on a variety of means by which to 
satisfy calls to address health and safety concerns and minimize their investment in health 
and safety.  One way of keeping health and safety costs down is to adopt low-cost 
protections, such as personal protective equipment, rather than altering the technology 
used in production, which usually is much more expensive to do.   Employers have also 
attempted to minimize investment in health and safety by staunchly resisting attempts by 
workers to broaden the definition of what can be considered a risk or what ailments can 
be considered work-related (Harrison, 1995; MacEachen, 2003; Morello-Frosch, 1997; 
Walters, et al., 1995).  The maintenance of narrow definitions of health risks serves 
employers‘ interests by reducing the scope of issues they must address in the course of 
―protecting‖ workers‘ health, thus protecting the generation of capital. 
2.2.3  Studies Employing Critical Theory  
Novek‘s (1992) comparative case study of labour process transformation in two 
meat-processing plants provides a good example of an application of a critical framework 
to the analysis of workplace injuries.  In one plant, a new system of production enabled 
management to increase the speed at which animals were killed and processed, and 
thereby exacerbated the intensity and repetitiveness of the already onerous physical 
labour workers did.  As a result of the intensification of work, employees were at a 
greater risk of lacerations and muscle strains (Novek, 1992: 27).  In the labour process 
transformation, employees‘ work was altered in two significant ways.  First, workers‘ 
jobs that originally involved performing numerous varied tasks became specialized so 
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that workers did only a limited number of tasks but did these repeatedly.  Second, under 
the new system of production, employers introduced conveyance machinery, the speed of 
which was regulated by management, and as a result workers lost much of the control 
over the pace of their work and the speed at which workers performed their tasks 
increased markedly.  Novek (29) notes that changes in the injury rate in one workplace 
that experienced transformation of the labour process were commensurate with the 
increase in output: 
The number of lost time accidents at the plant was 25.8 per 100 
production workers in 1983 and 26.7 in 1984. In 1985 with the 
intensification of production well underway the rate rose 
dramatically to 39.4 per 100 production workers, almost 40 
percent of the bargaining unit.     
Storey and Lewchuk (2000) provide support for the notion that, in attempting to 
minimize OHS investment, employers may invest in cheaper and less effective 
safeguards.  In their case study of worker health in a manufacturing plant, Storey and 
Lewchuk (2000: 117-121) found the employer provided only protective clothing in 
reaction to high levels of carcinogenic dust in employees‘ work environment, instead of 
installing expensive, but more effective, ventilation equipment.  Moreover, workers were 
provided personal protective equipment only after a bitter round of collective bargaining.     
Hall‘s (1993) study in the mining industry provides examples of how workers 
may resist deleterious work conditions.  In his case study, management implemented new 
production processes characterized in particular by new technologies to increase the 
production rate.  One outcome of these changes was increased injury and illness rates.  
Hall‘s (1993) study shows that increased mechanization in an underground mine setting 
increased the rate of injuries, in part because workers sacrificed their control over their 
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work and the informal safety practices they had developed to protect themselves from 
injury.  Workers‘ loss of control over safety led to animosity between union and 
management.  Hall (1993: 14-15) points out that restructuring the labour process also 
altered the relations workers had with supervisors, which was one of the primary ways 
health and safety concerns had previously been handled:  
…[D]ue to labour process changes, mine supervisors could no 
longer handle resistance. While conflict had largely been 
mediated and addressed in conventional relations among miners 
and between miners and their ―foreman,‖ the shift in control and 
planning to management, the creation of machine operators‘ jobs 
….shifted the locus of potential conflict and the means of 
resolution…. (see also 12-14; 15-16).  
2.2.4  Utility of Critical Theory for Studying OHS Programs 
The critical framework highlights the significance to working conditions of 
labour-management relations and economic imperatives, including investments in 
occupational health and safety.  Following from the above discussed broad features of the 
critical perspective, we can identify some specific contributions to the analysis of OHS in 
particular.  First, it recognizes structure as important in explaining OHS decision-making 
and in particular, it considers the effects that the social relations of production and 
economic imperatives may have on OHS interventions.  Second, it draws out the 
important role that power plays in the workplace and how it may influence interventions.  
In the workplace, power is unevenly distributed, such that workers typically will be 
unable to push their agenda the way others who are in positions of power may.  It embeds 
workplace activities in the capitalist mode of production and economic imperatives, 
which have an important bearing on managers‘ orientations toward health and safety.  
Significantly, it considers the effects that employers‘ and managers‘ attempts to maintain 
and/or increase production may have on occupational health and safety and OHS 
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interventions.  In so doing, a critical paradigm points to health and safety‘s precarious, 
and often subordinate, position relative to economic imperatives.  Third, it recognizes 
that work processes can have negative impacts on worker health and that managers need 
to address these so the conditions required for capital accumulation remain intact.  
Fourth, health hazards are socially constructed and, as such, their presence, severity, and 
how they are addressed, are a product of negotiation, and often contestation, between 
labour and management.  Therefore, this opens the possibility that management may 
contest an injury or illnesses‘ work relatedness.   
2.3  CONCEPTION OF MANAGERS IN CRITICAL THEORY 
While research on OHS from a critical perspective has done a good job in 
exploring occupational health and safety, a feature of this work is that it has failed to 
fully explore the concept of management and how divisions and in some cases conflicts 
between managerial roles may affect OHS.  In the literature on OHS that employs a 
critical framework there are few examples where researchers go beyond the dichotomous 
representation of management and labour and the class roles they fill.  Several 
researchers have noted that the critical framework often glosses over important aspects of 
management and managerial activity.  As Reed (1989: 10) notes, ―The dominant 
economic imperative that management have to realise is the need to achieve a sufficient 
degree of control over the production process necessary to secure the efficient extraction 
of surplus value and corresponding levels of profitability that it guarantees.‖  However, 
how management carries out these activities, and even whether it carries them out, may 
be more complex than is reflected in some variants of the critical paradigm.    
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One of the elements of managerial activity that researchers have discussed is the 
degree to which management acts to implement and sustain economic imperatives that 
are crucial to capital accumulation.  Within this dialogue around managers and their 
activities there is a discussion of the various, and sometimes conflicting, influences on 
their behaviour.  For instance, Whittington (1992) notes that there may be multiple 
influences on management, some of which may impinge upon how mechanisms of 
control that are so essential to capital accumulation are put into practice.   
Reed (1989: 125-129) notes that some managers may share some of the same 
concerns that labour does in terms of fending off work intensification and may act to 
protect both their status within an organization and their work involvement.  Managers 
may resist organizational change such as the implementation of new technology if the 
outcomes of such changes are anticipated to have detrimental effects on their own power 
and authority within the firm (Balogun, 2003; Harely et al., 2003; Knights and Graham, 
1994).  This may particularly be the case for mid-level managers, who possess less power 
than their upper-level counterparts.  Mid-level managers‘ rejection of change, based on 
how these changes affect them personally, complicates senior managers‘ attempts to 
ensure labour transformations are successful and that capital accumulation is improved, 
or at least maintained.  Significantly, the research noted above highlights mid-level 
management‘s mediating role between economic imperatives and senior managements‘ 
attempts to respond to these imperatives.  
Willmott (1997) provides an insightful critique of how managers are considered 
in Marxist writing.  In particular he criticizes the one-dimensional character that 
managers are often assigned.  In large part, this one-dimensionality is rooted in the fact 
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that managers are tasked with maintaining or improving capital accumulation by, among 
other things, ―containing structural contradictions and conflicts in the organization.‖  
Though these factors may be the primary motivation for managers, for Willmott (1337), 
they are reflective and agentic and thus should not be treated as ―personifications of 
economic categories.‖  Willmott (1997: 1338) notes that lower-ranking managers are 
often exposed to similar forms of pressures as their worker counterpart‘s experience, such 
as surveillance and increased pressure to perform.  Reacting to this, managers seek to 
protect themselves by attending to things such as ―career advancement and job security.‖   
In Willmott‘s (1338) words, ―The positioning of managers within capitalist relations of 
production, as sellers of labor, tends to render managers less concerned with the demands 
of capital per se than with the security of their employment and their career prospects 
(emphasis in original).‖   For Willmott (1997), the point is that there are features of the 
capitalist mode of production that highlight the importance of managers‘ job security and 
career prospects and managers, as reflective beings, will act accordingly in efforts to 
maintain their security and maximize their career prospects.  As Willmott (1340) notes, 
―Managers are not ‗judgemental dopes‘ (Garfinkel, 1967) who slavishly perform the 
functions of capital. The very positioning of managers within capitalist labor processes 
makes it possible, and indeed likely, that there will be departures from the performance of 
those functions attributed to managers by Marx.‖    
Similarly, Whittington (1992), drawing on Giddens‘ notion of structuration, and 
institutional theory, argues that the labour process perspective needs to move to a more 
agency-oriented understanding of managers.  As Whittington points out, ―the relationship 
of particular actors to society becomes less one of passive embeddedness, and more a 
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matter of active engagement‖ (704).  Whittington notes two sources of management 
agency.  The first source of agency emerges from the myriad possible avenues of action 
for managers to achieve their company‘s economic goals.  Agency emerges from 
managerial discretion and the choices managers have to make as they enact ―sets of social 
structures‖ which are both numerous and ambiguous.  Although managers are aware that 
their goal is to accumulate capital for their company, Whittington argues that how 
managers should pursue this goal is not straightforward.  Because the path to profit 
making is unclear, managers are frequently compelled to make choices among multiple 
options.  In Whittington‘s words, ―managers … are … faced by a variety of conflicting 
rules of conduct, all legitimate and plausible, but, often, none with any obvious 
superiority‖ (705).     
Agency can also arise from sources outside of the economic sphere.  Noting that 
managers inhabit economic and non-economic spheres, Whittington (1992: 704-706) 
suggests managers are able to draw on ―rules and resources‖ from both spheres.  These 
spheres connect managers to the multifarious non-economic influences that they may 
draw on in their decision-making.  According to Whittington (1992: 706) such a 
conceptualization recognizes a manager‘s ―plural social identities‖ including gender, 
family, religion and ethnicity that may influence her/his behaviours.  A manager‘s 
participation in these realms and the assumptions and norms embedded in them may 
bleed into managerial decision-making.  Significantly, norms and values in the non-
economic sphere may be inconsistent with economic imperatives, and managers may 
make decisions based on these values that diminish capital accumulation, or at least, do 
little to improve it.  
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Another point that emerges in the discussions concerning managerial activity is 
that with the divisions of labour among managers come differences in power in the 
workplace.  Managers who have a close connection to the production processes and 
control over labour typically have greater control over the workplace than those managers 
who are closely connected to production.  These differences in power can have important 
consequences for the shape and effectiveness of organizational programs (Thomas, 1994; 
Vallas, 2003).  
 2.4  OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGERS 
A number of researchers including Barely (1996) and Lounsbury and Kaghan 
(2001) have noted that organizational theories need to keep pace with changes in 
organizational forms, the emergence of new occupations and professions, and the 
changing nature of work.  Keeping astride of workplace changes includes taking into 
account the changes that new occupations may have brought about in work organizations.  
The emergence of new occupational groups, or structural changes that may have 
increased an extant occupation‘s power, may affect the way groups interact and alter the 
power balance in a workplace.  
One occupation that is of interest in this dissertation is that of the occupational 
health and safety manager, who monitors OHS conditions and when necessary addresses 
health and safety concerns.  Changes in the nature of injury, how injury and illness are 
addressed in the workplace, and rising injury costs (Sullivan and Frank, 2000; Sullivan 
and Cole, 2002) have influenced the responsibilities and pressures faced by OHS 
managers.  These actors may mediate workers‘ and managers‘ relations with production 
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and may provide each with new resources that they did not have in the past.  These actors 
may have an important role in shaping how OHS management practices play out. 
Dwyer (1991) noted that the increase in the number of occupational health 
managers has come about to address the increase in injury-related costs.  Swuste and 
Arnoldy (2003) and Hale (1995) note that OHS managers are transitioning from their 
traditional role of monitoring individuals‘ safety practices to a role in which they are 
taking on more organizational-level activities, such as the construction and 
implementation of OHS policy, procedures, and programs.  For example, in a study of the 
pulp and paper industry in Quebec, Brun and Loiselle (2002) noted that fifty percent of 
their sample of health and safety managers acted in an ―advisory role‖ to management 
who considered the health and safety implications of their business decisions.    
Another point to consider when examining the role of OHS managers is that the 
degree of influence they wield in the workplace is variable.  Hale (1995) notes there are 
differences in power between managers, especially production managers, and 
occupational health and safety professionals and an important part of this is whether or 
not the OHS manager is a technical specialist (e.g., engaged in fire suppression) or a 
health and safety generalist.  Research with a variety of health and safety professionals, 
including generalists and ergonomists, highlights the difficulty these managers have in 
getting management to heed their recommendations (Broberg and Hermund, 2004; 
Fulmer et al., 2006; Garrigou and Peissel-Cottenaz, 2008; Perrow, 1983).  
2.5  CONCLUDING COMMENTS ON THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Negotiated order and critical perspectives present important insights, with 
particular relevance to the examination of OHS programs.  A critical perspective provides 
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a means of unpacking the structural conditions that OHS programs are immersed in, 
which may enable or constrain the PE programs.  Emphasizing management and labour‘s 
asymmetrical access to resources, the critical perspective recognizes the influence of 
power on actors‘ attempts to modify work processes.  Additionally, the perspective helps 
comprehend the importance of the economic imperative and the role that it may play in 
shaping the functioning of OHS programs.  In so doing, it makes us aware that for 
employers the economic imperative is central to organization survivability and other 
concerns such as health and safety will generally be subordinate to it.     
The negotiated order framework highlights a different set of considerations, 
which are equally important to examining the processes involved in an OHS intervention.  
The perspective considers that competing groups in any organization may have different 
interests and interpretations about what should be done, or in the manner something 
should be done.  Furthermore, the perspective considers both power and structure as 
influencing negotiations, although does not see these as deterministic.  It recognizes that 
even those with limited power may be able to influence the program.  The negotiated 
order framework also highlights the critical relevance of ―articulation work‖ or the 
linking of lines of action through arrangements to accomplish program goals.  Finally, as 
it is rooted in interactionist assumptions, negotiated order theory considers any program 
to be enacted by knowledgeable humans and reliant on individual agency (interpretation, 
creativity, resistance, etc).     
The theories discussed above raise several considerations.  They are helpful in 
suggesting a set of questions that is more specific than the broader questions identified in 
the introductory chapter: ―What actions were undertaken by individuals to ensure the PE 
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program‘s functioned and continued? How did the organizational and societal context 
enable or constrain, the pursuit of PE program activities?‖  The following questions, 
derived from a consideration of the theories, guide my examination of the PE programs.  
How do differences in power between workers and managers affect the ECTs? How does 
the economic imperative influence the ECTs‘ functioning?  How do management‘s and 
workers‘ divergent (sometimes opposing) interests affect the extent to which the PE 
programs are supported?  Do management‘s attempts to establish and maintain the 
conditions of production affect the PE program?  And if so, to what extent?  To what 
extent do people‘s different perspectives (social worlds) affect the ECTs‘ functioning?  
What role does articulation work play in the PE program‘s functioning?  What sorts of 
tasks constitute the arc of action or trajectory of work?  What sorts of work are involved 
in articulation?  
In this chapter I have outlined the theoretical lenses that inform the analysis.  In 
doing so I have described the theories‘ underlying assumptions and discussed their 
relevance for examining workplace change.  Importantly, they enable consideration of 
both structure and agency and their influence on the programs‘ dynamics.  In the next 
chapter I discuss the methodology used and the data gathering and analysis techniques. 
This is followed by a description of the validity and generalizability of the findings.  The 
remainder of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the limitations of the methods.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
SETTINGS AND METHODS 
3.0  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes the research settings, the participatory ergonomic (PE) 
program implemented in each setting, and the data collection and analysis techniques 
used.   In my description of the data collection I cover the details of entrée, interviewing 
and direct observation, but I also consider some of the challenges I encountered in 
gathering the data for the project.  Accordingly, the descriptions concerning how the data 
were collected are interspersed with what Van Maanen (1988) refers to as ―confessional 
tales‖ that describe some of the methodological challenges that arose during data 
gathering.  Van Maanen (73) states that confessional tales include, "Stories of infiltration, 
fables of fieldwork rapport, mini-melodramas of hardships endured (and overcome), and 
accounts of what fieldwork did to the fieldworker."  Including these types of stories about 
how the data were collected is part of the responsibility researchers have in presenting a 
transparent and accurate picture of the data gathering process.  
The chapter begins by discussing the methodology used and then describes the 
data collection techniques and the data analysis.  This is followed by a description of how 
I endeavoured to ensure the findings were valid and generalizable.  The chapter 
concludes by talking about the limitations of the methods.    
3.1  METHODOLOGY  
The research aimed to examine how two ergonomic change teams worked and 
how they attempted to sustain a participatory ergonomic program.  With little known 
about the processes by which bodies such as ECTs go about altering work practices, an 
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appropriate way of investigating these occupational health interventions was to consider 
the perspectives of those who were carrying them out, using qualitative data gathering 
and analysis techniques.  These techniques were not presumptive about what the 
problems, concerns or capabilities were of actors involved in the OHS programs under 
study or that the programs would function as conceived by the RT.  Accordingly, I used 
an ethnographic approach consisting of direct observation and interviewing in which I 
observed events as they unfolded over time.  
Ethnography typically involves the use of multiple data gathering techniques, 
such as interviewing and direct observation, to intimately study some group, usually over 
an extended period of time.  As well, it stresses the interpretation of the setting from the 
point of view of those within it, and generally focuses on process or, as Morrill and Fine 
(1997:438) noted in reference to organizational ethnographies, the ―doing‖ of 
organizational work rather than the outcomes (see also Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994; 
Friedman and McDaniel, 1998; Morrill and Fine, 1997; Prus, 1996; Spradley, 1979).  To 
represent the perspectives of individuals involved with the PE programs and to capture 
the process of addressing work-related hazards, I incorporated multiple data gathering 
techniques, and maintained contact with individuals in the settings over a period of 
months.  I describe the data gathering techniques below but before doing so introduce the 
settings.   
3.2  DESCRIPTION OF THE SETTINGS AND PARTICIPATORY ERGONOMIC 
MODEL  
3.2.1  Courier Co. 
The interventions took place in two settings, a courier facility (Courier Co.) and a 
manufacturing plant (Furniture Co.).  The courier industry can be divided in to two 
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categories: local messenger services which specialize in ―same day delivery,‖ and usually 
deliver to destinations within a local area, and courier companies, which specialize in 
―overnight or later delivery‖ and deliver to locations locally, regionally, nationally and 
internationally.  In 2002, delivery firms classified as ―overnight‖ made up only about 
12% of firms in the courier industry, but accrued approximately 85% of the industry 
revenue and accounted for 85% of pieces moved (Statistics Canada, 2005).  The courier 
facility in which the intervention was carried out was owned by a large company in the 
overnight or later delivery category, which has customers in Canada and the United 
States, employs more than 10,000 employees in approximately 100 facilities across 
Canada and has a fleet of more than 2000 delivery vehicles.  In the facility where the 
intervention was implemented the company employed 150 people; of these 135 were 
hourly workers.  The company‘s financial health was good at the time of the intervention 
and, in the early 2000s it expanded and built new facilities.   
Competition in the transport industry is intense.  Courier companies compete with 
both small local couriers and large transport companies.  Essentially, in the courier 
industry, companies sell consumers the ability to ship an item from one location to a 
destination.  Companies compete based on the quality of services they can provide to 
customers, most importantly the speed and reliability of deliveries.     
Macro-level changes over the last several years have increased the time sensitivity 
of courier work and the pressure on companies to ensure their services are both fast and 
reliable (Taylor and Hallsworth, 2000: 243).  Developments in information technology 
allow for the tracking, monitoring and dispatching of couriers.  The emergence and 
growth of just-in-time modes of production in which inventory is minimal, means that 
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courier companies constitute an integral part of the infrastructure of production.  To 
retain the customers that use just-in-time production processes, courier companies are 
pressured to ensure they maintain dependable and expeditious service.  At one point in 
the history of the industry, courier companies focused on niche markets (Taylor and 
Hallsworth, 2000) but now many firms offer similar services and compete over the same 
markets.  Additionally, changes in the market resulting from internet sales in which 
companies do not use retail outlets but instead depend on couriers to distribute their 
products have also created opportunities for courier companies to expand and compete.  
Courier companies now provide an invaluable link between customers and retailers, a 
link that has created what Taylor and Hallsworth (243) refer to as ―logistics partners‖ 
whereby certain companies that do not maintain conventional ―bricks and mortar‖ retail 
locations, sell their products over the Internet and use couriers to ship their products to 
customers.  The combined effect of the above changes in the courier market puts pressure 
on courier companies to maintain promptness and reliability of their services.  To this 
end, Courier Co. monitored the quality of service and the timely delivery of freight daily 
both across the company and within the facility according to the company‘s standards, 
which were continually stressed to employees by management. 
In Courier Co., the production process consisted of unloading and loading of 
delivery trucks and the delivery and pick up of freight.  Couriers delivered and picked up 
freight; dockworkers, who worked in the depot, unloaded, sorted, and loaded freight from 
delivery trucks.  Consisting largely of manual materials handling, couriers‘ and 
dockworkers‘ job tasks at Courier Co. were labour intensive.  The technology used in the 
production process was neither complex nor varied and the operations performed during 
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the production process were simple and predominantly manual.  For dockworkers, the 
packages were moved by ―hand bombing,‖ or the processing of packages manually with 
minimal use of tools.  Typically, if a tool or equipment was used to relocate freight within 
the depot, moving was accomplished through the use of (1) powered and manual 
conveyance equipment; (2) pump carts, which are large manually operated carts that were 
―pumped‖ or ―jacked‖ to raise their loads off the floor before being moved; and (3) cage 
carts, which were large carts in which freight was enclosed in a wire cage.  Couriers 
transported their freight in delivery trucks.  Once at a destination, they either carried their 
freight or relied on two- and four-wheeled carts and dollies, two principal tools of courier 
work, which typically were manually operated and consisted of simple components.   
Some managers who were involved in Courier Co.‘s PE program were located 
within the depot and others at the company‘s headquarters (See Table 3.1).  Local 
management in Courier Co. consisted of the district manager, supervisors and a human 
resources manager.  The district manager directed the depot‘s day-to-day operations.  The 
supervisors oversaw the couriers and dockworkers.  Many of the senior managers were 
located at the company‘s headquarters approximately 180 kilometres from the depot.  
This included the general manager of operations, and the department heads of fleet, 
engineering, retail, facilities, and materials handling.  The national health and safety 
director oversaw the company‘s health and safety system.  The regional health and safety 
manager was responsible for health and safety in the jurisdiction where the depot was 
located and answered to the national health and safety director.  Both of these managers‘ 
offices were located at company headquarters. 
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3.2.2  Furniture Co. 
Furniture Co. produces a variety of components for office furniture and home 
appliances and at the time of the intervention had 300 employees, of whom 
approximately 250 were hourly.  A subsidiary of a larger company that was established in 
the early 1900s, Furniture Co. has plants in Canada, the United States and Taiwan and is 
one of the largest manufacturers of its product globally.   
Furniture Co. competes predominantly with two large multinational 
manufacturers and a number of smaller foreign and domestic manufacturers.  
Competition in this manufacturing sub-sector is based on the price and quality of parts.  
Furniture Co.‘s manufacturing expenses consisted primarily of labour costs and purchase 
of raw materials, such as plastics and steel.  The industry became extremely competitive 
in the early 2000s.  During the time of the study the company‘s profit margins were 
challenged by an increase in the worldwide steel price, a decrease in demand in the 
furniture market, a slowdown in demand for Furniture Co.‘s parts as some customers 
looked for overseas suppliers that could make parts more cheaply, and an increase in 
competition from Asian manufacturers.  Indeed, in a discussion I had with him, the 
company‘s president said that attempts to improve the company‘s profit margins were 
about holding on to existing market share and ―survival.‖   
In response to the challenges it has faced, Furniture Co. remained profitable in 
part by restructuring.  It reconfigured its operations in Canada in 2003 by amalgamating 
plants and laying-off workers.  Beginning in 2003, the company initiated several rounds 
of temporary and permanent layoffs of typically between 20-40 hourly and salaried 
workers.  Late in the intervention, the plant adopted lean production methods in an effort 
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to shed inventory and eliminate waste in the production process.  Additionally, in an 
attempt to enter into areas of the market that were not as crowded, the company focused 
on producing medium and high-end parts and on a line of specialized components few of 
its competitors sold.   
The production process in Furniture Co. comprised a set of interrelated 
operations: roll forming, pressing, assembling, painting, and packaging of finished 
product.  Much of the technology used during these operations was automated and 
complex.  Operations technology consisted of roll-forming machines and an assortment 
of different sized machine presses and assembly machines.  Additionally, there were 
areas in the plant where products were painted.  Most of the work that went on in these 
areas involved feeding parts into machinery.  The factory was divided into work areas, 
such as the assembly department, and parts were shuttled between work areas by forklifts 
and lift trucks.  Because production at Furniture Co. was highly mechanized, altering 
machinery or reconfiguring the lay out in any significant way was neither straightforward 
nor quick.  I expand on the work processes in Furniture Co. insofar as they affected the 
ECT‘s activities in Chapter Four. 
In Furniture Co., all managers involved with the PE program were located within 
the plant (see Table 3.1).  The President managed three plants but was usually not 
directly involved in daily operations.  The Vice President managed the plant‘s daily 
operations and one of his responsibilities was evaluating the ECT‘s requests for changes.  
The plant manager was in charge of the supervisors in the each of the departments.  In 
turn, the supervisors ran their departments and monitored the operators within them.  The 
maintenance manager supervised the maintenance department and its personnel whose 
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duties included regular machine maintenance, emergency maintenance (e.g., repairing 
breakdowns), and installation of new equipment.  The production manager was 
responsible for maintaining and, in some cases improving production efficiency, which 
involved such responsibilities as overseeing factory layout, workflow, and planning new 
product manufacture.  Both the plant manager and the production manager answered 
directly to the Vice President of Operations. 
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Table 3.1  Managerial Personnel Involved in the ECTs 
 Company Position Responsibilities  Located  
Courier 
Co. 
District Manager  
Oversaw the daily operations 




















Oversaw various facets of 















Oversaw Operations within 
Furniture Co.  
Plant  
Plant Manager  










Supervised maintenance dept 










Health and Safety 
Manager 
Oversaw health and safety 
within the plant 
Plant  
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3.3  THE PE PROGRAMS AND CHANGE TEAM FORMATION  
In each setting, the programs were a collaborative effort of a university-based 
research team (RT), management, and the union.  The change process began with the 
formation of facility Ergonomic Change Teams (ECT) based on a ―representative 
participation‖ model of participatory ergonomics (PE) (Haines et al., 2002: 311-312).  
The ECTs included hourly workers, management representatives, and an ergonomist-
facilitator who was a member of the University Research Team.  The same ergonomist-
facilitator served in both settings. 
In the courier setting, the ECT consisted of 11 representatives: five salaried 
employees including, a supervisor, the human resources representative, a health and 
safety management representative from corporate headquarters, and six worker 
representatives and an ergonomist-facilitator who was a member of the University 
Research Team.  The team experienced turnover during the course of the programs as one 
management member was transferred and replaced and two worker members from the 
team left and were replaced. 
In Furniture Co., the ECT was composed of nine members: two worker 
representatives and a supervisor, the health and safety manager, an engineer, the plant 
manager, a continuous improvement manager and maintenance manager and the 
ergonomist-facilitator.  In Furniture Co. turnover involved an engineer and the two 
worker representatives.  Three months into the program, the engineer was released from 
the company in one of the lay offs as the plant downsized and not replaced.  The worker 
representatives were laid off and replaced with other workers from the plant.     
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In each setting, ECT activity commenced with a series of training sessions 
conducted by members of the RT, including the RT member who would serve as an 
ergonomist-facilitator throughout the intervention.  These sessions, held for 
approximately four hours a day, for four days, covered some of the main issues in 
ergonomics, including risk factor identification and measurement.  In their deliberations, 
the ECTs identified hazards and designed and oversaw the implementation of multiple 
changes.  The programs were intended to evolve according to a ―Blueprint‖ (Wells et al., 
2001) that specified stages in which opportunities for improvement were identified, 
solutions formulated, implemented and evaluated by workers and then improvements 
modified on the basis of the evaluation.  The Blueprint was developed on the basis of a 
review of literature pertinent to making ergonomic changes and the research team‘s 
experiences in implementing workplace ergonomic programs in previous sites.  Similar 
models of change have been used in other MSD reduction programs (e.g., de Looze et al., 
2001; St Vincent et al., 2006). 
 In Furniture Co. the ECT met for 48 months, for the first 12 months weekly, and 
after that, bi-weekly.  In Furniture Co., the ECT made 40 changes.  In the courier setting, 
the ECT met for 30 months, for the first 8 months weekly, then bi-weekly and then on a 
monthly basis.  During this period, the ECT implemented 14 changes.  Having described 
the settings and PE intervention framework I now move to a discussion of the data 
collection and analysis. 
3.4  DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
In this section I describe the primary data gathering technique: observation.  In so 
doing I relate some of the challenges that I encountered in the field.  I begin by describing 
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the process of securing ethics approval.  Then, I discuss my entry into the settings, 
establishment of my role, and adoption of a research stance.  I conclude the section by 
outlining the sequence of events that typically unfolded during a field visit. 
3.4.1  Ethics Clearance 
Prior to entering the field I received ethics clearance through the University of 
Waterloo‘s Office of Research Ethics (ORE project 10658).  As part of the ethics process 
I informed the plant and district manager in each setting in writing about my research 
objectives and sought their permission to spend time in the facility.  Each manager wrote 
a brief letter to the University of Waterloo‘s Office of Research Ethics acknowledging 
they were cognizant of and consented to my presence in the setting.  For all audio-
recorded interviews, individuals were presented with an information letter indicating that 
the project was directed by researchers from the University of Waterloo and describing 
the goals of the research, data collection techniques, and procedures for ensuring 
participants‘ confidentiality (see Appendix A).  After a potential interviewee read the 
letter, I asked if they would give written consent to participate in an interview and for the 
use of anonymous excerpts from their interviews in academic publications (see Appendix 
B).  Additionally, before beginning the interview, I verbally summarized the research 
objectives and underlying interests, provided some examples of the interview questions, 
and reiterated my commitment to confidentiality.  In particular, I noted that no one within 
the organization would see the raw data and all names, including the company‘s name, 
would be replaced with a pseudonym in any publications or presentations.  In each of the 
settings, in a high traffic area, I posted an information letter that described my research.  
Additionally, prior to periods of observation of non-ECT members, I informed 
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individuals about the purpose of my research and asked for their verbal consent to 
observe.    
3.4.2  Gaining Entry   
My research was part of a larger project, which aimed to examine both the 
outcomes and implementation of a participatory ergonomic program.  I was hired as a 
research assistant to collect qualitative data to examine the implementation of the PE 
programs.  As a research assistant, I was provided formal access to the settings.  That 
management, labour, and the RT had already discussed and agreed to the broad goals and 
data gathering methods of the research prior to my entry into the settings meant that 
much of the time-consuming preparatory work typically associated with accessing 
research settings (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973) was already done.  Therefore, my 
experiences gaining entry may differ from those researchers who work independently 
(e.g., Barley, 1995: 9-11; Smith, 2001; Thomas, 1994: 262-265).  Although my 
connection with the research group facilitated my initial formal entry into the settings, as 
discussed below it did cause some confusion when it came time to establish my role as a 
researcher.   
3.4.3  Establishing my Role  
While my entry into the setting was facilitated by my involvement in a larger 
research project, I still needed to establish and clarify my role and develop rapport with 
individuals in the settings.  An important aspect of establishing my role was achieving 
independence from the ergonomist-facilitator, who filled both a researcher role and a 
facilitator role for both of the change teams.  In his researcher role he conducted such 
activities as collecting data about the injury rates in the organizations and gathering 
biomechanical data about the changes the ECTs were making.  As a facilitator, his 
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responsibilities included, but were not limited to, teaching the ECTs ergonomic skills, 
assisting them in identifying and assessing hazards and the formulation of solutions to 
address these hazards, and for the first eight months of the interventions, chairing the 
ECTs‘ meetings.  In contrast to the ergonomist-facilitator‘s traditional researcher and  
interventionist role, my own role was that of an observer and I did not involve myself in 
the ECTs‘ activities or decision-making.   
Initially, managers, ECT members and workers in the setting did not distinguish 
between the ergonomist-facilitator‘s work and mine, and perhaps for good reasons.  
Because both the ergonomist-facilitator and I were part of the RT, often travelled together 
and were seen together, many in the setting were under the impression that the 
ergonomist-facilitator and I shared the same interventionist role.  Confusion around my 
role was connected to my non-interventionist, observer, status.   
One of the ways that I thought my association with the ergonomist-facilitator 
could be damaging was if participants saw me as an agent of surveillance.  I suspected 
that workers and managers may not see me as a researcher operating ―neutrally‖ but 
rather as someone who was there to monitor the ECTs‘ activities for management and/or 
the research team.  Most significantly, they might expect me to monitor ECT members‘ 
compliance with the ergonomist-facilitator‘s suggestions, participation in meetings, and 
willingness to carry out ECT activities.  Such a perception would affect their trust in me 
and what they shared with me.  
To counter such understandings, I attempted to distance myself from the 
ergonomist-facilitator, frequently noting in ECT meetings and in conversations with 
workers and managers that I was working independently of him as another researcher on 
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equal footing, with complementary but distinct, research priorities.  Additionally, in my 
conversations with workers and managers I emphasized that my interest was in 
describing the intervention‘s evolution, that I wanted to hear the ―positives‖ and 
―negatives‖ about the ergonomics program and that both were important aspects of 
developing an understanding of the intervention.  I also arranged for times, and 
opportunistically seized occasions, when I could talk to workers and managers without 
the ergonomist present, in an attempt to insure they could speak freely about the 
ergonomics program.   
After several weeks, the ECT members in both settings came to understand my 
position as the individual who was chronicling how the PE programs unfolded and, as 
several participants said, who ―just took notes.‖  Indeed, one worker representative in 
Courier Co. frequently joked that my nickname was ―buzz,‖ referring to the fly on the 
wall.  Conversely, throughout the intervention, there remained confusion about my role 
among some non-ECT workers, who on occasion misidentified me as an ergonomist, and 
directed my attention to ―ergonomic problems.‖  
Another important aspect of data collection involved delimiting the opportunities 
for observation.  I knew that I wanted to observe as much of the ECT-related activities 
relevant to the research questions as possible.  At the intervention‘s outset, I considered 
that attending ECT meetings and observing ECT members would receive the bulk of my 
attention (which I describe later in the chapter).  Indeed this was the case, but as themes 
emerged and I became aware of what I needed to know, I realized that certain interactions 
and discussions that occurred outside of the ECTs‘ meetings were relevant to my 
research.    
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In Courier Co., in the program‘s first months, I discovered opportunities for 
observation that I had not anticipated.  For example, I determined that my understanding 
of the change-making process would be enhanced if I learned about the relations between 
the ECT members and other company representatives, as these had significant bearing on 
the ECTs‘ activities.  In the early months of the intervention in Courier Co., I was 
surprised to learn that I was excluded from a meeting among the worker representatives, 
ergonomist-facilitator, and representatives from middle management concerning the 
acquisition of a solution the ECT had recommended.  Upon hearing about this meeting, I 
immediately made the ergonomist-facilitator aware that I wanted to be informed of the 
conversations that were occurring outside of the ECT‘s meetings and where possible, 
invited to attend.  I explained that if I was not able to attend, that I would be interested to 
know about the discussions he was having with people from either of the sites regardless 
of whether these were face-to-face, over email or teleconferences, noting that what went 
on was valuable for my research.  The ergonomist-facilitator responded favourably to this 
request and subsequently included me in much of the correspondence and meetings that 
were relevant to my interests or informed me of deliberations in meetings that I was 
unable to attend.  Typically, I asked him about the circumstances under which such 
communications arose and how he had dealt with (or was going to deal with) their 
inquiries, requests, and so forth.  This information, obtained either directly or indirectly 
through the ergonomist-facilitator was very helpful.  It usually allowed me to glean 
insights regarding the obstacles the ECTs had encountered and/or enablers that the ECTs 
used to deal to with obstacles and address hazards.   
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3.4.4  Research Stance 
Researchers doing qualitative fieldwork adopt a stance or relationship to 
participants that is informed by their research goals, theoretical orientations, and the 
limits and opportunities they encounter while collecting data.  Several possible options 
exist in regard to the role a researcher might play during fieldwork including those in 
which the researcher‘s aim is to intervene in the setting, as is the case with participatory 
action research (e.g., Szala-Meneok and Lohfeld, 2005; Ulichny, 1997; Whyte, 1998).  In 
participatory action research, the researcher‘s aim is typically to advocate on behalf of 
those people under study and in many cases collaborate with the groups to alter 
conditions they identify as negative.   
Another stance, the one I took during the research, was non-interventionist.  It is 
decidedly different from one that seeks to advocate on behalf of a particular group.  It 
aims to describe a setting but does not advocate on behalf of a group of individuals or 
aim to transform the setting.  Instead, it seeks to minimize, as much as possible, the 
researcher‘s influence on the setting (Hammersly and Atkinson, 1994).  Adoption of a 
nonpartisan orientation not only serves to reduce a researcher‘s disruption of the 
dynamics in a setting, but also may facilitate a researcher‘s movements in the setting 
(Prus, 1996; 1997).
9
  Grills (1998: 77) speaks to this approach to participant observation 
research and notes that the participant observer ―utilizes the distance afforded by 
remaining non-judgemental to interpersonal advantage – as an interactional strategy that 
allows for access to the relations, negotiations, perspectives, and processes found within 
any particular research setting.‖  This stance ensures that a researcher does not advocate 
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  While I strove to minimize contamination in the setting, I am aware that not having an impact is an ideal.  
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on behalf of a particular group, which diminishes the risk of alienating other groups in the 
setting, and conveys to individuals in a setting that a researcher has no particular agenda 
outside learning about the goings on of a setting.
10
  
As is typical with workplace ethnography (Buroway, 1979; Delbridge, 1998; 
Fine, 1996: 233-235), I was aware that both management and labour could interpret my 
presence as a threat to their interests, and I was cautious about appearing sympathetic to 
either group or even to the PE program itself.  Therefore, from the early days of the 
initiatives, I tried to play the part of an interested but neutral researcher.  To this end, I 
attempted to spend time with each group in the setting and while doing so I tried not to 
present views that might be seen to ally me with either management or labour, or factions 
within either group.  Also, in my conversations with stakeholders I did not praise the 
intervention or the RT.  This stance, to my knowledge, worked out well.  I freely moved 
between labour and management and saw no evidence that individuals in either group 
were concerned about my work, including most notably, the possibility that I would 
relate any of the material I recorded or share any of my observations with the other party.  
Fortunately, my experiences concerning the relationships with groups in the field stand in 
contrast to those of researchers who have described how study participants have 
attempted to label them a spy for one group by another (Barley, 1995: 25-26), or ask 
them to become a spy for one group (Ferdinand et al., 2007: 529-531; Morrill, 1996:237), 
or to pressure a researcher to disclose where his or her loyalties lie (Grills, 1998; Murray, 
                                                 
 
10
 As productive as it can be, there can be also serious repercussions from adopting this stance.  Participants 
may for instance question the loyalty of researchers who do not appear to be advocates aligned with their 
values (Grills, 1998).  Also, researchers themselves may have misgivings about maintaining this stance 
(Murray, 2003).  I pick up this latter point below.   
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2003) or simply act uncooperatively (Leidner, 1993: 242-44).  The consequences of such 
situations on fieldwork may range from mild discomfort to abandoning a particular data 
gathering technique or line of inquiry, or, at worst, abandoning a research project 
altogether. 
Attempting to minimize my impact in the setting and on the PE program 
processes and to let events unfold ―naturally,‖ I divulged little information to individuals 
in the settings.  This meant revealing little to individuals about my interpretations of the 
setting, or activities associated with the programs, teams or their members.  Periodically 
those in the setting asked me for my perspective on the program or the ECT‘s actions.  
Occasionally, as I took fieldnotes, they asked about what I was recording and often this 
took the form of comments such as, ―I‘d love to know what you are writing.‖  To parry 
these inquiries I used strategies similar to what Schatzman and Strauss (1973: 89-90) 
refer to as ―begging off‖ in which participants are told that a researcher is still 
formulating an impression of what is going on, and ―giving bits of information,‖ in which 
a researcher comments on occurrences in the setting but in ways that minimize 
contamination of the study, and reveal very little about the his/her findings.  Additionally, 
infrequently those in the settings asked whether I thought what I was observing was 
strange, to which I typically replied that what I was observing was not unusual.  (For 
another example of participants inquiring about researchers‘ views on their behaviour see 
Fine, 1996: 256).   
I also was faced with decisions about what to reveal to the ergonomist-facilitator.  
We occupied similar positions in that we were both researchers, but otherwise filled very 
different roles.  As I noted above, he was also an interventionist, whereas I was solely 
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observing.  I suspected that revealing my interpretation of events and sharing information 
with him might affect his behaviour and lead to alterations in the program being studied.  
In instances in which I felt my interpretations might lead the ergonomist to rethink how 
he approached an issue, this often required begging off or giving bits of information.  
Additionally, in many instances, when I felt answering a question could lead the 
ergonomist-facilitator to change his position, I reiterated that I was in an observer role 
and I did not want my interpretations to influence what was unfolding.  After several 
months, the ergonomist realized that I evaded some of his questions or responded vaguely 
to them.  And there were occasions when he asked a question and before I could reply 
quickly stated, ―you‘re not going to answer that, are you?‖  Over time, the ergonomist-
facilitator‘s questioning lessened, although there were still occasional queries throughout 
the interventions.  An email exchange that took place 12 months into the program was 
typical of the exchanges the ergonomist-facilitator and I had when questions about the 
ECTs arose.  On this occasion, the ergonomist-facilitator emailed a company 
representative to confirm whether the ECT had a meeting scheduled for the following 
day.  The company representative replied, ―As far as I know, there is a meeting.  Not sure 
what the attendance will be...‖ and noted that several members would likely be absent.  
The ergonomist-facilitator then asked me for my interpretation of the situation.  Worried 
that I may influence whether there was a meeting or not, I told the ergonomist-facilitator 
that I would go to the meeting, if held, but declined to comment on whether there should 
be a meeting or not.  He responded that he did not expect me to ―to cancel or not.‖ But 
that, ―I was wondering what your thoughts were on this situation.‖  
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An unanticipated consequence of my ethnographic stance of non-involvement 
was that it occasionally made me uneasy.  My commitment to non-involvement 
conflicted with my awareness that effective OHS interventions decrease workers‘ 
exposures to risk of injury.  My non-involvement stance was also incongruous with the 
fact that MSDs are a serious issue in need of addressing; that they had altered some 
workers‘ lives in either subtle or dramatic ways and that these committees, if they 
functioned well, might play a significant role in reducing work hazards.  However, taking 
action with these observations in mind would go against a stance of neutrality.  Perhaps 
naively and arrogantly, there were many occasions when I wanted to be involved in the 
discussions in various ways, such as to point out some of the topics that I thought were 
important but being overlooked, to disagree with the ECTs‘ choices and suggest 
alternatives, and to reveal information that not all members were privy to.  These were 
not topics that involved ergonomics per se in either the assessment of work hazards or 
development of solutions to address hazards – topics about which I had no expertise.  
Instead, they were topics such as the ECTs‘ relation to the broader work organization, 
communication between the ECT and managerial personnel, and what ECT members or 
the ergonomist-facilitator could be doing to improve the likelihood of the program‘s 
effectiveness and continuation.  Despite my misgivings, I endeavoured to remain 
purposefully uninvolved with the exception of one occasion.   
I broke character, to borrow a theatrical phrase, and injected my interpretation of 
an event late in the intervention at Courier Co., as the team struggled to perform its 
activities in the face of failing management support.  I was discouraged by this state of 
affairs but hoped that members would remain enthusiastic, despite growing problems 
 76 
related to management‘s lack of commitment.  I interrupted an exchange among members 
during an ECT meeting in which team members were talking about the outcomes of a 
discussion that had occurred in which senior management, the research team, and 
management from the local depot were involved.  One of the issues under discussion in 
this meeting was whether the ergonomic program was going to continue at this depot or 
be terminated and introduced elsewhere.  No answer to this question was provided during 
this meeting involving senior management.  Yet, hours later, at an ECT meeting when a 
worker member asked whether the ergonomic program would continue he was told by a 
management member it was going to be cancelled.  I suddenly blurted out, ―Whoa, that‘s 
not what happened!‖ I then noted that when this issue was discussed in the meeting with 
senior management there was no final answer.  An ECT member playfully stated that it 
must be true because I was protesting too much.  Some of the members, laughing, also 
chided me noting that I was ―not supposed to talk.‖ I am unsure what impact if any my 
statement made.  Surveying the ethnographic literature one can find examples of 
situations in which researchers, despite aiming to minimize involvement, have 
occasionally intervened (e.g., Leidner, 1993: 246-247).  Sometimes these interventions 
are motivated by aggravation with individuals under study; other times, by compassion 
for those investigators study.  Fine (1993: 287) points out that these types of emotional 
displays are not uncommon among participant observers, ―Participant observation often 
becomes participation intervention: Finding a problem we wish to fix it.  Identifying with 
our informants in loco parentis we wish to take their side…. to protect them from harm 
and make everything right.‖     
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3.4.5  Description of Field Visits  
The observations recorded during visits to each of the settings make up the central 
part of my data.  During the program at Courier Co., I visited the depot approximately 75 
times; during the program at Furniture Co., I visited the plant around 90 times.  The visits 
ranged in length from one to nine hours but typically lasted approximately three hours.  
In the first months of the intervention the visits to each of the sites were weekly and then, 
in keeping with the ECT‘s scheduling, they occurred biweekly.  In Courier Co. 
approximately eight months into the intervention the ECT switched to meeting biweekly 
and at Furniture Co. the ECT shifted to biweekly meetings 18 months into the 
intervention.  The goals of my site visits shifted over time as I moved through the phases 
of the data collection.  The intent initially was to develop rapport with those in the sites 
and become familiar with how organizational factors affected the PE program and its 
continuation.  As the intervention proceeded, my data collection became more focused 
and I moved from questions about ―what was going on‖ to questions about ―how and why 
things were going on‖ (Pettigrew, 1995: 106).  As a result, my data gathering strategy 
shifted and I began to go to the settings with more specific questions. 
At the research project‘s outset in each setting, during an introductory meeting 
with the workers and managers, I told them that I was interested in how the process of 
making change in the workplace unfolded, that I would be attending the ECT meetings 
and activities, observing, and making notes.  In the early stages of data gathering, visits to 
the research settings involved going to ECT meetings, which usually lasted 
approximately 2½ to 3 hours.  In the meetings the ECT members sat around a table and I 
sat with them.  There were no assigned seats but most often the worker representatives sat 
close to one another, managers sat together and the ergonomist-facilitator typically sat 
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near the OHS manager.  The meetings at the courier facility were held in a small 
conference room approximately 10 x15 feet, around a rectangular table, which prompted 
people to sit fairly close together but everyone had room to sit at the table.  In the 
manufacturing setting, the majority of meetings took place in a much larger space, about 
25 x 25 feet, that permitted members to spread out.  In each of the settings, the meeting 
rooms were equipped with an overhead projector, an easel, and dry erase board that the 
ECTs‘ periodically used when discussing changes.  Typically, at each meeting, each 
person was given an agenda by the ECT chair, members brought the last meetings‘ 
minutes, and a binder supplied by the research team.  Team members‘ binders usually 
contained a condensed version of the training manual, the notes they had individually 
taken concerning the changes the team had or was in the process of making, and the 
minutes and agendas of past meetings.   
During the ECT meetings I listened to and watched discussions and recorded 
observations that were germane to the investigation.  In these meetings I was not covert 
about taking notes.  ECT members appeared to pay little attention to my presence during 
the ECT meetings but occasionally jokingly inquired about whether I had recorded 
something that they found particularly interesting or humorous.  Such comments by 
participants are not atypical of ethnographic research (Barley, 1995: 28; Fine, 1996: 235; 
Theberge, 2000).  
As the intervention proceeded, in addition to attending the meetings I spent time 
outside of the meetings, talking directly to ECT members and to those who were involved 
with supporting the ECTs‘ activities.  Informal conversations with several team members 
on each of the ECTs before and after meetings, as well as during meeting breaks, were 
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invaluable opportunities to ask questions, to get reactions to what had or had not 
transpired, and to talk to members about what they had done regarding ergonomics 
between meetings and about what was going on in the organization more generally.  
Berg (2004: 171-173) refers to individuals who possess ―expert knowledge‖ about 
the setting as ―guides‖ (see also Spradley, 1979 on ―key informants‖).  In each of the 
sites, one individual filled this role and was particularly valuable in supplying 
information about the ECTs' activities: the OHS manager in the manufacturing setting 
and the operations administrative assistant in the courier setting.  These individuals, 
because of their position within the ECT and within the worksite, possessed an awareness 
of the ECT‘s activities that other members of the ECT did not have.  Their vantage point 
was different from that of others in the setting partly because they had the opportunity to 
spend more time on OHS than other ECT members.  They were also heavily involved 
with the requests that the ECTs were making to management, so they had insight into 
who was involved and how management was receiving the ECTs‘ proposed changes.  
Perhaps as importantly, their position within the organization meant that they routinely 
had time to discuss the ergonomics program when I visited the settings.  
Paramount to starting and keeping information flowing in a setting is building and 
maintaining rapport with the individuals in it.  Having poor relations with those in the 
setting and failing to develop rapport can often impinge on what can be heard, observed, 
recorded and asked about (Prus, 1996; 1997; Shaffir et al., 1994: 47-48; Spradley, 1979; 
Schatzman and Strauss, 1973: 18-23).  Generally, rapport between researcher and 
participants is established over time and through demonstrations of respect and goodwill 
(Berg, 2004; Morrill, 1996; Prus, 1996; 1997).  Overall, my rapport with participants in 
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the settings was good and remained stable throughout my time in the field.  Few 
individuals would not answer my many questions.  Worker representatives at the courier 
company indicated that they wanted their story told and were glad someone outside the 
company in a position of neutrality was there to record what was happening.  In both 
settings, I think the trust I gained was partly enabled by the fact I was a member of the 
university research team and as such an ―outsider.‖  This outsider status was reinforced 
by the fact that funding for the project came from external sources (specifically, the 
Research Advisory Council of Ontario‘s Workplace Safety Insurance Board) and that I 
was not working for the companies or the unions.  Moreover, the trust between the ECT 
members and me was nurtured by my regular attendance at meetings, which 
demonstrated my commitment to telling the ECT members‘ stories. 
3.4.6 Typical Field Visits      
Generally, a visit to the courier depot proceeded as follows.  I, often accompanied 
by the ergonomist-facilitator, arrived at the facility thirty to sixty minutes prior to the 
scheduled meeting time and signed the visitors‘ logbook.  I then proceeded to an area in 
the depot where the supervisors worked – a large office with several computer 
workstations and phones – and/or to the area of the depot where the delivery vehicles 
were loaded and unloaded and often talked to any ECT members I located.  In many 
instances, prior to meetings, ECT worker representatives congregated outside the 
building talking and I would chat with them in this location.   
At the manufacturing setting, I arrived, usually accompanied by the facilitator, 
signed in at the front entrance, and then typically proceeded either directly to the ECT 
meeting or to the OHS manager‘s office.  Unlike the courier setting, employees often 
 81 
worked up to a few moments prior to meeting time so there was little time to chat.  On 
other occasions, I met ECT members who were milling about prior to the meeting, we 
chatted and then I accompanied them to the ECT meetings.   
In both settings I often stayed after the meetings, especially after the program had 
been underway for a couple of months.  Usually this meant lingering in the meeting room 
to talk to ECT members before they dispersed and/or talking briefly with an ECT 
member in another part of the facility before s/he went back to work.  Staying after 
meetings typically granted opportunities to ask ECT members to clarify remarks they 
made during the meeting, to comment on what occurred in the meeting, and to investigate 
topics that emerged out of the previously collected data.   
The opportunities to chat with managers and worker representatives were 
different as the former had more discretionary time.  Unless it was a scheduled formal 
interview, in which case the member was given a block of free time, I talked with 
individual employees in the settings as they carried out their regular work duties or 
change team related tasks. 
3.5  DATA SOURCES  
In the subsections that follow I describe the three data sources that I used: field 
notes, interviews, and documents.  I discuss what I recorded in my notes, what personnel 
I talked to in my interviews, and what sorts of documents I used in my analysis.  
3.5.1  Field Notes  
As Berg (2004: 173) points out, ―The central component of ethnographic research 
is the ethnographic account.  Providing such narrative accounts of what goes on in the 
lives of study subjects derives from having maintained complete, accurate, and detailed 
 82 
field notes.‖  Recording observations can be done in a range of ways (Wolfinger, 2002).  
Some researchers do not record any notes in the field, making only ―head notes‖ or 
mental notes, choosing to wait until they leave the setting to compose notes (Emerson et 
al., 1995: 17-19, Papp, 2007); others take notes in the setting but do so covertly (Berg, 
2004: 173-175; Delbridge 1998: 28).  In my case, during informal conversations and in 
the ECT meetings, I took notes with pen and notepad clearly visible, making no attempt 
to conceal the fact that I was recording observations.  The nature of my notes varied.  
Some of these were in the form of ―cryptic jottings,‖ (Berg, 2004: 171) in which I 
recorded the significant aspects of what went on in the setting and depended on these to 
cue my memory later when developing full notes.  The bulk of my field notes, recorded 
in ECT meetings, were ―comprehensive‖ (Wolfinger, 2002) and consisted of detailed 
accounts of the teams‘ activities and discussions that included a mix of paraphrased 
conversations and verbatim quotations.  Regardless of the manner in which field notes 
were taken down, they were transcribed into more elaborate records soon after I left the 
field.  Both in the field and when I elaborated on my field notes as I transcribed them I 
made use of what Berg (2004: 174) refers to as ―observer comments‖ or notes concerning 
―linkages between people in the study, theories that might serve to explain something 
happening in the field, or simply a judgmental observation.‖ One way that I used these 
comments was to note the possible connections between activities I observed in the 
meetings and the circumstances surrounding their occurrence.  
3.5.2  Interviews  
 The other data source for developing an understanding of the programs for the 
research is face-to-face interviews with ECT members and non-ECT members.  Thirty-
one individuals were interviewed in the courier setting, twenty people were interviewed 
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in the manufacturing setting, and the ergonomist-facilitator was interviewed on four 
separate occasions.  In Courier Co. I carried out interviews after 16 months and in 
Furniture Co., I carried out interviews after 20 months into the intervention.  In each 
setting I did some follow up interviews with ECT members (Courier Co. N=6; Furniture 
Co. N=4).   
The interviews were semi-standardized, based on research questions common to 
both sites and adapted to address issues specific to each site that emerged in an analysis 
of the field notes.  In the interviews I used a mix of question styles including ―descriptive 
questions‖ (Spradley, 1979: 85-91) which ask an interviewee to specify, in as complete 
detail as possible, the activities involved in a task.  For instance, I asked interviewees, 
―typically, in order to do X what sorts of things are necessary?‖ or ―usually, who 
undertook X?‖   I also used ―probing questions‖ (Berg, 2004: 86-87), which can be 
employed when the interviewer wants the interviewee to be more expansive in her/his 
answer (See Appendix C).  In an attempt to elicit detailed answers I employed a number 
of verbal and non-verbal cues signalling to interviewees that I was interested in what they 
had to say further about a point.  I also deviated from the interview schedule when 
warranted.  For example, during the interviews if an interviewee mentioned a topic that 
s/he was particularly passionate about or s/he mentioned a topic repeatedly or mentioned 
a topic that I had not thought of but was relevant to the research, I pursued this point and 
also would ask the next the interviewee about this. 
Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 150 minutes in length, with most lasting 
around 90 minutes, were audio-recorded, and transcribed verbatim.  The majority of 
interviews were carried out in the workplaces, in rooms where there was privacy, and that 
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were free of interruptions, such as offices with the door closed.  Three of the follow-up 
interviews were carried out off-site at settings of the interviewee‘s choosing.  The 
interviewees consisted of those people who were directly involved with the ergonomic 
program, including the change team members, senior management and a small group of 
workers from each setting (N=5), who were not on the change team but had some 
involvement in the change making process.  With the exception of four individuals in 
management who had been with the companies for at least a year, those interviewed had 
been with their respective companies for five or more years.  
While I typically found that individuals readily accepted my requests for 
interviews, this process was not without its obstacles.  One ECT member at the courier 
company agreed to be interviewed, but repeatedly did not meet me for prearranged 
meetings and in the end was not interviewed.  This individual left the ECT in the sixth 
month of the program and I was unable to interview this person, who was replaced by 
another worker representative, whom I did interview.  At the manufacturing facility, three 
supervisors declined to be interviewed.  Follow-up interviews were carried out with some 
of the ECT members from each site but follow-ups with some employees were 
impossible because these individuals had left the company.  
3.5.3  Documents 
In addition to the primary data sources – field notes and interview transcripts – I 
examined a number of types of documents that were made available to me.  These 
included copies of minutes of ECT meetings, meeting agendas, the surveys the ECTs 
used to assess job task hazards, and diagrams of potential changes drawn by ECT 
members.  The documents reviewed also included materials produced by the companies 
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that seemed pertinent to my investigation such as company newsletters, documents 
related to health and safety, production data, and, in the case of Courier Co., results of a 
company-wide employee satisfaction questionnaire.  Also, to gather additional 
information about the companies‘ backgrounds, I consulted their websites and looked for 
news stories in the popular press.      
Documents prepared by the company, such as newsletters, were used to develop a 
better understanding of the context influencing the company internally and externally.  
For instance, in one of the newsletters gathered from Furniture Co., a column written by 
the president explained the company‘s financial concerns and the sources of these 
concerns, such as the reduced market demand for parts and increase in the price of raw 
materials.  In another example, the ECT meeting minutes provided an excellent source to 
crosscheck findings and to review timelines.  In particular, the minutes were a means to 
corroborate which personnel most often had the responsibility for the team‘s 
implementation tasks.  Looking at both agendas and timelines one could also get a sense 
of the progress (or the lack thereof) the teams were making toward their goals. 
3.6  DATA ORGANIZATION AND ANALYSIS  
Once a portion of the data was transcribed, a coding scheme was developed.  This 
coding scheme was adjusted over time as the data collection and preliminary analysis 
progressed.  As field notes and interviews were transcribed they were imported into a 
qualitative data software package, QSR NUD*IST.  This software facilitated data 
organization and analysis by allowing me to code, save, and easily retrieve categorized 
data.   
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Once field notes and interviews were transcribed and imported to NUD* IST they 
were coded.  I used both initial and focused coding (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 189-
191).  Initial coding represents a first examination of the raw data and usually involves 
going through the transcripts line-by-line, categorizing small units of text.  Focused 
coding is used to examine codes that the researcher identifies as particularly salient to 
getting at the research objectives.  During coding I found it helpful to follow Strauss‘ 
(1987) suggestion of ―asking the data specific and consistent questions.‖  A particular 
series of questions that I found useful are those that Charmaz (2004: 507) suggests:  
―What‘s going on?; What are people doing? ; What‘s the person saying?; What do these 
actions and statements take for granted?; How do structure and context serve to support, 
maintain, impede or change these actions and statements?‖ 
As the analysis proceeded, I followed an iterative process, continually moving 
back and forth from interpretations to the raw data.  This added to the clarity of 
interpretations as well as insuring that they were representative of the data from which 
they were produced.  An analysis technique that I found particularly useful throughout 
the analyses was the ―constant comparative method‖ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 105-113; 
Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  The constant comparative 
method may involve comparing data from different individuals, comparing different 
situations, and/or comparing data from two different points in time if the data are 
collected longitudinally, and aims to identify consistencies and inconsistencies and 
reasons for these.   
Principally, I compared data from different situations, points in time, and data 
from different ECT members.  I also compared interviews, field notes and documents 
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(e.g., meeting minutes).  For instance, a juxtaposition of the ECTs‘ activities around 
assessment and solution building in the first several months of the interventions with the 
ECTs‘ activities around assessment and solution building later in the interventions, gave 
me an idea of how the ECTs altered some of their activities.  Further examination gave 
me an understanding of why these changes had occurred.  Additionally, as the ECTs‘ 
projects varied in scope, complexity, and duration, I was able to examine the various 
types of activities associated with different types of projects, what the activities were, and 
whether they enabled the ECTs to reach their objectives.   
Another technique I used during analysis was ―diagramming‖ (Lofland and 
Lofland, 1995: 199-201) as a means to help to organize what was going on in each of the 
settings.  Diagramming often directed my attention to topics to be followed and helped to 
generate questions that I pursued in the field and as I analyzed the data.  For instance, I 
used flow charts to map the processes involved in implementing changes, and at various 
times, to map how the ECTs‘ activities changed over time and how a series of events led 
to these changes. 
Figure 3.1 is an example of a diagram used during data analysis.  The diagram 
makes clear how worker representatives and others were not fully aware of what 
activities needed to be carried out during implementation in Courier Co. once a request 
had been submitted to senior managers outside the depot.  (This topic is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Six.)  The diagram outlines the factors that perpetuated this lack of 
awareness such as organizational hierarchy, worker representatives‘ reluctance to confer  
 88 







worked out  
Explanation of the black box  
Some group members are kept out of the 
implementation process –HOW –  
Processes within black box essential for 
ECT to make change  
Structures/conditions that support/maintain 
this relationship:  
regular bureaucratic channels; authority; 
class; the need to get change made; 
adherence to the blueprint; adherence to 
patterns of authority 
(professional/managerial); workers feel 
incapable of communicating with hierarchy   








solution   
Team‘s 
recommendation is 
sent on to a manager 
external to team and 
outside the depot 
―Black box‖ is created 
and maintained – team 
members do not know 
what goes on beyond 
their recommendation at 
the facility-level  
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with senior managers, and failure to discuss how the process of requests is negotiated.  
Combined, these factors created and maintained a ―black box‖ around implementation 
that prevented several ECT members from learning about the process by which changes 
were requested. 
A technique that I also used to coax patterns from the data was to perform what 
Huberman and Miles (1994: 429) refer to as ―data display,‖ which is ―an organized, 
compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and/or action 
taking.‖  I found that data display techniques could be accomplished by examining the 
material around a code using NUD*IST, which allowed me to efficiently display the data 
when trying to comprehend what and why ―things‖ were going on. 
A significant portion of the latter phases of analysis consisted of memo-writing.  
Memos ranged in length from a few sentences to a couple of pages and described 
particularly significant themes and the relations between these themes (Emerson et al., 
1995: 162-166; Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 193-195).  Some of these memos were 
developed into narratives. 
Qualitative researchers are faced with the task of distinguishing between 
irrelevant and germane themes as they analyze their data.  Part of the burden of this task 
is that there are few criteria by which to judge what a ―good‖ theme is.  I typically 
selected themes that I pursued based on several criteria, which resemble those outlined by 
Emerson et al., (1995: 157-160).  I judged themes to be important according to whether I 
found recurring instances in my fieldnotes and interviews, how important particular 
issues seemed to be to the individuals in the setting, and how the themes related to the 
broad research questions I set out to investigate which were, What actions were 
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undertaken by individuals to ensure the PE programs functioned and continued? How did 
the organizational, and societal context enable or constrain, the pursuit of PE program 
activities?   
3.7  ASSESSING QUALITY 
This section discusses issues related to the quality of the data gathering and 
analysis.  I describe the techniques that were used during the data gathering and analysis 
to enhance the validity of project‘s findings.  The section begins with a discussion about 
credibility then proceeds to talk about transferability.  I conclude the section by 
considering the limitations of the methods.    
3.7.1  Credibility 
To evaluate qualitative research there must be some sort of assessment of how 
consistent the fit is between a researcher‘s account and what actually occurred in the 
setting.  Another way to put this is how valid is a researcher‘s account of what really 
went on?  One approach to questions of validity is by ―establishing credibility‖ or ―the 
naturalist‘s substitute for the conventionalist‘s internal validity‖ (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985: 296).  
I attempted to ensure the validity of the findings in the present study by following 
some of the techniques that Lincoln and Guba have laid out.  Lincoln and Guba (1985: 
301-309) put forward a set of measures for assessing the credibility of a piece of 
qualitative research, which they refer to as ―establishing trustworthiness.‖  Establishing 
trustworthiness in the results of qualitative analysis can be achieved both during data 
collection and analysis stages.  One way I tried to establish credibility during the data 
collection phase was to use ―prolonged engagement‖ or the ―investment of sufficient time 
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to achieve certain purposes: learning of the ‗culture,‘ testing for misinformation 
introduced by distortions either by the self or of the respondents, and building trust‖ 
(303) (see also Creswell and Miller, 2000).  Another way I sought to increase the data‘s 
trustworthiness was to engage in what Lincoln and Guba (1985: 304) call ―persistent 
observation,‖ which ―adds the dimension of salience to what might otherwise appear to 
be little more than a mindless immersion.‖  The purpose of persistent observation is the 
inverse of prolonged engagement in the sense that the former intends to focus on a select 
group of themes relevant to the research questions, whereas the latter intends to cast 
one‘s net as widely as possible so as not to miss anything relevant.  In persistent 
observation, instead of going to the field and focusing on new events each time with no 
direction as to what may be of importance to the research questions, one goes there with 
specific questions in mind.  Persistent observation motivates one to ―sort‖ among those 
aspects of the setting that are relevant to the phenomenon and those that are not and to 
focus on elements that are germane to the emergent themes in the analysis.  As such, the 
observations were recorded over several months, in situ, collected contemporaneously, as 
events unfolded, as opposed to retrospectively, thus reducing recall bias.   
Triangulation is another way of enhancing credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 
305).  Most simply put it is the use of multiple sources of information to verify or 
corroborate some observations and/or interpretations.  In the analysis, triangulation was 
employed by using different data sources and methods of collection.  I used documents, 
interviews, and observations as data sources and used interviewing and direct observation 
as the core data collection methods.  Together, the various data sources and data 
gathering methods enabled me to continually recheck my observations.     
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Another means of enhancing credibility was to discuss my findings with other 
researchers in particular, Nancy Theberge and Donald Cole, who were familiar with the 
project, and worked on both conference presentations and papers with me.  During these  
―peer debriefings,‖ in the words of Lincoln and Guba (1985: 308-309), among other 
suggestions, they encouraged me to check whether my portrayals corresponded to what 
the participants had said or done and to check the sequencing of events.  In particular, it 
was helpful to ensure there were no gaps in the narrative and to ask the data more 
questions. 
3.7.2  Transferability 
Some would say that the question of whether what happened in the sites is 
representative of what may occur in other settings is beside the point, noting that there is 
a ―trade off‖ (Morrill and Fine, 1997: 440-441) between the depth one achieves and how 
representative the setting is of a broader population of settings.  Qualitative researchers 
typically reject conventional notions of generalizability (Athelaide and Johnson, 1994; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Lincoln, 1995; Patton, 2002).  Instead, they generally rely on 
what is referred to as ―transferability.‖ In qualitative research, some researchers suggest, 
―that only working hypotheses may be abstracted, the transferability of which is an 
empirical matter, depending on the degree of similarity between sending and receiving 
contexts‖ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 316).  Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that the onus 
on the researcher is not to predict whether or not the results are ―generalizable‖ but rather 
to ensure there is enough detail or ―thick description‖ about the setting, the concepts, the 
data gathering process, and the process whereby interpretations were arrived at such that 
future researchers can compare between studies.  Following this line of thinking, 
Schofield (2002:198) notes that, ―A consensus appears to be emerging that for qualitative 
 93 
researchers generalizability is best thought of as a matter of the ―fit‖ ―between the 
situation studied and others to which one might be interested in applying the concepts and 
conclusions of that study.‖  
Schofield (2002: 180-185) suggests there are ways of increasing the 
generalizability of qualitative findings.  One such way is to do multi-site analyses.  
Carrying out the study in two settings exposed me to a wider range of processes and 
events, enabled me to see common processes, and allowed me to compare the 
circumstances under which different processes arose.  Further, some of the data collected 
from Courier Co. was used in a cross-site analysis of several sites in which the RT had 
conducted PE interventions and there was consistency of the findings among it and three 
other settings (Cole et al., in press).  According to Schofield (2002), another way to 
enhance the generalizability of a study‘s findings is to examine situations that are typical 
or representative of the phenomenon under study.  In establishing the representativeness 
of the interventions two aspects of the intervention are of interest: the intervention model 
and the organization itself.  
 Based on descriptions of PE interventions in the ergonomic literature, I am 
confident that the programs that were introduced in the sites were representative of the 
interventions that PE researchers usually undertake (see for instance, Haines et al., 2002; 
Hignett et al., 2005; St Vincent et al., 2006; Van Eerd et al., 2008) and have parallels 
with other participatory interventions designed to reduce musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., 
Wands and Yassi, 1992).  The PE program the RT introduced followed the general 
precepts of participatory ergonomics (e.g., Imada, 1991; Wilson et al., 2005) including an 
emphasis on worker input and use of ergonomic assessment tools to evaluate work 
 94 
hazards.  It was also similar to other models of PE programs in its use of ergonomists to 
train and then guide the ECT, its use of ―representative participatory‖ style of 
involvement, and its use of an iterative model (the Blueprint) to guide change making 
(see Van Eerd et al., 2008).  
It is more difficult to establish whether or not the organizations in which the 
interventions took place were representative of the population of organizations in the 
courier sector or manufacturing sector.  Nonetheless, some of the relevant characteristics 
of the settings can be enumerated.  First, the settings were unionised and staffed by full-
time employees.  Studies have shown that non-unionized labour typically fare worse on 
health and safety issues compared to their unionized counterparts (Nichols, 1997).  
Second, the settings may differ from other Ontario workplaces based on management‘s 
interests in health and safety.  The organizational settings where the interventions took 
place were self-selected to take part in a PE program and management, at least to some 
extent, saw workplace health, or at least recorded injuries, as important, as evidenced by 
the fact that management in each company contacted the university research team in an 
interest to address MSDs.  Third, the settings in which the interventions were carried out 
were mid-sized organizations and both were part of larger companies.  This is relevant 
because their size gave them reliable access to certain resources, such as health and safety 
practitioners, not likely to be possessed by smaller organizations.  Lastly, the 
occupational health and safety regulatory climate differs across Canadian jurisdictions.  
Some provinces, such as Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia, have legislation 
regarding MSDs.  The absence of such MSD legislation in Ontario may have had some 
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impact on how managers responded to the PE programs both in their functioning and 
continuation.   
3.8  LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
One limitation of ethnography is that the ethnographer, despite how much he or 
she would like, cannot be in all places at once to observe and record activities and 
circumstances germane to the research.  Situations unfold, conversations take place, and 
decisions are made in the researcher‘s absence that may be relevant to the investigation 
but which the researcher has no opportunity to observe and record.  This reality reflects 
the natural goings on of a setting and was definitely the case in this study.   While much 
of the decision-making was carried out in the ECTs‘ meetings and I was able to 
accompany the ECT members during some of their activities, some of the ECTs‘ 
activities were carried out at times, usually non-meeting days, when I was not in the 
settings.  Also, there were some meetings and discussions about the participatory 
ergonomic programs that I was not present for but would like to have been.  Missing 
some of these opportunities to observe is one of the hazards that researchers are exposed 
to as they attempt to witness and chronicle how phenomena unfold ―naturally.‖ I tried to 
minimize this issue by staying in the settings over a prolonged period and trying to get at 
what had happened when I was not around by talking with those in the setting.  When I 
became aware of decisions that had been made or discussions that had occurred that had 
shaped or could possibly shape the participatory programs, I tried to follow them up as 
much as possible.   
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3.9  COMPARING CASES 
The comparison of multiple cases can be formatted in several ways.  One could, 
for instance, use a predetermined list of core or common concepts that allows comparison 
across cases and elucidates the phenomenon of interest with one explanation.  This type 
of comparison is suitable when the cases under study are similar and differ quantitatively 
on a set of data points.  A problem with this approach is that it does not leave much room 
for qualitative differences between, or among, the cases under study.  As a result, as a 
researcher attempts to capture the empirical findings using a single explanation, some of 
the key qualitative differences between the cases, such as the presence of a factor in one 
setting that is absent in another, may be overlooked, undervalued and/or excluded.  
Significantly, such instances may diminish the validity of a study‘s results.  Also, as 
MacPhee (1995: 191) points out, ―The key challenge in integrating cases under a single 
model is one of calibration – making sure that cases with different values for the model‘s 
general variables or categories really do belong on the same dimension in the order they 
appear to have.‖  
Another way of comparing across cases and the one that this dissertation uses is to 
rely on different explanations for the cases.  The idea underpinning such an approach is 
that different factors may account for divergent or similar outcomes across cases.  
MacPhee (1995:191) suggests this type of style is analogous to looking at a map in the 
sense that, ―there can be two or more alternative routes to a destination.‖ So, for example, 
the effectiveness of an occupational health and safety program in one site may be 
attributed to strong management commitment, but in another, effectiveness may be due to 
actions by OHS consultants external to a company.  In the dissertation, discussions of the 
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empirical findings from each site will be interpreted using concepts that in some cases 
differ based on the findings from each site.  The dissertation‘s findings chapters are 
organized as parallel case studies that explore a common set of topics for each, namely: 
(1) how the ECTs developed solutions to address the hazards they identified, (2) how the 
ECTs implemented solutions, and (3) how the participatory ergonomic programs were 
sustained.  The examination of the cases resembles what Bonnell refers to as an 
―analytical comparison.‖ Bonnell (1980) describes two types of comparative practice: 
―analytical comparison‖ and ―illustrative comparison.‖  In analytical comparisons,  
the main point of comparison is between or among equivalent 
units. The comparison involves identification of independent 
variables that serve to explain common or contrasting patterns or 
occurrences.  The investigator juxtaposes equivalent units with 
each other in order to discern regularities that might provide 
explanatory generalizations. In the second or illustrative type [of 
comparison] the main point of comparison is between equivalent 
units on the one hand and a theory or concept on the other. This 
variant evaluates individual units not in relation to each other but 
in relation to a basic theory or concept applicable to all of them‖ 
(Bonnell, 1980: 164-65).    
Unlike illustrative comparisons, which tend to be more deductive and where the 
objective is to provide a test of theory, analytic comparisons are typically more inductive 
but still may use concepts to guide the researcher‘s interpretation of findings.  In this 
dissertation, similarities and contrasting elements of each case are discussed at a 
conceptual level in the final section of each chapter.  By pursuing this comparative style 
more of the particularities of each setting are retained, enabling a closer examination of 
some of the contextual factors that may account for different empirical findings in each 
setting.  There are challenges though in following such a comparative strategy.  MacPhee 
(1995:192) points out that, ―The key challenge of this approach involves distinguishing 
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between minor case differences and differences reflecting different models, and 
determining the exact relations that hold among different models.‖   
3.10  SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a description of the settings and an overview of the data 
sources, the data collection techniques, and the analysis.  It also described some of the 
problems that were encountered while establishing my role in the settings as an observer 
rather than interventionist.  Additionally, the chapter outlines how issues such as 
credibility and generalizability were dealt with.  The primary data gathering techniques 
chosen, direct observation and interviews were suitable for getting at the ―how‖ of 
intervention change and sustainability.  Chapter Four discusses the activities undertaken 
by the ergonomic change teams as they identified ways to address MSDs.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE NATURE OF AND ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN DESIGNING 
SOLUTIONS 
―I‘ve walked the circumference of the earth with a cart for 
Christ‘s sakes.  I should be able to speak to this. … You should 
listen to what I have to say‖  (Courier, in reference to an 
engineer‘s questions about one of the designs proposed by the 
ECT). 
4.0  INTRODUCTION 
    Participatory ergonomic (PE) programs are intended to involve workers, 
considered to be the most familiar with production processes, in the design of 
ergonomically sound solutions.  However, as the design process is also affected by social 
and organizational conditions, attaining this goal of ergonomically- and worker-informed 
solutions can be problematic for an ergonomic change team (ECT).  Some projects 
require specialized knowledge that is not possessed by an ECT and gaining and 
maintaining access to this knowledge may be difficult.  Further, production pressures 
often pose challenges to accessing workers‘ time to attend to ergonomic issues.      
  This chapter examines solution design, the process by which the ECTs in each 
setting developed a means to address MSDs.  The ECTs‘ goal was to devise solutions to 
reduce MSDs and, in doing so, apply workers‘ experiential knowledge.
11
  In this chapter I 
present an account of the problem-solving processes used in both of the settings, an 
overview of the types of knowledge that were used, and a description of the actors‘ 
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 Worker knowledge encompasses both an understanding of a job that may be codified in a job description 
but also an understanding of a job that is amassed over time, informal, and usually emerges from workers‘ 
experiences, not formal training.  Kusterer‘s (1978) research in the manufacturing and service sector on 
knowledge and skill brings to light the depth of worker knowledge.  Worker knowledge includes 
knowledge of how to perform a job but also the hazards that it entails.  Recently, Cann et al., (2008) 
reminded us of the important role worker knowledge plays in identifying hazards.    
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access to knowledge.  In examining solution building, the chapter investigates one part of 
the change-making trajectory.  The analysis reveals that the organizational program was 
dependent upon the perspectives of multiple groups.  It also suggests that different types 
of and differential access to knowledge affected both the levels of worker participation 
and the design process effectiveness.  In each setting, design parameters, production 
pressures, the nature of the knowledge required to design solutions, and the differential 
distribution of that knowledge among workplace personnel influenced (a) the 
effectiveness of the ECTs‘ solution building activities, (b) the design process, and (c) the 
nature and degree of participation by the teams‘ worker members.  
 4.1  CHALLENGES TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING AND APPLICATION  
The degree to which worker knowledge is used in workplace programs is affected 
by the extent to which workers are given opportunities to use it.  Evidence in the 
literature on occupational health programs demonstrates that management control of a 
workplace may limit workers‘ application of knowledge relevant to addressing hazards 
(Hall et al., 2006; Nelkin and Brown, 1984; Smith, 2000; Tucker, 1995; Walters and 
Nichols, 2006).  In the literature on participatory work arrangements there are many 
examples in which the goal of worker involvement is not reached because production 
demands subordinate participatory objectives (e.g., Vallas, 2003), and managers are 
reluctant to grant workers autonomy to provide input into problem solving (e.g., 
Rothstein, 2006).  This literature makes clear that worker involvement in participatory 
schemes is not straightforward and is often shaped by both managerial control and 
economic imperatives.  
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Findings reported in the ergonomic design literature demonstrate that the 
incorporation of ergonomic principles into workplace design is a political process 
(Garrety and Badham, 1999; 2004; Jensen, 2002; Perrow, 1983).  In a study of interaction 
during a design project, Burns and Vicente (2000) showed that because of the divergent 
perspectives of multiple actors it was necessary for ergonomists to negotiate the 
incorporation of ergonomic principles into the design; this process was often difficult and 
sometimes resulted in conflict.  Similarly, Wulff et al., (1999a; 1999b) note that even if 
an organization has policies and procedures in place for the application of ergonomic 
principles in design processes, integrating them involves negotiation.  In their study of 
OHS consultants‘ efforts to promote ergonomic design, Broberg and Hermund (2004) 
confirmed that, for OHS consultants to participate in technology design they must be 
―skilled in political and negotiative processes and the dynamics of technological design 
processes.‖    Importantly, a common thread in these studies is that the design process is 
affected by the priorities which actors in different social worlds place on ergonomic-
informed design.    
4.2  KNOWLEDGE LIMITATIONS 
  The uneven distribution of workplace knowledge may limit workers‘ 
participation.  Because opportunities for learning about the whole labour process are 
often limited by the conditions of Fordist
12
 production, production workers (e.g., machine 
operators) typically possess fewer skills than trades people (Braverman, 1974; Rinehart, 
                                                 
 
12
 Generally, Fordism refers to production processes in which there is little worker involvement in 
production decisions (e.g., how job tasks should be carried out), work is carefully controlled by 
management, and often machine paced.  Post-Fordist organizations are those that have genuinely embraced 
participatory schemes.  Many authors note that claims by management and consultants about the genuine 
adoption of Post-Fordist practices are exaggerated (see for instance Vallas and Beck, 1996). 
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2006).  Accordingly, even if workers are granted opportunities to engage in the problem-
solving process, the uneven and often hierarchical distribution of knowledge within the 
workplace means they may be unable to come to a solution themselves.  As a result, some 
types of problem solving require involvement of those with specialized expertise.  In 
participatory initiatives to improve quality and production processes (e.g., Delbridge et 
al., 2000; Rothenberg, 2003), which resemble participatory OHS programs in that both 
depend on worker knowledge for their effectiveness, there is evidence of a discrepancy 
between the knowledge required to solve problems and workers‘ experiential knowledge.   
A body of literature that has focused on collaborative design processes has 
examined the ways in which these processes are constrained.  Evidence in various 
contexts, such as science (Fujimura, 1987; Sundberg, 2007), policy formation (Hall and 
McGinty, 1997; Prus, 2003), medicine (Casper and Clarke, 1998), technology (Klein and 
Kleinmann, 2002), culinary arts (Fine, 1996), art (Becker, 1974; 1982) theatre (Lyon, 
1974), and invention (Whalley, 1991) highlight the constraining influence of multiple 
audiences on design.  A key point in this literature is that the production of ―things‖ at the 
local level is subject to shaping by organizational and social structure.  Ensuring that 
something meets the need of those who designed it is important, but because designs are 
contextually influenced, typically this is not the only design consideration.  For instance, 
an architect may be tasked with designing a house but have to create a house plan that is 
compliant with local fire codes, electrical codes, and municipal bylaws.  Multiple 
audiences typically have different expectations about what design elements need to be 
taken into consideration.  Design teams need to be aware of these parameters; more, they 
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must also have the knowledge to incorporate the global features into their designs; 
otherwise, design failure may result.    
The research discussed above makes clear that design processes may be affected 
by a multitude of factors:  in the case of OHS programs, both the process and the extent 
of worker involvement may be shaped by access to knowledge and access to opportunity 
to share and apply that knowledge.  This chapter explores how the nature of and access to 
knowledge affected solution design and the incorporation of workers‘ knowledge into the 
design process.  The next section describes the approach that both ECTs used to 
formulate plans to address hazards in the initial months of the interventions. 
4.3  DESIGNING SOLUTIONS IN COURIER CO. AND FURNITURE CO. 
This section describes the scheme that was intended to guide the processes, and 
how in both workplaces, as the process unfolded, deviations from the scheme occurred.  
Dealt with are the types of knowledge that were deemed important, the formal model 
used by the ECTs to address hazards, the activities entailed in devising plans to address 
them, and the sequence of stages that the ECTs followed when developing solutions to 
address these hazards.  
The discipline of ergonomics studies how humans interact with their physical 
environment.  With regard to injury prevention, ergonomics is devoted to reducing the 
biomechanical forces acting on workers.   In what are typically referred to as 
―engineering interventions‖ ergonomists devise ways to alter human interactions with 
work environments by modifying work processes, usually locating the source of injury in 
the physical workplace rather than workers‘ personal characteristics (e.g., height, age) 
(Wilson et al., 2005).  As Norman and Wells (2000: 119) point out, ―Engineering 
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interventions are physical manipulations of hazards or routes of exposure to physical 
hazards.  Typical examples may be the provision of lift tables to prevent lifting from 
ground level, or adjustable office equipment.‖  Significantly, because the focus of 
ergonomics is on the source of injury in the work environment, the ECTs concentrated on 
addressing injury by manipulating the physical environment through modifying tools, 
machines, and work organization.   
  Given that this was a project in participatory ergonomics, the principal 
knowledge the ECTs relied on was ergonomic.  As described in Chapter 3, in both 
settings, ergonomic knowledge was provided to the ECTs‘ members during an initial 
multi-day training session held at the outset of the programs and a three-hour, follow-up 
training session held ten months into the programs.  During these sessions, the ECTs 
learned about basic anatomy, how physical forces act on the human body, and how these 
forces are identified and measured.     
The ECTs also relied on workers‘ experiential knowledge, which was applied by 
the ECT‘s worker representatives and collected from workers who were not ECT 
members.  The ECTs spent considerable time consulting with workers about the team‘s 
prospective changes and gathering information from workers regarding the potential 
hazards and ways of addressing them. 
PE programs may also require technical knowledge, that is, an understanding of 
how to carry out the design and development of changes, and perhaps familiarity with the 
operation and inner workings of machinery, as well as knowledge about the use of tools 
and operations of systems, and the alignment of various pieces of production equipment 
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in order to manufacture a product or provide a service.  This knowledge may also include 
information about industry standards that need to be followed, including safety protocols.   
An important feature of technical knowledge is that it also includes knowledge 
specific to a given work site.  As Cooke‘s (2002; 2003) research demonstrates, 
maintenance personnel possess an array of skills, both generic and types of ―firm-
specific‖ knowledge‖:  ―Maintenance work may incorporate much more than checking 
machines and fixing breakdowns; it may involve the purchasing of spares, liaising with 
the supplier/customer, supervising contractors, training other people and so on‖ (58). 
Both formal and informal knowledge of equipment and work processes may need to be 
taken into consideration in the design of a change. 
In the ECTs‘ meetings, decision-making about what should be changed and how 
it should be changed was shaped by the multi-step model called the ―blueprint‖ (Wells et 
al., 2001), which emphasizes that decision-making should be based on carefully gathered 
evidence from the examination of work areas and job tasks.  In each of the settings, the 
ergonomist-facilitator frequently endorsed the formal model‘s usefulness and encouraged 
the teams‘ use of it.  He frequently pointed out when team members skipped the 
necessary steps in the model, and on these occasions, asked them to re-evaluate the 
hazard under consideration so they could accurately identify its source.  
The initial steps of any project undertaken by the ECTs were to develop a solid 
understanding of the job and then evaluate the hazards it exposed workers to (Chapter 3 
provides details of the process of identifying hazards).  Then, using what the ECTs‘ 
members referred to as ―solution building‖ team members identified what would address 
a hazard and determined how it would achieve that goal.  Central to solution building was 
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the application of workers‘ intimate knowledge about the work processes and ergonomic 
principles to generate solutions.  Solution building initially involved coming up with a 
general idea of how to optimally address a hazard.  For instance, if a hazard arose from 
bending into a bin, then the solution would likely involve minimizing the need to bend.  
Next, solution building involved the ECT specifically identifying how it would put its 
general idea into practice.  It also involved locating articles, such as equipment and tools, 
or services so that a hazard could be addressed.  Occasionally, the ECTs were able to 
identify articles that were purpose-built to reduce MSDs (e.g., adjustable tables), which 
minimized the time and effort to design something.  Sometimes there was equipment 
housed within the facility that the ECTs could use; other times, the ECTs had to go 
outside the worksite to obtain equipment or services.  With regard to equipment, whether 
it was found in the facility or outside, it often needed some adjustments and was re-
configured to fit within the work processes and meet the team‘s ergonomic requirements.  
If a solution was unavailable, the ECT designed something from scratch to address a 
work task that exposed employees to MSDs. 
Sources of information about potential solutions varied: In some cases, these 
activities could be accomplished by drawing on the knowledge within the team; other 
times it meant going to get information from non-ECT members.  Few changes were ever 
designed in one meeting.  Design usually occurred over a series of meetings.  There were 
two reasons for this:  (a) design took a good deal of time and team members did not have 
a lot of time to devote to design in a single meeting and (b) often, the information to 
pursue a design required was not possessed by those in the meeting.   
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The ECTs began solution building by ―brainstorming,‖ the term of their choice, to 
generate several alternative approaches that might address a hazard.  Typically, the teams 
next compared these solutions by examining their positives and negatives and asking 
about their feasibility, in order to narrow the list to those solutions that best addressed the 
hazard.  Frequently, during the generation of solutions and their evaluation they sought 
additional information about them.  These additional types of information included 
concerns such as the financial cost and measurements to allow the ECT to predict the 
extent a solution would reduce exposure to injury.  Additionally, the ECT‘s sought 
feedback from non-ECT workers on what would best address a hazard. 
As brainstorming and the evaluation of possible solutions were intended to 
include ECT members‘ perspectives, both were important opportunities for dialogue 
within the teams.  Encouraging as frank an exchange of ideas as possible, the ergonomist-
facilitator often emphasised that during brainstorming there were no incorrect suggestions 
about how a problem should be addressed and that ECT members should think as 
creatively as possible and not limit their thinking by worrying about cost or how 
management might respond to the suggestion.  In both settings, at the outset of 
interventions, the teams were quite inclusive in their efforts and their activities could be 
described as co-production or co-authorship.  In Courier Co., for instance, the ECT 
members described it as a ―good forum‖ in which ―nothing was considered wrong.‖  
Likewise, in Furniture Co., worker representatives described solution building and 
assessment of solutions as very participatory. 
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4.4 COURIER CO. 
4.4.1  Solution Building and ECT Members’ Experiential Knowledge 
Once the ECT had enumerated a number of potential solutions to address a 
hazard, the members typically tried to narrow their list to a single possible solution.  
Whether worker representatives were involved in the process was generally contingent on 
whether they possessed knowledge of how the hazard could be addressed and knew 
where they might be able to get what the ECT needed.  When worker members were not 
involved, solution building mainly involved the ECT‘s management representatives, and 
for the most part, excluded worker representatives.   
The solution building stage generally emphasized the application of contextual 
information, which was the kind of knowledge that workers possessed, and so they 
generally were heavily involved.  For instance, when the ECT was looking into injuries 
incurred by couriers delivering to a shopping mall, they suggested that getting a trailer 
with a mechanical lift, known as a tail-lift, would reduce risk of injury.  The decision to 
get the trailer and tail-lift was based on the fact that there were few mall loading docks 
onto which couriers could offload their cargo, and these were often inaccessible to the 
couriers, which compelled workers to repeatedly clamber in and out of the trailer, 
exposing themselves to potential injury.  In another example, the ECT‘s selection of a 
lightweight two-wheeled cart for a courier was not only about the cart‘s ability to carry 
freight but also about how easily it could be loaded and stowed in the courier‘s delivery 
trucks, a task that the couriers performed repeatedly every day.  Because the ECT 
operated with workers‘ knowledge of the job, the solutions it selected were tailored 
specifically to their understandings of workers‘ job environments and demands. 
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A dramatic example of how workers brought their experiential knowledge to the 
solution building stage occurred in a situation in which a worker was invited into a  
meeting to talk about a design for a new four-wheeled cart, to replace a cart that couriers 
currently were using to pull heavy loads of freight.  The heavily-laden cart that they 
wanted to replace, weighing several hundred pounds, often needed to be stopped quickly.  
When the team asked the worker how he stopped the cart he swung a dirty, well-worn, 
steel-toed work boot onto the table and pointed to the boot‘s toe.  The leather had been 
stripped from the toe of his boot revealing the steel underneath and he indicated that he 
usually slowed the cart by bracing his body against its load and sticking the toe of his 
work boot under one of the cart‘s front wheels.  Part of the proposed design of the cart 
was to add a handbrake. 
Worker representatives used their experiential knowledge of a job not only to 
determine a practicable solution, but also as a resource to identify vendors who could 
assist in developing or providing the solutions.  For instance, the ECT‘s courier 
representatives frequently relied on information from customers on their delivery routes 
to develop ideas about how to address a hazard.  The mechanic drew on his own expertise 
as well as relationships with vendors who did regular depot maintenance, with companies 
that supplied parts and tools to the depot‘s garage, and with companies that did major 
repairs to Courier Co.‘s delivery trucks.  In one instance of the incorporation of 
experiential knowledge into solution building, some couriers requested new wheels and 
casters on two carts.  As the ECT began to think through the appropriate type of cart 
wheels, a courier on the ECT pulled out a supplier‘s catalogue that contained materials 
handling equipment, read some of the wheels‘ characteristics aloud, and noted that he 
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knew of a vendor on his delivery route from whom wheels could be purchased.  In 
another instance in which the ECT was investigating different types of carts to haul 
parcels, several worker representatives participated in the process of selecting what the 
best type of cart might be.  Some worker representatives volunteered to talk to people 
they knew who sold carts, and another worker representative offered to look into a 
different type of cart, saying, ―I‘ll see if there are places around here [depot] [where they 
can be purchased].‖  The worker representatives reported that they checked into the 
availability of carts using the Internet, the phone book, and their personal contacts. 
While the majority of the ECT‘s solution-building activities heavily involved 
worker representatives, in other instances solution building involved almost exclusively 
management members.  When worker representatives were unaware where they could 
obtain a solution, they typically turned to the ECT‘s manager representatives and the 
ergonomist-facilitator for assistance.  The OHS manager and operations administrative 
assistant were the team members who either had this information or knew people in the 
company who had it, and thus could give members insight into their options.  The 
ergonomist-facilitator drew on his ergonomics knowledge and on his experiences with 
past interventions in other settings.  Usually, the operations administrative assistant or 
OHS manager came forward or was asked by the ECT to look into possible solutions and 
then share them at the next meeting. 
An exchange at one meeting provides a good example of worker representatives 
seeking assistance from management representatives.  On this occasion the ECT was 
attempting to address the concerns of some of the depot‘s dockworkers, who spent much 
of their shift standing stationary on a concrete floor sorting packages, a position which 
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created pain in their knees and ankles.  Having decided that anti-fatigue matting would 
address these concerns, the ECT needed to select the most appropriate matting for their 
needs from an array of different types.  The ergonomist-facilitator advised the group to 
compare the quality of several types of matting and to select a type that best suited the 
team‘s purposes.  The OHS representative suggested that a vendor visit the depot with 
some samples.  However, the ECT‘s worker representatives did not know what vendor to 
consult, and during the discussion a worker representative asked the OHS manager to 
contact an appropriate vendor. 
A similar exchange occurred at another meeting.  The ECT discussed changing 
the speed of one of the depot‘s conveyor belts, and the conversation turned to borrowing 
a device that the team could use to measure the belt‘s speed from management at another 
depot.  After a lengthy discussion of the problem, the ergonomist-facilitator asked who 
was going to be responsible for measuring the belt‘s speed and then suggested making 
some calls to acquire the measuring device.  A worker representative replied, ―Who do 
you even call?‖ The operations administrative assistant interjected at this point and said, 
―I will do it.‖  Even when the team‘s worker representatives were given the names of 
company personnel to contact, reaching these individuals often proved difficult.  The 
operations administrative assistant recalled an instance in which she tried to connect a 
change team member with company personnel located outside the depot. 
…. we tried that once with [ECT worker representative]….. and 
he had to find out about the low boy trailer [trailer that sits low to 
the ground] and it didn‘t work out too well because I gave him a 
couple of names and he came back and he said, ―This person said 
I had to talk to this person and this person said I had to talk to this 
person.‖… which is the same thing I would have done if I had of 
called – sometimes you are not talking to the right person and 
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that‘s how you find out who the right person is and they tell you 
you should talk to someone else. 
Overall, in the ECT‘s solution development activities at Courier Co. designing 
and selecting solutions were largely done within the change team and did not require 
outsiders.  The reliance upon team members flowed from the kinds of concerns that were 
addressed.  The production processes in the depot involved very little high-tech 
machinery.  For the most part, it involved considerable manual materials handling: the 
movement of packages, freight, and mail from one area in the facility‘s loading dock area 
or form a delivery truck to another.  The equipment used was rudimentary:  mainly two- 
and four-wheeled carts, manual and powered conveyance equipment, pallet jacks, and 
cage carts.    Significantly, the limited amount of complex production equipment reduced 
the ECT‘s need for technical knowledge.  
The descriptions above give a sense of the types of knowledge that the ECT in 
Courier Co. required and how this influenced the involvement of worker members.  
Those whose knowledge was required to devise solutions were, for the most part, ECT 
members, and only infrequently did members have to go outside the group to get 
information about how it could best design a solution to address hazards.  The workers 
supplied their intimate knowledge of tasks, as well as their opinions about how they 
should be addressed, based, in part, on their ergonomic knowledge. 
4.4.2  Forwarding Frustrations and Challenges to Knowledge Application 
To apply and share their knowledge, workers had to be able to attend the ECTs‘ 
meetings and involve themselves in its activities.  In the program‘s first several months, 
local management, supportive of the PE program, provided the ECT with the time it 
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needed to investigate hazards and discuss how they could be addressed.  Significantly, 
their support included relieving workers from their regular duties so they could attend 
ECT meetings and carry out activities related to making change.  This support began to 
wane some eight to twelve months into the intervention, when the district manager 
expressed concern about his ability to meet production demands and indicated he was 
experiencing difficulty relieving workers from their jobs to attend to ECT activities.  
Thus, worker attendance at the ECT meetings became irregular as the intervention 
proceeded, which greatly hindered the ECT members‘ capacity to apply workers‘ 
knowledge.  The effect of workers‘ absences was twofold:  the ECT‘s activities slowed 
and worker representatives‘ involvement in the decision-making process was limited. 
An ECT worker representative explained how the company‘s production 
pressures constrained the ECT‘s ability to collect and use ergonomic information.  When 
I asked what he thought of the formal model for making changes, he noted that the 
approach was fine but was significantly compromised by the time pressures that workers 
faced: 
As a process itself it [ergonomics program] makes great sense. To 
apply it to [Courier Co.] is the…. weak link, I‘d say. 
Interviewer: Why is that the weak link? 
[Courier Co.] is a minute-by-minute business.  They think about 
two seconds ahead at any given moment.  They want results 
exactly when things happen.  They have no patience.,…  they 
want to see the money spent, they want to see the results for the 
money.  This ergonomics blueprint doesn‘t flow with the culture 
of [Courier Co], because it takes time.  It takes research.  It takes 
people to … go out and have a look and see what the problem is 
and try to solve the problem.  
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Management was able to relieve workers, and especially couriers, for ECT 
meetings under certain conditions, but on many occasions scheduling couriers off was 
precarious.  Such scheduling hinged on whether a spare courier was available to cover the 
ECT member‘s delivery route.  Having one or more spare couriers in the depot was 
company policy.  The availability of spare couriers was conditional on whether any 
difficulties developed.  If there was a problem, such as a worker calling in sick, and the 
spare courier had to fill his/her spot, then a courier was often unable to be released to 
attend the ECT‘s meetings.  When I asked the supervisor responsible for ―scheduling off‖ 
the couriers about the challenges the ECT faced in getting its work done he said: 
…I had four back up guys, I had two guys call in sick this 
morning [courier]‘s out there and his grandmother just died, 
…and [courier]‘s truck [engine] just blew up. Well, what am I 
going to do?  
The supervisor‘s comments highlight the precariousness of the ECT‘s position in the 
facility, which relied on the availability of personnel to cover team members as they 
engaged in ergonomic activities.  The limited availability of people to relieve couriers on 
the ECT is linked closely to the limited number of spare couriers in the depot. 
When I asked the OHS manager why it was difficult to relieve workers so they 
could attend meetings he said, 
The bottom line is that operations come first. Delivering the 
package comes first. We deliver packages. If we don‘t deliver 
packages there‘s no opportunity for the ergonomic change team to 
even be looked at. 
The couriers‘ inability to get relieved for the ECT‘s meetings influenced the 
ECT‘s ability to gather the information that it required to devise potential solutions to 
address hazards, and thus, limited its progress.  As one worker representative stated, ―We 
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need to, the ergo team needs to do things quick BUT you can‘t do things quick if you 
don‘t have the people there. …only four people at a meeting ain‘t gonna cut it.‖  The 
failure to grant worker representatives time to participate in meetings or do ergonomic-
related activities restricted the ECT‘s access to the team‘s worker representatives‘ 
experiential knowledge, and their suggestions and evaluations of ways to address risks of 
exposure to injury.  Without the ECT‘s worker representatives involvement, the team‘s 
commitment to use workers‘ knowledge of job tasks to assess hazards and devise ways to 
address them could not be fulfilled, and its progress on several projects slowed or even 
came to a standstill. 
An example of how the ECT‘s information gathering activities conflicted with the 
time available for employees was in the team‘s difficulties getting together and sharing 
information about the work hazards associated with the depot‘s delivery trucks.  The 
team was interested in examining delivery truck doors because it identified that the 
incidence of injuries was related to several features of the doors and their use.  The 
delivery trucks had three different doors, each presenting distinct hazards.  The ECT split 
into three subgroups, each investigating one door.  The subgroups aimed to gather 
information about the biomechanical forces it took to open and close the doors, the 
frequency with which the doors were opened and closed during a shift, the condition of 
the doors (e.g., damage, lack of maintenance) which affected their operation, and the 
couriers‘ sense of the work processes that might affect their use of the doors.  Soon after 
forming, the subgroups had difficulties meeting because members were not relieved to 
attend the meetings; these troubles persisted for over three months.  At several 
consecutive meetings, because couriers were not relieved from their regular duties, 
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members reported that they were unable to meet with their subgroups.  At one point, in an 
attempt to ensure the ECT made some progress, the team decided that it would only 
examine one delivery truck door but because workers still could not get the time off, this 
change did not resolve the problems of making time to address issues.  A meaningful 
discussion among ECT members about the delivery trucks‘ doors, and how the hazards 
associated with them might be addressed, never occurred. 
 The dialogue around devising solutions involved substantial worker input and 
incorporated workers‘ knowledge of job tasks, some technical knowledge and knowledge 
of sourcing the ECT‘s solutions.  Discussions regarding solutions were inseparable from 
the production imperative and management‘s control over the ECT‘s members, especially 
worker representatives.  The conflict between production pressures and the ergonomic 
approach became more prominent over several months of the intervention, and continued 
to affect the ECT‘s access to worker knowledge and the opportunity workers could play 
in solution development. 
4.4.3  Summary  
For the most part, in the courier company solution-building processes were a joint 
effort between worker and management representatives.  Brainstorming and solution 
evaluation relied heavily on workers‘ experiential knowledge and ergonomic knowledge 
to generate and then select potential solutions.  As noted above, there were some 
exceptions, when worker representatives needed management representatives‘ assistance.  
Later in the intervention, attendance problems associated with production pressures 
hindered the participation of worker members, which had the effect of also limiting their 
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ability to apply their experiential knowledge to solution building and slowed this process 
down.   
4.5  FURNITURE CO. 
This section examines how the ECT in Furniture Co. assessed hazards and 
developed solutions designed to address them.  The discussion indicates that the ECT 
experienced problems at the outset because its members lacked access to knowledge 
required to design solutions.  These problems were addressed through managerial 
intervention.  The chapter also examines how the ECT‘s solution building changed over 
time and the effects of these changes on the involvement of the ECT‘s worker 
representatives.   
4.5.1  Back to the Drawing Board 
In its earliest months, ECT members were able to identify hazards but had 
difficulty developing workable solutions.  Many of these difficulties were due to the 
complexity of the production process.  In a few instances, the ECT developed a solution 
to address a hazard, attempted to implement it into the work process, but quickly realized 
it was impracticable.  In other instances, the ECT took its designs to plant maintenance 
personnel and was told that its plans were unworkable, as they did not adequately take 
into consideration key features of the production process or plant layout.  These problems 
often prompted team members to backtrack and redesign solutions that they thought they 
had settled on.  Scrapping or significantly modifying plans cost the team a lot of time.  
Indeed, twelve months into the intervention the team had seven projects in progress, and 
was having difficulty finalizing an acceptable design for each.  Difficulties devising 
workable solutions frustrated the team‘s members.  Noting the ECT‘s protracted 
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discussions about work hazards and solution designs but lacklustre progress, one member 
lamented the team was ―not moving,‖ another said that the ECT‘s progress was 
―stagnating,‖ and still another said the team had ―lost momentum.‖  The following 
section examines in detail the design considerations that the ECT needed to take into 
account to devise workable solutions.         
4.5.2  Considering Production Flow, Machinery, and Shopfloor Space 
Plant features, such as the production process, built environment, and the 
technical complexity of production equipment determined the types of knowledge that 
the ECT required to formulate practicable solutions.  One consideration the ECT needed 
to think through was whether a change could be accommodated given the plant‘s space 
restrictions.  In Furniture Co., work was carried out in interdependent work areas within 
different departments (e.g., roll forming, press, assembly, paint).  To move raw materials 
and finished parts between work areas they were loaded into corrugated steel containers 
called ―bins,‖ measuring about a metre long, three quarters of a metre high, and three 
quarters of metre wide, and then forklifts and tow motors shuttled the bins among the 
work areas.  Typically, bins sat near machine operators and usually there were input bins 
that held parts that required work and output bins in which finished parts were placed so 
they could be moved to another department.  Significantly, the bins took up a lot of floor 
space and limited the room available near production machinery.  Accordingly, when 
ECT members recommended that a machine be repositioned or modified, or that a piece 
of equipment be installed near a workstation, they had to consider whether (a) fork lift 
drivers had sufficient room to safely and quickly place and retrieve parts around 
equipment and operators and (b) fork lifts and employees could travel unobstructed in the 
plant‘s aisles. 
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The plant‘s production flow was another feature the ECT needed to consider in its 
designs.  In particular, the team members needed to think through the interconnectedness 
of the production process within and among departments.  Such production process 
interconnectedness meant that the ECT had to consider in its solution building not only 
how its proposed changes would impact a job task, but also how the change would affect 
the sequence of job tasks necessary to complete a part in any department.  One example 
in which the interconnectedness of the work processes confounded the ECT and they 
were unable to formulate a workable solution was the attempted introduction of a lift 
table.  During a lengthy discussion about where the lift should be located, the ergonomist-
facilitator observed that the ECT needed to consider the job task and how the lift, ―affects 
a whole system that involves the press shop, operators on the… riveter [machine], 
placement of parts in the bin prior to arriving at the riveter, and the correct positioning of 
the bin on the lift by forklift operators.‖ He then added, ―I don‘t think we have the 
knowledge in the room to know the whole system.‖  The ECT‘s lack of comprehensive 
knowledge of how its changes might disrupt operations within a work area and/or the 
department-level production flow complicated and often slowed solution building. 
One feature of plant life that the ECT also needed to be aware of was the ongoing 
changes in the factory that were introduced independently of the ECT but nonetheless 
influenced its activities.  For instance, unbeknownst to the ECT, the factory‘s lines 
sometimes were reconfigured or eliminated, or a piece of machinery on a line, such as a 
press, was modified.  The significance of this is that the ECT devised some solutions but 
then had to revise or even scrap its plans because the area that it was working in had 
changed in a way that rendered its changes unworkable or impractical to install. 
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Adding to the ECT‘s design considerations was that it had to be mindful of 
whether the solution it devised negatively affected safety.  This meant that the ECT 
needed to ensure its proposed changes to work processes did not introduce new hazards. 
If the team did identify safety hazards that were linked to its proposed change, it had to 
develop a plan to address them.  In one example of how this unfolded, the ECT attempted 
to add safety features to a lift table, which would reduce the need for workers to bend to 
floor level.  In this case, the team had to ensure that the lift table met OHS regulations 
concerning proper safety guarding around the mechanism that raised and lowered the 
table.  At one point during an ECT meeting, after several failed attempts to come up with 
proper guarding and the lift table had sat unserviceable in storage for a number of weeks, 
the plant manager remarked that the ECT‘s inability to introduce it to the shopfloor was 
―a little embarrassing.‖  In another instance in which the ECT had to integrate safety 
features into its designs, the team‘s attempts to devise a receptacle for parts next to a 
workstation to reduce reaching stalled because one design was too expensive and another 
was unsafe due to the risk of operators pinching their fingers.  In the end, after 
approximately eight months of considering various designs and prototyping some of 
these, this project was abandoned. 
Ascertaining whether the functionality of a piece of equipment it intended to alter 
would be negatively affected by the proposed changes was an additional concern for the 
ECT as it attempted to devise workable solutions.  Whereas some machinery could be 
repositioned and perform optimally with minimal adjustment; repositioning others was 
complex.  For example, it was easier to have a trench dug in the floor where workers 
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stood to operate a large piece of production machinery, providing a lower work platform, 
rather than lower the machine.    
Additionally, to create operable plans for equipment that the team sought to 
introduce, its members needed to be aware of four design considerations.  First, if the 
ECT was attempting to introduce a lift table or tilt table, the team needed to be attentive 
to the weight-bearing tolerances under which the equipment could operate
13
 and to what 
extent a load on a lift could be safely tilted to facilitate the removal of parts.  Second, 
because the ECT‘s solutions typically involved machinery, it required some mechanical 
knowledge and an understanding of the materials required.  Third, many of the team‘s 
mechanical changes, such as lift tables, operated hydraulically, pneumatically, or 
electrically thereby requiring a power source; therefore, the team members needed to be 
cognizant of whether this was accessible.  For instance, some ECT-recommended lifts to 
reduce employees bending into bins required pneumatic power so a source of this had to 
be located for each lift.  Fourth, the ECT needed to consider issues that arose around 
equipment installation, such as whether it must be portable or stationary.  Typically, lift 
tables had to be moveable; conversely, tilt tables had to be bolted to the floor so they 
would not tip. 
4.5.3  The Need for “Technical Expertise”  
The significance of the above discussed design considerations were particularly 
significant at the intervention‘s outset, when many of the changes the ECT considered 
required knowledge that was not possessed by the team‘s members.  The problems that 
                                                 
 
13
  Indeed, when it came the redesign of some pieces of equipment, according to provincial occupational 
health legislation, their safe operation had to be certified by a professional engineer in what is called a ―Pre-
Start Health and Safety Review.‖ http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/hs/guidelines/prestart/index.html 
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arose from this fact led to considerable slowing of the team‘s work, which in turn led to 
frustration among team members.   The ECT‘s members‘ frustrations with their inability 
to design workable solutions came to a head approximately 12 months into the 
intervention and in a series of meetings the team discussed the problems it was 
experiencing.  A prevailing theme expressed by several members during this period was 
that, in the ECT members‘ words, the team did not have the ―technical expertise‖ it 
needed.  In one such meeting, the ECT discussed its inability to formulate plans for 
changes and the OHS manager asked three times if the team had the right composition.  
At one point she queried, ―Is this kind of team really suited to the kind of make-up of the 
facility? I am questioning whether we have the right people on the team.‖ To address its 
lack of technical expertise, the ECT‘s members agreed they needed to work more closely 
with the plant‘s skilled trades personnel, such as the engineering staff and maintenance 
department, who were responsible for modifying and installing equipment, and with the 
plant‘s production manager, who was responsible for plant layout and maintaining and 
improving the plant‘s production.  The ECT expected that enlisting the assistance of 
trades personnel would improve its capacity to conceive and implement workable 
solutions. 
To address the above concerns, the change team requested that the maintenance 
manager and the production manager become members.  In the intervention‘s eighth 
month, the maintenance manager started attending meetings and then, approximately 
eight months later, the production manager became a member.
14
  The maintenance and 
                                                 
 
14
 I expand on the production manager and maintenance manager‘s recruitment in Chapter 5, in a 
discussion of implementing changes.  
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production managers possessed knowledge about the plant‘s production processes and the 
operation of its machinery that other change team members did not, and for this reason, 
their addition to the team greatly improved the ECT‘s capacity to devise workable 
solutions. 
While a certain amount of the production manager‘s and maintenance manager‘s 
knowledge overlapped, each possessed some distinct skills.  When I talked to the ECT 
members about the managerial personnel they stressed the importance of the production 
manager‘s lengthy and varied experience: he had worked in the factory for over twenty 
years, and had done many of the plant‘s jobs from machine operator to his present 
position.  His experience enabled him to enumerate some of the plant‘s features that the 
ECT needed to consider during solution design that were not visible to other ECT 
members.  During the ECT‘s deliberations, the production manager frequently described 
the spatial parameters the team had to work within to install (and/or modify) a piece of 
equipment in a department.  Acutely aware of the plant‘s layout, he knew whether re- 
positioning or modifying equipment would interfere with production flow.  He also had a 
commanding knowledge of the plant‘s production equipment.  The OHS manager 
described the production manager‘s knowledge this way 
For example, one of our last meetings, … we were talking about 
the reaching necessary for a particular die and [production 
manager] says, ―No big deal.  We can run that die in another press 
and in the other press it‘s closer to an employee and we can just 
remove the issue.‖ I WOULDN‘T have known that.  I don‘t know 
which dies can run in which of the presses, but [production 
manager]‘s had years of experience here and he knows that‘s no 
big deal he just changed that on the order routing.  And he also 
knew that there was probably enough capacity in that other 
machine to do that. …that would have taken me two hours of 
goin‘ all over the place to figure that out…. So that decision was 
made, what, in a couple of minutes as I recall as opposed to 
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weeks of running around and finding the answer and bringing it 
back to the team. 
Additionally, the production manager‘s regular duties and involvement with the 
plant‘s senior management kept him abreast of the company‘s plans to reposition and/or 
alter equipment.  He was therefore able to help the ECT avoid designing unworkable 
solutions that they may eventually have had to reconfigure.  In ECT meetings the 
production manager frequently noted that the volume of parts that was running in a 
particular work area was either low or high and whether or not the work area would 
maintain, increase or decrease that output.  Crucially, this knowledge influenced the types 
of change that the ECT considered were possible or sometimes even whether the ECT 
would attempt to introduce a change at all. 
If the production manager‘s central contribution to the ECT‘s solution design was 
his comprehensive knowledge of the plant‘s layout and production flow, it was the 
maintenance manager‘s intimate knowledge of the plant‘s machinery that was his 
principal asset to the ECT‘s solution building.  The maintenance manager possessed what 
Rothenberg (2003:1792) referred to as ―process knowledge,‖ or ―an understanding of the 
mechanical and chemical properties at hand, as well the performance parameters within 
which the process should operate.‖  Possessing formal knowledge about machine 
operation and adept at modifying machinery, the maintenance manager could ascertain 
what sort of materials needed to be procured and how they should be fashioned to realize 
the ECT‘s designs.  In many instances, when the ECT was deliberating on a solution, the 
maintenance manager drew on his skills and experience to raise issues that he foresaw as 
problems and suggest ways to address these issues.  For instance, during discussions 
about conveyance equipment he knew that a specific conveyor‘s rollers would become 
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clogged so he suggested alternatives.  In another instance, in which the team attempted to 
reduce employees‘ bending, he advised the team to avoid selecting an underpowered 
vacuum to extract ball bearings from a drum.  When asked about the maintenance 
manager‗s role on the ECT, the plant manager said: 
…we needed [maintenance manager]– MAINLY for technical 
solutions and looking at technical ideas or technical solutions in 
the trades‘ areas.  We needed his input for that to how to solve a 
problem, what makes sense, WHAT is possible.  And we just had 
ideas we want to take something from A to B.  That‘s easy for us 
on paper to say, ―We‘ll get this measure, this part and put it here, 
and this is what we want, this is nice and friendly to grab it from 
here.‖ …this is the person to do this with.  … how do you 
physically do that?  What kind of mechanisms do you use when 
you do it? So we needed the [maintenance manager] for that. 
As Cooke (2003) has pointed out, skilled trades people often draw on knowledge 
that goes beyond tools and machines; they also rely on knowledge of who the parts and 
services suppliers are.  The production and maintenance managers‘ positions required 
that they had continual responsibility for replacing, modifying, and/or repairing 
equipment and lines.  These responsibilities familiarized both of them with vendors from 
whom the ECT could procure some of the equipment it needed.  Throughout the 
intervention they relied on this knowledge extensively to provide critical input into the 
ECT deliberation process.  Frequently, during the ECT‘s discussions around changes, the 
production manager and maintenance manager passed around catalogues that contained 
equipment or tools that the team may be interested in, so each member could consider 
whether equipment or tool under discussion suited the problem.  Additionally, in the ECT 
meetings, the managerial personnel often drew on their organizational memory to provide 
information that was useful to team activities.  For example, there were instances in the 
ECT‘s meetings when they pointed out that there was unused equipment in the facility 
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that the ECT could use.  They were also knowledgeable of some of the attempts to make 
changes that had occurred in the past and gave pertinent information about how this was 
carried out. 
The maintenance manager and production manager delimited what sort of 
solution could be built, based on several factors.  One of these factors was cost.  They 
often explained that the cost of a change increased markedly with its complexity, 
therefore designing or selecting a solution that was simplest was better.  Also, given the 
time it would take to design a solution from scratch, the managers frequently suggested 
purchasing something ready-made, if possible.  Another vital piece of information that 
the maintenance manager and production manager contributed was knowledge about how 
the solutions would be crafted:  how the change could actually be designed, what 
materials were to be used and, in cases in which something could be sourced ready-made, 
what company could supply it.  
Drawing on the maintenance manager‘s and production manager‘s stocks of 
knowledge enabled the ECT to create ergonomically-informed, workable solutions, 
something that previously proved very difficult for the ECT.  Key to the managers‘ 
participation was that they were able to take abstract ideas about how a hazard should be 
addressed and transform these into concrete plans.  One of the ECT‘s worker 
representative‘s comments typified what other ECT members said regarding the 
managers‘ abilities to transform ideas into operable plans, ―We could have come up with 
a million ideas, and… without [maintenance manager‘s] input we would, like we do need 
someone who knows a bit on how things …are made, and [production manager,] he‘s 
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also got experience with that…I think things would be a lot harder if we didn‘t have 
them.‖  
Importantly, the maintenance manager‘s and production manager‘s contributions 
were not just about technological know how, although that was important.  They also 
contributed to design based on their knowledge of the local and global design parameters 
and how the two needed to correspond.  For instance, one could design and fabricate a 
piece of equipment according to ergonomic principles but these had to be carried out in 
accordance with parameters such as safety rules, production flow, and machine tolerances 
and functionality. 
The production manager‘s and maintenance manager‘s activities on the ECT 
made them similar to Nutch‘s (1996) ―gadget scientists,‖ technically proficient field 
biologists who were able to overcome environmental challenges and equipment 
limitations and malfunctions to accomplish their study goals.  Drawing on their skills and 
experience, gadget scientists and management personnel enabled their respective groups 
to surmount technical contingencies, anticipate and subsequently avoid problems and 
formulate successful plans.  The production manager and maintenance manager‘s 
participation in solution building reduced the likelihood the ECT would devise 
unworkable solutions, spared it from struggling with design issues, which its members 
were not knowledgeable about, and saved the ECT‘s membership time.  Though 
designing the changes that the ECT wanted to make still took a fair amount of time even 
after the managers joined the team, their participation made the process much more 
efficient. 
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4.5.4  Changes to Solution Building  
The team‘s solution building changed dramatically eighteen months into the 
program.  The team remained committed to reducing employees‘ exposures to hazards 
but solution building changed such that ergonomic principles and formal model change-
making were no longer an important means by which hazards were reduced.  Instead, the 
dominant concern was designing workable solutions that were compatible with the 
factory‘s layout and work processes.   
The ECT‘s changes to its solution building were, in part, a reaction to the lengthy 
time needed to follow the steps outlined in the formal model, the failure to make 
substantial changes in the intervention‘s early months, and a view among some members 
that following the formal model was needless or at least inefficient for what it intended to 
accomplish.  In reference to the changes the ECT had made in its solution designing and 
its aims to devise workable solutions, the OHS manager said: 
… I think we became less concerned with following the process 
exactly and the paper flow and whether we had enough surveys or 
enough pictures or it documented and just more concerned with, 
―Let‘s make something before we all resign.‖ Because that‘s how 
people were feeling,…  ―Like, am I making any difference here? I 
think not.‖ That‘s how we were at the end of the first year. So I 
think it came with, ―Let‘s make something work and we honestly 
don‘t care how we get there, we JUST have to have something to 
show for all this effort. 
Contrary to the step-by-step process in which the ECT went about solution 
building in the intervention‘s initial months, later in the process the team members rarely 
carefully considered the root causes of injuries and they seldom paused to evaluate the 
extent to which their solutions addressed the hazard.  Initially, the determination of the 
extent to which a solution addressed a hazard was typically based on careful 
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measurement of how a solution decreased the biomechanical forces acting on a worker.  
Later in the intervention, the ECT‘s decisions were guided more by general ergonomic 
principles regarding acceptable motions, postures, and positions.  For instance, the group 
knew that repetitive bending was to be minimized so they aimed to devise solutions that 
reduced it.  Approximately 12 months into the intervention, the ergonomist-facilitator 
became markedly less involved in the assessment and solution building, notably by not 
asking the team to reconsider the cause of injuries when group members were either 
skipping steps or not attempting to identify the root causes of an injury.  Additionally, the 
team less often engaged in brainstorming and evaluation of their proposed solutions, 
which had been occasions in which all members, regardless of expertise, had an 
opportunity to participate.  Approximately 20 months into the intervention this point was 
captured by one ECT member who said, ―I can‘t remember the last time we brainstormed 
using the steps.‖  In an interview twenty-four months into the program, one ECT member 
described solution building this way: 
…we talk about the injury,… we say, ―So what can we do?‖ And 
we‘ll come up with a solution right there.  And then that‘s 
basically it.  So it‘s a lot faster NOW but we‘re not doing the 
legwork behind it so we say, ―Is it the right solution, could there 
be a better solution, what are the drawbacks…? What will the 
employees working there think?‖ So we don‘t do any analysis 
anymore before we go ahead.  And maybe the solutions that we‘re 
coming up with right now are simpler if that‘s the word. 
One feature that was noticeable during this period was that the ECT had lowered 
its standards for defining a result as a meaningful improvement.  One manager 
representative said that the team took a different orientation to solution building later in 
the intervention, ―And now we‘re just kinda like, ‗Oh it‘s better than it was,‘ …, this 
project could be put in place because this solution is better than it is now…. We just 
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come up with a solution and we think, ‗Okay that‘s not bad, we‘ll work with that.‘‖ Other 
ECT members shared this sentiment, which represented a significant change in the ECT‘s 
expectations.   
The change team members felt that there were few drawbacks in the new way that 
solutions were devised and the new approach enabled them to more quickly fulfill their 
goals.  Many ECT members noted that although they sidestepped several of the formal 
model‘s stages, little was lost in the transition to the truncated version of solution 
building.  The plant manager distinguished between the forms of solution building used at 
the outset of the intervention and the one used later, noting that both achieved the same 
purpose: 
…it‘s still brainstorming just not as formalized as in the 
beginning. …I don‘t think seriously at this point that we‘re 
…LOOKING for somebody that has the ANSWER rather than us 
trying to brainstorm and come up with the answer to look to 
[production manager] ―What can we do here?,‖ or [maintenance 
manager] ―What are we going to do here?‖  That risk is there, but 
I think we still talk about it [solutions] enough to make sure that 
we feel good about the solution. 
ECT members did not doubt that the team‘s less formal style of designing 
solutions was improving the efficiency of its activities.  In an ECT meeting 
approximately 24 months into the program, the OHS manager reviewed the team‘s 
accomplishments that year by listing their finished projects.  Looking at the list of 
changes, the maintenance manager said, ―I didn‘t realize we had done so much even 
though things have been painfully slow.‖  The OHS manager responded, ―Yeah, we are 
on track, we said we would do two changes per month and we are on track to have 
twenty-four done by year end.‖  The fieldnote excerpt that follows, developed from notes 
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taken in an ECT meeting, points to the fact that the change team members sought to make 
changes, but not necessarily according to the formal model‘s evidence-based approach: 
[OHS manager] notes that with [maintenance manager] and 
[production manager]‘s help the team has been able to work more 
efficiently. [Maintenance manager] ―we are not looking for pie in 
the sky solutions but we are doing things.‖ [OHS manager]: ―It‘s 
not enough [indicating that there were still many MSDs to 
address], but we are rolling.‖ 
4.5.5  Diminishing Worker Involvement 
Changing the way solution design was carried out and managerial personnel‘s 
increased involvement reduced participation by other ECT members in the development 
of solutions.  In the later stages, during the discussions in which the ECT identified a 
hazard, discerned its cause, and talked about solutions at a very general level, typically all 
members were involved.  Once the discussion began to move from a general to a 
particular solution, however, the maintenance manager and production manager often 
dominated the discussions.  In fact, in many instances during the ECT meetings, the two 
managers had extended discussions between themselves as the other team members 
looked on.  When it came time to discuss the specifics of a change, that is, the particular 
measurements and materials needed to build something, where a piece of equipment 
might be found, or who might build it the managers engaged in what I refer to as ―tech 
talk.‖  These discussions were typically wide ranging, including elements such as 
whether there was a supplier who could readily provide a piece of equipment down to the 
minutiae of design, such as the types of nuts and bolts required and types of mechanisms.  
Exchanges between the managers were rapid, with little time taken to explain the nuances 
of machine function.  Often, tech talk was impenetrable unless someone possessed the 
know-how to design a change in accord with both local and global parameters.   
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Worker representatives were also prevented from being more involved in solution 
building as the maintenance manager and production manager sought information from 
external sources.  The maintenance manager and production manager were devising 
solutions, making calls to suppliers, and discussing solutions between themselves outside 
of, as well as in, the meetings.  Often, members who were not involved in the discussions 
about solutions that occurred outside the ECT‘s meetings would only hear about a 
solution once the maintenance manager and/or production manager reported to the ECT, 
after a series of decisions had already been made.  These activities effectively shut some 
of the ECT members out of the process.  Also, these activities stood in contrast with the 
ECT‘s earlier investigations in which sales representatives from vendors came into the 
company and met with all the team members to discuss equipment of interest to the ECT.  
Moreover, unlike solution design at the intervention‘s outset in which solutions were 
suggested and then scrutinized at team meetings, the maintenance manager and 
production manager‘s suggestions were not held up to the same scrutiny.  The fact that 
other team members did not evaluate the managerial personnel‘s suggestions may be 
understood as the managers having what Mukerji (1976) refers to as ―authority to know.‖  
The past experiences and expertise that managers possessed, which was acknowledged by 
team members, exempted managers‘ ideas from the more careful and prolonged 
examination that other suggestions received. 
4.5.6  Summary 
The evolution of solution design in Furniture Co. was affected by a number of 
factors.   The problems encountered in the first 16 months were associated with its 
inability to devise workable solutions.  Additionally, they were complicated by the lack 
of personnel on the ECT who had the expert knowledge to design solutions that were 
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practicable in light of the plant‘s production processes, technology, and spatial 
constraints.  Solution building changed dramatically after about a year and half, in that 
the gathering of ergonomic information and following the formal process became much 
less a focus for the ECT.  The primary focus was on building solutions that were 
workable with much less attention to whether this yielded the ―best‖ possible ergonomic 
solution.  This change had serious repercussions for the ECT‘s worker representatives, as 
they were much less involved than they had been. 
4.6  DISCUSSION 
The chapter began by noting the goal of PE programs was to design ergonomic- 
and worker-informed solutions to address MSDs.  In both settings, the ECTs had received 
ergonomics training, had guidance from the ergonomist-facilitator, and had worker 
representatives on the team who possessed intimate knowledge of job tasks.  
Additionally, as the analysis shows, the teams‘ solution development processes were 
affected by the social and organizational context, the teams‘ access to knowledge 
required to devise workable solutions, and the worker representatives‘ opportunities to 
apply their knowledge.  
In both settings, limitations to worker representatives‘ contributions were 
influenced by factors that were related to the production process, although the manner in 
which this occurred differed in the two sites.  In the program‘s first 12 months in 
Furniture Co., the complexity of the production process and the team‘s lack of access to 
skilled trades personnel and their specialized knowledge hampered the team members‘ 
attempts to devise workable solutions.  The need to have skilled trades personnel 
involved in the ECT‘s solution building was related to the range of design considerations 
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that were required to be accounted for such as production flow, spatial constraints, and 
machinery functionality.  In contrast, team members in Courier Co., were generally able 
to develop operable solutions themselves without additional expertise.  In part, this was 
connected with the simplicity of the tools used in production, which enabled, or at least 
facilitated, the process whereby workers could draw on their experiential knowledge and 
ergonomic knowledge.   
The findings that pertain to access to technical knowledge raise important 
questions about workers‘ involvement in the solution design process.  In order to 
maintain managerial control over the production process, for the most part, workers are 
the executors and not the designers of work (Braverman, 1974; Rinehart, 2006).  This is 
contrary to the principles of PE, which endeavours to draw workers into the conception 
of work activities in an effort to reduce MSDs.  Yet, in the two workplaces examined 
here, the differential access to knowledge created limitations on workers‘ contributions to 
some parts of the design process.  Under Fordist production regimes workers generally 
receive limited technical training in how machinery functions and the overarching 
knowledge of the production processes (Livingston and Sawchuk, 2004).  In a study of 
workplace knowledge, Livingstone and Sawchuk (2004) highlight the limitations on 
workplace learning and offer insights into why workers‘ involvement may be constrained 
in participatory initiatives.  Writing about their own research in an automobile-parts 
factory, Livingstone and Sawchuk (2004: 181) state 
In general, there are clear limits to worker involvement in work 
processes shaped by the organization of work.  For production 
workers at this parts factory, for example, intensification of work 
and the demands of the assembly line diminish human energy, 
limit the time to reflect, constrain access to an experience of the 
broader production process and restrict discretionary interaction 
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among co-workers.  Through the organization of work, the 
production worker comes to participate in work-based learning 
life more as an ―operative‖ or ―tool‖ than as an ―agent‖ of 
production. 
In Courier Co., late in the intervention, the company‘s production pressures 
affected the ECT‘s functioning and worker involvement.  These pressures, manifest in 
difficulties relieving workers from their regular duties, restricted their opportunities to 
apply their ergonomic and experiential knowledge.  Discrepancies between the time that 
worker representatives needed to complete ECT activities and how much time 
management at Courier Co. was willing to provide are consistent with findings reported 
in other research on participatory work arrangements (Ichniowski et al., 1996).   
In Furniture Co. the lack of access to knowledge of the production system 
prompted the ECT to seek, in the ECT members‘ words, ―technical expertise‖ from the 
maintenance manager and production manager.  The managerial personnel‘s involvement 
greatly improved the ECT‘s capacity to devise workable solutions.  Changes to the way 
the ECT carried out solution development and the presence of the managers eventually 
limited worker representatives‘ input into the dialogue around solution development. 
The specialized knowledge that was required to design solutions to address 
hazards influenced solution design and involvement of worker representatives.  This 
finding is consistent with evidence from various bodies of literature on participatory 
problem solving.  For instance, Rothenberg (2003) in a study of an environmental 
management program, found that changing a workplace may involve a number of 
different types of knowledge which typically are not possessed by workers.  Likewise, 
Delbridge et al., (2000), in an examination of a production improvement program, found 
that decentralizing responsibilities to workers was difficult for anything beyond their 
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regular production activities, in large part because of their limited production system 
knowledge.  
The design problems that the ECTs‘ encountered converge with findings reported 
in literature on ergonomic design (Badham and Ehn, 2000; Broberg and Hermund, 2004; 
Burns and Vincente, 2000).  As Burns and Vincente (2000: 81) point out, ―Contextual 
constraints provide the background for any ergonomics problem.  Constraints arising 
from the parsing and distribution of design work are commonplace in engineering design 
projects.  And finally, constraints from other domains are inevitable in an 
interdisciplinary design effort.‖  Similarly, in their study of an information technology 
project, Garrety and Badham (1999:288) discuss the constraints that face those 
attempting to integrate ergonomic principles into design plans:   
it [the study] demonstrates the sheer difficulty of aligning people 
and objects into trajectories deemed to be desirable by human 
factors experts.  There are always others involved.  These others 
may have different goals and plans, and they may possess the 
power to carry them through in ways that override or circumvent 
the trajectories planned by human factor experts. 
The ECTs‘ solution building process was conditioned by the complexity of the 
production process and the ECTs‘ access to the knowledge it required.  Moreover, the 
difficulties encountered in solution building had important consequences for the 
collaborative nature of problem solving around MSDs and the efficiency of the solution 
design process.  Significantly, this raises questions about notions of participation and 
involvement and what, in practice, it means to be involved in solution design.    
Drawing on the negotiated order insights, the findings demonstrate that the ECTs 
had to align the designs they put forth with multiple audiences.  This was particularly the 
case for Furniture Co., where the design process was marked by a greater number of 
 137 
concerns.  A solution had to be ergonomically sufficient but also had to meet a number of 
other concerns: fit within the work area, match with the interdependent workflow among 
areas and departments, and correspond with safety and engineering protocols.  In this 
study, worker representative creativity and involvement were limited by production 
pressures, production process complexity, and the uneven distribution of knowledge.  
Becker‘s (1974: 770) words, though pertaining to artists, fit equally well for the ECT 
members: 
Artists often create works which existing facilities for production 
or exhibition cannot accommodate.  Sculptors build constructions 
too large and heavy for existing museums.  Composers write 
music, which requires more performers than existing 
organizations can furnish.  Playwrights write plays too long for 
their audience‘s taste.  When they go beyond the capacities of 
existing institutions, their works are not exhibited or performed: 
that reminds us that most artists make sculptures which are not 
too big or heavy, compose music which uses a comfortable 
number of players, or write plays which run a reasonable length 
of time.  By accommodating their conceptions to available 
resources, conventional artists accept the constraints arising from 
their dependence on the cooperation of members of the existing 
art world.  Wherever the artist depends on others for some 
necessary component he [sic] must either accept the constraints 
they impose or expend the time and energy necessary to provide it 
some other way.  
Given the multiple worlds that the ECT had to satisfy, or at the very least 
consider, we could say that the ECT‘s work was analogous to that of the scientists in 
Fujimura (1987) research who sought to envision ―doable‖ research projects.  According 
to Fujimura (1987:2), ―Doability is the alignment of several levels of work organization. 
These include experiments as a set of tasks; the laboratory as a bundle of experiments and 
other tasks; and the social world as the work of laboratories, colleagues, sponsors, and 
other players all focused on the same family of problems.‖  (see also Sundberg, 2007).   
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The chapter highlights that solution design was a creative, collaborative activity 
employing both worker and ergonomic knowledge.  The use of worker representatives‘ 
experiential knowledge and their involvement in the process of solution design were 
affected by the circumstances in the settings.  Lining up the ECT‘s designs with relevant 
audiences proved challenging in Furniture Co. as the production processes consisted of 
complex machinery and work processes.  In Courier Co. worker representatives‘ 
opportunities to apply their knowledge was circumscribed by production pressures.  In 
Chapter Five, the examination of the trajectory of change is furthered as the dissertation 
investigates the implementation of changes and the factors that bear upon this process.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION 
5.0  INTRODUCTION 
 Evidence in the literature on health and safety programs demonstrates that OHS 
program functioning is often undercut by social and organizational factors such as lack of 
managerial support.  One finding of interest is that often health and safety committees are 
able to identify and assess hazards but unable to effectively alter the conditions to 
minimize hazards.  In reference to joint health and safety committees
15
, Tucker (1995: 
256) pointed out the importance of the ―distribution of power and political-economic and 
ideological circumstances.  Management guards its control over basic investment 
decisions, including what, when, and how to produce.‖  Commonly cited obstacles to the 
implementation of changes are workers‘ weak power relative to management, lack of 
managerial support, and the weak position of health and safety experts (Fulmer et al., 
2005; Tucker, 1995; Walters et al., 1995; Walters, 1985).  Our understanding of how 
health and safety programs function greatly benefits from these studies, and we are able 
to identify some of the key obstacles to effective OHS program functioning.  However, 
there has been less attention paid to how those involved in health and safety programs are 
able to make changes and overcome constraints if they are encountered.  This chapter 
extends the available research by examining the hindrances to implementing changes that 
the ECTs faced and the ways they attempted to circumvent these hindrances.  It focuses 
                                                 
 
15
 Joint Health and Safety Committees (JHSC) are legislated in many jurisdictions in Canada and 
elsewhere.  In Ontario, all companies with 20 or more employees must have a JHSC.  Consisting of both 
labour and management representatives, they are intended to give workers an opportunity to assess the 
health and safety conditions in a workplace and address conditions that are not satisfactory. 
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on the ECTs‘ implementation activities.  The analyses draws in particular on Strauss‘s 
notion of articulation work to examine the strategies that ECTs used to turn their plans 
into concrete changes in the workplace.  I suggest that articulation work‘s form and pace 
was affected by workplace conditions and in particular the authority ECTs had to make 
changes.   
5.1  HOW WORK IS CARRIED OUT 
To understand how project work plays out, we have to understand how this work 
is ―fitted together‖ (Strauss, 1993).  To accomplish tasks, according to Strauss (1988), 
workers need to align their ―respective work-related actions,‖ which requires that they 
engage in a series of interactions, a process he called ―articulation work.‖ To implement 
ergonomic changes, actors must have the authority to bring together both material and 
nonmaterial resources.   
Creating and maintaining the necessary links between units and departments to 
make changes is part of the articulation process.  Of central importance to Strauss (1988; 
1993) is how work processes are brought together, or linked, so that an objective can be 
met or workflows maintained.  Successfully articulating work tasks means that 
arrangements among actors have to be created and preserved.  Arrangements refer to the 
agreements among actors about the work to be done.  Strauss noted that (1993: 89)  
Within departments, the arrangements pertain to such questions as 
what work, by whom, where done, for how long, for what pay-
back, for what purposes, and according to what standards? 
Between departments the arrangements may be concerned with 
the above but also with other issues, such as: what resources, 
technology, and supplies, within what time-frame, with what 
information, in what space, and with what other back-up services 
that a particular department may need to do its work?  
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If arrangements are not created and maintained, then workflow is hindered, or may even 
be stopped.   
Arrangements are made through ―interactional processes‖ (Strauss, 1993: 87), 
which refers to tactics that actors use to make arrangements so that project goals can be 
accomplished.  Interactional processes include such activities as negotiating, 
manipulating, lobbying, and discussing.  Arrangements and the form(s) that interactional 
processes take are influenced by local circumstances and broader structural conditions 
(Strauss, 1993: 88).  That is, those involved are not free to make arrangements as they 
wish but are to some extent constrained by aspects of an organization‘s structure, such as 
power relations between labour and management.   
5.1.1  Articulation Work  
Articulation work, encompasses securing authority to make change and gathering 
material and nonmaterial resources.  In the case of PE this includes the personnel to 
physically carry out and integrate the changes into the work processes.  To accomplish 
these tasks, the ECTs used an array of interactional processes – negotiation, persuasion, 
alliance building, and recruitment.  Articulation work involves coordinating tasks.  In the 
workplaces studied, it is directed at linking the tasks that are required to alter the 
workplace, including gathering scarce resources and securing support from managers 
who may see investment in occupational health as unimportant or even threatening to the 
maintenance of capital accumulation.   
At the core of articulation work in these settings is the fact that there were 
problems realizing the ECTs‘ authority to make change.  Lacking the authority to pursue 
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changes independently, the ECTs had to negotiate for permission to make changes and 
secure the resources they needed to do so.  As Corbin and Strauss (1993: 76) point out,  
To arrive at an arrangement, then, involves arriving at a common 
definition of the situation.  This means that any discrepant 
understandings (such as, about who has what power to control 
structural organizational conditions and a willingness to share or 
relinquish some of that control; or about expectations about what 
is to be done) must be discovered, thought about, and ironed out 
through interactional strategies.   
In both settings, although management agreed the ECTs were to be the agents of 
change for the PE programs, arriving at ―common definitions‖ concerning what latitude 
the ECTs had to independently alter the workplace was difficult and prompted the teams 
to do articulation work.  
Articulation work was necessary for two reasons.  First, as noted above, there was 
a need for articulation work because the ECTs had little independent authority to affect 
changes, a contradiction of the initial management-approved agreement that the ECTs 
would oversee and implement ergonomic changes.  Similar to the advisory role of joint 
health safety committees and their limited powers to make change (e.g., Tucker, 1995; 
Nichols and Tucker, 2000), the ECTs were constrained in the degree to which they could 
independently act.  Management had to approve any of the ECTs‘ recommended changes 
but were often uninterested and/or reluctant to do so.  In both settings, managers at 
various levels, who controlled the resources required to make changes and had the 
influence to authorize changes, were uncooperative for at least part of the interventions.          
Second, articulation work was required because of the collaborative nature of 
change making in such settings.  Changes, regardless of their scope, necessitated that 
material and nonmaterial resources be gathered and a plan formulated concerning who 
 143 
would carry out the change.  However, gathering these resources required the cooperation 
of personnel who were often unwilling to render assistance.  Aligning the resources 
required for ECT changes often meant channelling resources away from production, but 
such resources were already typically scarce and, generally, were controlled by groups 
that were closest to production (Ranson et al., 1980).  Therefore, achieving a degree of 
access to the personnel and the material resources required to fabricate and install 
changes meant that the ECTs had to employ interactional strategies in an effort to secure 
arrangements to achieve their goals.   
 In examining the implementation of changes the chapter explores how this 
process is affected by (1) the organizational context, in particular the ECTs‘ authority as 
agents of change, and how their activities, were shaped by conditions in their settings, 
and (2) the activities that constituted the ECTs‘ articulation work.  The chapter shows 
that limitations on the authority the ECTs had to make changes prompted them to select 
an array of interactional strategies.  
5.2  COURIER CO. 
5.2.1  Context of Change Making  
In Courier Co., change implementation was complex and time consuming.  Three 
contextual features in particular shaped the form and pace of the change-making process: 
(1) the ECT‘s limited authority as an agent of change, (2) the centralized/fractionalized 
organizational hierarchy, and (3) managers‘ lack of cooperation with the PE program.   
The ECT had no authority in practice to make changes independently; thus it had 
to frequently contact senior-level managers for permission to make changes in the depot. 
Seeking management‘s permission to make changes was difficult because of the 
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organization‘s hierarchy.  The division of labour within management was in Hales‘ 
(1989) terms ―fractionalized‖ and ―centralized.‖  Hales (27) points out that, ―[w]here 
management functions are highly fractionalized, the content of managers‘ work will have 
a relatively heavy technical component, with a concentration upon specialist ‗decisional‘ 
roles.‖  The division of an organization into separate specialist roles means that those in 
the organization trying to make change may have to consult with and get permission from 
multiple managers.  Importantly, Hales (1989: 34) noted that 
The extent to which ownership and management functions are 
fractionalized will impact predominantly upon managers‘ contacts 
and interactions.  Where these functions are relatively 
fractionalized, managers will need to accomplish their work 
through relatively large networks, a high level of lateral 
communication, many meetings and contact patterns more closely 
resembling the ‗hub‘ or peer-dependent types (Stewart, 1976). 
Manager involvement was not straightforward, however: some of them were 
resistant or indifferent to the ECT‘s recommendations.  Senior managers were largely 
unaware of the ECT or, if aware, either uninterested in, or resistant to, its activities.  
When the ECT sent requests to management representatives, they typically failed to 
respond or referred the request to another unit within the company.  In other cases, 
though less frequently, managers argued that the ECT‘s recommendations were 
unwarranted.  Management‘s responses, or lack thereof, meant the ECT frequently had to 
revisit issues.   
It is within this organizational framework that the ECT evolved a set of practices, 
or carried out articulation work, that enabled it to implement some of its intended 
changes.  These practices, however, were not always successful; indeed, four of its 
recommendations were denied; and, in the other cases that were approved, the process 
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was both inefficient and time consuming, hindering the ECT‘s progress and limiting its 
effectiveness.  Three aspects of articulation work found in this setting are examined: (a) 
revisiting (persistence), (b) using allies, and (c) making a case for change.  Although I 
separate these for the purpose of the analysis, often, they were used concurrently during 
articulation work. 
5.2.2  “Revisiting Issues”  
In many instances, the ECT was forced to persist and revisit issues.  Indeed, at 
least nine of the ECT‘s nineteen proposed changes required its members to contact a 
manager multiple times to ensure that a project was proceeding.  The OHS manager 
referred to these activities as ―keeping issues alive‖ a response used to counter managers‘ 
general indifference to the program.  Because management often did not act on proposals 
for change, the ECT needed to make contact with management again; otherwise, the 
change making process stalled.  The OHS manager and the operations administrative 
assistant were most involved in keeping issues alive.  
Ensuring that changes proceeded involved following up on requests and 
reminding managers that a project existed.  Such activities usually came about after the 
team considered it had waited for an unreasonably long time for management approval or 
to get feedback on a request.   While revisiting was a feature of all proposed changes, 
projects of greater scope generally required particularly extensive follow up.  Typically, 
larger projects required the team to contact management repeatedly to keep the project 
moving; in smaller projects, fewer calls were placed to management and much less time 
and energy were required.   
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In one case, the ECT needed to contact a manager repeatedly to ensure a small 
handcart, a relatively routine piece of equipment that had been requested, was received.  
The ECT recommended a cart but the wrong cart was sent by management.  The 
operations administrative assistant phoned the purchasing department and clarified what 
the ECT wanted, requested the cart again, but, once more, the incorrect cart was sent.  A 
second call was placed to the purchasing department, and the manager there noted that 
the cart sent was the ―standard‖ cart used for that courier‘s route.  The operations 
administrative assistant explained what the ergonomics team had requested, and the 
purchasing manager said that he was unaware of the ergonomics program.  In the end, 
after the administrative assistant‘s repeated phone calls over more than eight weeks, the 
simple, off-the-shelf cart finally arrived.     
 5.2.3  Using Allies and Making a Case for Change  
The OHS manager drew on a repertoire of tactics in an effort to secure 
management cooperation with the ECT‘s recommendations.  The OHS manager did 
much of what he referred to as the ―legwork‖ to make the changes happen.  In doing so, 
he sometimes relied extensively on connections with key managers.  On certain 
occasions, to help push changes through, he contacted the general manager of operations, 
who was a supporter of the program.  In a discussion with me he noted that he and the 
general manager were close, and they had been through some ―important battles 
together.‖  About one change the OHS manager said   
If I didn‘t take on the tail-lift project
16
 it would have got buried – 
if the team went to [the district manager] he would have looked at 
                                                 
 
16
 A tail-lift is a mechanism attached to the rear of a delivery truck or trailer that allows workers to lower 
items from the back of the truck or trailer to ground level.  For couriers in this setting, the tail lift 
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the cost and said ―no.‖ [It was a result of]  My access to [general 
manager of operations] and got a commitment on it when there is 
NO money. 
The OHS manager described himself as a ―lobbyist,‖ when it came to the ECT‘s 
changes, something that involved ―selling‖ the team‘s changes and coaxing managers in 
the right direction.  He explained that some company personnel needed to have projects 
explained to them and be convinced about their utility.  At times, in his words, he ―had to 
circumvent regular procedures.‖  Sometimes the OHS manager‘s activities involved 
persuading uncooperative managers that the project had the full support of other senior 
managers.   
Part of the OHS manager‘s activities involved making a convincing case for the 
change.  One element of making a case involved differentiating the ECT‘s requests for 
changes from other requests in the company.  He explained that senior managers see 
numerous requests and, if unfamiliar with them or unable to quickly understand their 
usefulness, they put the requests aside.  To address this concern the OHS manager often 
tried what he termed, ―putting a face‖ on a change: establishing who the change was for, 
what it was for, and the rationale behind it, thereby ―guiding‖ the managers toward the 
right decisions.  Often, he did this by having face-to-face discussions with the managers.  
Another aspect of articulation work involved discussing the benefits of a change. 
In some ways, doing so resembled ―pitching‖ (Prus and Fleras, 1997; Prus, 1989).  Often, 
managers wanted to know about potential cost and the likely return on investment or ―pay 
back.‖   These inquiries were connected to the fact that the ECT‘s suggestions for change 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
eliminated the need to climb into the back of the truck using poor hand- and footholds, and it eliminated the 
need to move parcels from the back of the truck to ground level by hand, both of which were sources of 
injury.  
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were being assessed by some managers, not on merit to reduce workers‘ exposure to 
injury, but on economic merit – how the change would either save or make the company 
money.  Consequently, gaining some managers‘ endorsement was difficult because the 
ECT‘s changes were seldom based on a return on investment, and if they were, returns 
would only show up many months later or in enhanced productivity.  Importantly, when 
it came to results, the OHS manager noted, ―you have to explain to them that you won‘t 
see the fruits of… this [change] [i.e. lower injury rates] until a year away.  Even some of 
the people who… SHOULD understand that don‘t understand it.‖   
The ECT also sought to make a case for changes by highlighting both health 
related and other types of benefits, particularly economic.  Referred to as the ―business 
case for change‖ by the ergonomist-facilitator and OHS manager, the persuasiveness of 
these arguments rested on explaining to managers that there were production benefits to 
changes, such as decrease in task time and reduction in rework, which could make 
operations more efficient and less costly.  The ergonomist-facilitator met with managers 
face-to-face to make the case for the ECT‘s changes.  The rationale behind inviting the 
ergonomist-facilitator was that his expertise enabled him to make a more convincing case 
for an ergonomic change than the OHS manager could.  The ergonomist-facilitator noted 
that there were times when the OHS manager and other members of the ECT could not 
articulate to management why changes were required beyond the fact they reduced 
workers‘ exposure to injury.   
On one such occasion, the ergonomist-facilitator went to corporate headquarters 
to meet with the head of engineering; in another case, he met with the head of the 
company‘s fleet department to argue that a larger truck be purchased by the company.  In 
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yet another, he met with the district manager, unit supervisor, and engineer to argue for a 
speed reduction in the depot‘s main conveyor belt.  In the case concerning the fleet 
department, the manager argued that a smaller truck would best meet the couriers‘ work 
demands.  Countering this point, the ergonomist noted that the larger truck would be 
beneficial because it gave workers more room to manoeuvre and in this way decreased 
the risk of injury.    
While the ergonomist-facilitator‘s attempts to influence engineers often were 
successful, as in the examples noted above, on other occasions they failed.  One example 
of an unsuccessful effort involved an attempt to alter the task of unloading a trailer.  One 
of the duties of the depot‘s dockworkers was to manually unload the contents of large, 
fifty-three foot trailers of freight.  The depot‘s injury statistics showed that the intensity 
of this job was hazardous for dockworkers, with workers suffering arm, shoulder, and 
back injuries.  The ECT evaluated the unloading job and determined that it placed 
dockworkers at risk of injury based on a set of recognized health guidelines for manual 
lifting.
17
  The ECT recommended that adding another person to the position to assist 
unloading the trailer‘s contents could alleviate some of the pressure on workers.  The 
engineering manager disagreed, arguing that there were enough people to unload the 
truck, and that the intensity of the dockworkers‘ activities was within the guidelines that 
he was using.  The ergonomist-facilitator met with the engineer to make the case for the 
                                                 
 
17
 The ECT‘s recommendation was based on the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health‘s 
(NIOSH) lifting equation.  The NIOSH lifting equation is a method to evaluate the hazards of lifting in 
manual handling tasks.  The equation provides a weight limit that should be lifted in a particular job task.  
The weight limit for a given job task is determined by considering the following: the weight of a lift, 
frequency of lifting, duration of a lift, height of the lift, body position during a lift, and the quality of the 
grip a person has on the object being lifted.   
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ECT‘s proposed change, and in an interview, described their exchange.  He began by 
describing the engineer‘s position. 
Because his idea is to put one person in the truck and we‘re 
saying, ―well, they‘ve got to do double lifts, you‘ve got a person 
working in there all by themselves. They could be at risk of 
anything. They could trip over a box, hit their head. Nobody‘s 
there to help them. And he‘s saying, ―well, there‘s somebody 
right outside the door‖…. and his words were, ―I‘ve just told 
them to work as fast as they can and don‘t worry about what you 
do, just work as fast as you can. Don‘t worry about a break. We‘ll 
spell you off every 15 minutes.‖ So you got someone working 
their ass off every 15 minutes. Well, your potential for injury‘s 
increased because now they‘re working like a dog for 15 minutes, 
going out there [on the loading dock], and they‘re still doing 
SOMETHING. It‘s not like they‘re just sitting down and resting.  
Then they‘re going back in and working like a dog for another 15 
minutes.  And he quoted me a bunch of numbers, ―well, they‘re 
working within the [engineering standards] rates per person,‖…. 
And I said, ―but no, they‘re working at the upper end of that.  
They‘re not working in the middle as you‘re saying, they‘re 
working at the top end of it, by themselves.‖  And who‘s to say 
these rates are even correct?  They‘re an engineering spec rate.‖  
The significance of this story is that it highlights (a) the ECT‘s limitations in 
pushing its agenda and (b) that the ergonomic principles and data showing the high injury 
rate were insufficient to persuade the engineer.  In this instance, the engineering manager 
drew on materials-handling standards to argue against the request for another worker, 
even though there was good evidence from injury statistics that it was an injurious 
position and the ECT, using a recognized set of lifting standards, calculated that work 
tasks unloading the trucks put dockworkers at risk of injury.   
5.2.4  Budgeting for the Ergonomics Program  
The ECT needed funding for the majority of its changes but receiving it was 
problematic because there was no ergonomics budget; that is, no finances were 
exclusively allotted for making ergonomic improvements.  Consequently, each time the 
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ECT wanted to make a change – large or small – the team looked for a manager who 
could draw resources from his/her budget.  Company policy was that the district manager 
had discretion over expenditures of five hundred dollars or less.  If sums of money were 
required beyond five hundred dollars, managers external to the depot needed to review 
and approve the request, which often made the search for funds complicated and time 
consuming.   
When the ECT recommended a small-scale inexpensive change, it relied on the 
budgets overseen by company personnel who were within the depot and easily accessible, 
such as the district manager.  If the ECT received permission to make a change, and the 
district manager agreed to supply funds from his budget, getting monies for small 
changes was handled with relative ease and speed.  In one instance, a worker 
representative was given the depot‘s credit card, and with little discussion, purchased a 
set of wheels and casters for a cart.  The district manager also used his budgetary 
discretion to make small, ECT-driven changes to the depot‘s physical lay out, such as 
removing a railing that obstructed dockworkers and forced them to do unnecessary 
lifting.    
If a change required large expenditures, the ECT went through the company‘s 
administrative channels to make capital acquisitions: an unfamiliar and protracted process 
for most of the ECT members.  This process started with an effort to secure the district 
manager‘s endorsement of the change; the request was then sent on to the more senior 
managers who needed to approve the investment.   
As mentioned, some senior managers were not cognizant of the intervention, and, 
were thus reluctant to have monies drawn from their budgets.  Without its own budget, 
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the ECT was working outside the company‘s regular channels with no immediately 
apparent funding source, sparking confusion among managers and hindering budgetary 
approval.  Typically, the ECT‘s requests for changes were not turned down because of 
their cost; however, managers‘ were reluctant to have funds pulled from their own 
budgets.   
Throughout the intervention, the district manager and OHS manager noted that 
the ergonomics team should have had its own budget which tied the team‘s requests to 
what they referred to as a ―project code,‖ which was an identifier that linked expenditures 
with a company project that had money allotted solely for it.  If the PE program had such 
a code its expenses would be associated with it and confusion among company personnel 
minimized.  According to them, a budget and project code would have greatly simplified 
the process, eliminated some of the uncertainty among managers, reduced discussions 
related to that uncertainty, and saved company personnel and the ECT much frustration.  
According to the OHS manager, the project code would have given the ergonomic 
program and the ECT ―its own corporate identity‖ and would have been a clear statement 
of the importance of the ECT and its activities, extending the intervention‘s ―scope,‖ and 
thereby minimizing the ambiguity about who was responsible for paying for ergonomic 
changes.  The district manager, in particular, was vocal about this point, in part because 
he was concerned about the money coming out of his budget.  When asked if having a 
budget would speed up the process he said, categorically, ―Yes absolutely. It would.‖ He 
talked about being responsible for maintaining his own budget and not overspending, and 
commented on pulling money from one place to put it in another and his frustration over 
the fact that there was not a budget for ergonomics even after he had requested one.  
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When the district manager was asked if he thought that not having a budget was a 
problem from the beginning of the intervention he was unequivocal: 
Absolutely. A HUGE one.  It delayed a number of things.  I think 
it‘s become very political. I think that because there is no budget 
everything is politics.  I guess what I mean by that is we‘re doing 
the process, we are identifying what we need and we need 
something we are going through the process of filling out 
[acquisition forms] and whatever the case might be, but because 
there is no budget I am looking at it differently than I would if the 
money was there.  Others are looking at it differently because the 
money isn‘t there.  I think if there was a bucket of ergo money 
and someone was paid to manage that, to make sure it went to the 
right stuff than I think it would be very easy to make decisions 
because that‘s what the facts say that‘s what we should do. … 
what happens now is that my level to my boss to his boss to 
whoever signs these things, knows whatever we are buying has to 
come from a bucket that it wasn‘t planned to get money from.  
So, robbing Peter to pay ergo. … But, if I had a ten thousand 
dollar ergo line, tell me what you need and if it makes sense, 
we‘ll buy it. But that‘s not what we are doing right now. So it‘s 
definitely hampered the ergo process in my opinion.          
If there had been an ergonomics budget, confusion about where responsibility to 
pay for changes resided and worries about accountability may have been reduced and 
requests would likely have been processed more smoothly.  As the OHS manager said,  
By NOT getting that project classification up front, I think [we] 
hampered the effectiveness of this group tremendously, in the 
sense of bogging [them] down with a lot of red tape and having 
me do a lot more explaining and impromptu seminars about what 
the ergonomic team is and why they [managers] are getting billed 
for this. 
  Having a PE program budget would have eliminated, or at least lessened, delays 
associated with managers who needed to be convinced that they would not be 
accountable for the expenses and assured department heads that senior management was 
supporting the program.     
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One of the first change(s) the ECT attempted to carry out involved getting 
cordless phones for the depot‘s retail and garage workers.  The ECT needed little time to 
determine that cordless phones would alleviate the workers‘ exposures to physical strains, 
but it took quite a while to receive budgetary approval.  A problem emerged when the 
retail and fleet department heads balked at the request.  The fleet manager, responsible 
for signing off on a request to put an additional phone in the depot‘s garage, did not 
return the ECT‘s calls, delaying the team‘s progress.  The OHS manager said he finally 
persuaded the retail manager and fleet manager to purchase the phones after explaining 
that senior management endorsed the PE program and that when it came time to review 
the budgets, ergonomics expenditures would be considered.   
If the ECT had possessed some discretionary power over a budget, change-
making progress would have been more efficient.  Time consuming conversations with 
management regarding funding would have been unnecessary.  While the lack of a 
budget and management‘s incognizance of the intervention may explain the delays in the 
early months of the intervention, it does not explain why management was unwilling to 
provide the ECT with a budget after it had operated for twelve months and raises 
questions about where ergonomics ranked on the company‘s list of priorities. 
5.2.5  Consequences of Slow Change  
 The changes that the ECT undertook, even those that required limited or no 
fabrication and would only minimally interrupt the workflow, required extended time to 
complete because of the need to secure senior management approval.  Frequent 
negotiating and revisiting issues with managers had important consequences for the team. 
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The constant, lengthy, delays contributed to the ECT‘s lack of momentum, and frustrated 
worker representatives.   
In one instance of frustration exhibited over the protracted process, a worker 
representative, who was quite involved with acquiring a small handcart for a courier, was 
discouraged by the unreasonably long time it took to get the cart.  Noting that the old cart 
was heavy and unwieldy, and its use by the courier was putting him at risk for injury, he 
said the process could have been speeded up.  He noted the irony of a courier company 
that sells customers its speed of deliveries taking so long to get the cart:  ―like eight 
weeks, COME ON! You know we‘re a shipping company.  We can have stuff here the 
next day.  So don‘t tell me …– we can‘t get it from Toronto, get it from out West or 
something.  I think it [to receive the cart] was a minimum of eight weeks.‖ 
Some worker representatives‘ sense of dissatisfaction with the time it took to 
implement changes was rooted in their own expectations and also that their fellow 
workers were waiting to hear about the status of their suggested changes and continued to 
work under onerous conditions while they waited.  In ECT meetings, the worker 
representatives repeatedly noted that non-ECT workers wanted to know when their 
changes would be implemented, that they were getting impatient, and that they were 
starting to believe that there would be no changes.  These worker representatives, feeling 
obligated to fulfill their promises to fellow workers, found it difficult to repeatedly tell 
them that a change was ongoing.  In one instance of this, a worker representative recalled 
an episode in which a fellow worker asked him about the status of a change:  
he‘s asking me, ‖What‘s the deal?‖ and I said, ―look we‘re 
trying.‖ And I was in there [ECT meeting] battling but I felt really 
bad for the guy. … it was out of my hands. I couldn‘t really do 
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anything except wait for the new one to come.   …– apparently 
where it was ordered they didn‘t know diddly squat about what it 
was for.  All they thought was that we were ordering a [standard] 
cart. To me, if you can tell somebody on the other end of the 
phone, ―We need this ASAP this guy, is going to hurt himself – 
he‘s already hurt himself…,‖ and it was a top priority in my view.  
It should‘ve been treated that way and it seemed like, ―Well it‘s 
not here yet, Well it‘s not here yet.‖ Well to me there should‘ve 
been a phone call. …finally a couple of phone calls were made 
and it got shipped and finally came, and I assembled it for him.  
Occasionally, when confronted with a situation in which they were unable to 
make a change for a prolonged period, the ECT suggested interim solutions.  For 
instance, as it waited for a cart, the team ordered wheels and bearings that served as a 
temporary solution, reducing couriers‘ exposures to injury.  In another instance, the ECT 
was able to fix some badly damaged carts that the dockworkers were using to move 
freight around within the depot, without going to management.  For the most part, 
however, the ECT was forced to wait.   
ECT members often commented on the ECT‘s slow progress – or how much it 
was hindered by going through multiple channels to secure endorsement for its projects.  
One of the ECT‘s courier representatives referred to getting support from management 
for the projects and its concomitant problems as the, ―Courier Co. two step.‖  In an 
interview 16 months into the intervention, the operations administrative assistant noted 
that even when it came to the smaller changes, the ECT could not do things without 
checking with multiple levels of management, which invariably took time and slowed 
progress.  In her words, ―as far as even little changes, I don‘t think we felt we …could 
make them without checking with someone else first.‖ 
The pace of the ECT‘s changes also frustrated local management.  In one meeting 
the district manager said that the ECT was ―stalled‖ and was ―spinning its wheels.‖  In 
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particular, he noted that there were items that had reappeared on the ECT‘s agenda week 
after week but were never accomplished. 
Several members noted that the team could have operated more efficiently if 
someone in management, supportive of the ergonomic program, was readily available to 
help.  Members suggested that having access to such a person would reduce the 
confusion encountered among managers and made the ECT‘s changes more of a priority.   
5.3  FURNITURE CO.  
5.3.1  “It just takes so much time to get something done” 
For the first twelve months at Furniture Co., the ECT had great difficulty 
implementing its changes, leading to considerable frustration among the ECT‘s worker 
and management representatives, both of whom saw the team as ineffectual.  Members 
described the ECT as ―floundering,‖ and ―languishing‖ because of its inability to make 
changes.  Managers not on the ECT wondered whether the team had accomplished 
anything.  The plant manager, talking about some of the ECT‘s changes, described the 
ECT‘s problems this way:  
Let‘s say… all the things we‘re looking at the prototypes for the 
stands – altering the stands or the chutes [for parts]… we were 
floundering as a group when we‘re trying to deal with, without 
those individuals, trying to buy lifting devices and tilting devices 
trying to get them modified on our own.  We were floundering as 
a group, we just didn‘t have – it wasn‘t happening it was taking 
weeks to get things in weeks and if something wasn‘t right it 
would take weeks to get it resolved. 
In the first 12 months of the intervention, the team faced at least two problems 
that hampered its change-making activities.  First, it had no influence on the shopfloor to 
implement changes.  Second, the ECT had little control over the material and non-
material resources it required to have the solutions it designed fabricated and installed.  
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At the intervention‘s outset, once the ECT identified a hazard and developed a 
solution, a representative, typically the plant manager, went to the maintenance manager, 
who was key to having the maintenance department fabricate and then install changes. 
The plant manager‘s articulation work was undermined because the maintenance 
manager was not carrying out the required changes.   
Initially, the group underestimated the amount of work it took to make the 
changes and did not directly involve the plant personnel who had authority and access to 
resources.  The plant manager recounted early ECT attempts and expectations:  
I thought if we got the employees on the plant floor, this 
supervision and training from the University that we would be 
able to package it better to be able to present it and say, ―here, to 
the organization, here is the improvement that we want.  Here‘s 
what we want to deliver.  If you do this, you get this.‖  … it didn‘t 
seem to work very well that way.  It seemed more that we have 
involve the structure within the plant that lives and breaths that 
activity.  I think it‘s got to be part of that.  Whatever system‘s in 
the plant that is responsible for CHANGES in the plant, this [PE 
program] is all about changing things, and I think you have to 
involve those groups.  That‘s the trades group because those are 
the ones who are constantly something breaking and they‘re 
fixing it, or someone say ―this is always breaking and I‘m always 
fixing it, can‘t you do something better?‖  And that‘s the group 
that‘s gotta do that.  They have this workin‘ relationship day in, 
day out.  That‘s what they do.   
Below, I describe some of the exigencies that the ECT faced as it attempted to 
move its changes from the drawing board to the shopfloor and the articulation work that 
it engaged in to implement its changes.   
5.3.2  Shopfloor “Collisions”:  Authority Required to Make Changes 
One factor related to the ECT‘s lack of authority to make changes on the 
shopfloor was that it did not have the cooperation of the production manager responsible.    
One of the issues here was that the ECT‘s activities conflicted, or ―collided‖ in the plant 
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manager‘s words, with the production manager‘s undertakings.  Similarly, in an interview 
well into the intervention, the production manager described his goals and the ECT‘s as 
―conflicting.‖  
The plant manager, an ECT member, oversaw department supervisors but had no 
authority over the shop floor‘s production machinery.  The plant‘s management hierarchy 
was set up such that control over the floor was shared.  The plant manager and the 
production manager occupied parallel places in the authority structure so the former 
could not simply direct the latter to carry out ECT-related tasks.  Moreover, the vice 
president often gave directions to the production manager, which were not shared with 
the plant manager.  The plant manager explained the relevance of this for the ECT‘s 
work: 
So the VP would be issuing directives or have initiatives that 
[production manager] would be carrying out for him of which I 
may not even be aware of. And even though I‘m responsible for 
the plant, there‘s that one, one or two strings in the plant that 
report directly to the VP.  Those things are outside of my control. 
So he had [his] initiatives out there and for a lot of these that we 
were colliding on what we were working on.    
In several instances, the ECT‘s activities were directly hampered by the 
production manager‘s work.  In one such episode, the ECT was trying to reduce the 
exertion related to handling parts in an area of the assembly department.  After examining 
the work area, the ECT devised a way to reconfigure the lines to mitigate the strain on 
workers.  Part way through its reconfiguration, the ECT discovered that the production 
manager was rearranging those lines as part of another, non-ECT related project.  
Consequently, the ECT‘s changes were undone by the product manager‘s alterations.  In 
another instance, the ECT members examined a large press machine with the intent to 
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devise an easier way to load it with parts.  As they finished the change, they became 
aware that the production manager‘s plant layout changes would eliminate that piece of 
equipment.  In a third example, the ECT was trying to alter the manner in which workers 
fed parts into a machine.  However, the production manager‘s planned changes to the 
layout restricted the space available in the area to such an extent that workers and lift 
trucks could not move around, which rendered the ECT‘s change unfeasible.   
One of the team‘s worker representatives noted that the production manager was 
rarely positive about the ergonomic program and the ECT‘s proposed changes:     
The production manager and I actually had a fight the one time 
because we [ECT] wanted to move something and I don‘t even 
remember what it was but and he didn‘t agree about where it 
should be moved.  And I said,  ―Well…it has to be moved 
because it‘s one of our ergo projects…and we‘re going to be 
move it and we‘re going to put the lifter in there and see how it 
works …‖ And he just didn‘t want to have anything to do with 
that and he goes, ―You guys just can‘t come in here and tell me 
what to do. It‘s already costing me money on the lean program 
and the floor plan and I have everything planned out and you guys 
can‘t and I am going to go and talk to [OHS manager].‖   
The production manager‘s lack of support and involvement with the ECT had two 
consequences for the team‘s activities.  Sometimes, the production manager‘s activities 
negated the ECT‘s activities when they were completed; other times, the manager 
disrupted the ECT‘s changes when they were partially finished.  Regardless of the 
circumstances of the disruption, when it occurred the team was unable to make changes 
that addressed a hazard.  Regarding these problems with the production manager as 
extremely important, the plant manager said that, ―Without knowing what the production 
manager was working on, it was impossible for us to make improvements.‖  Additionally, 
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sometimes the production manager, disagreeing with a proposed change, withheld his 
support of the project so it could not go forward.     
5.3.3  Supervisors   
To implement its solutions the ECT needed the cooperation of shopfloor 
supervisors; however, they typically were unhelpful, especially in the PE program‘s early 
months.  In some instances, the supervisors did not understand the importance of 
ensuring that the workers set up new equipment the way the ECT installed it.  In others, 
they failed to adopt the work processes that accompanied a new piece of equipment.  In at 
least a couple of instances, a recently-added piece of equipment was moved out of the 
work area, as when the ECT introduced a lift table that minimized the need for workers to 
bend.  A key feature of the table is that workers could adjust it to a comfortable working 
height.  However, the department‘s supervisors failed to ensure that the workers could 
use the table and it remained at floor level, the very position that required workers to 
bend the most.  Because of the supervisors‘ uncooperativeness in the intervention‘s 
beginning months, the ECT often found the machinery it installed was being removed, 
misused, or underused by workers. 
ECT members distinguished between those supervisors who were helpful and 
others who were unsupportive.  One of the ECT‘s worker representatives noted that, ―I 
got no complaints for my supervisor.  He comes to ergonomics.  He‘s been pretty 
good….. He‘s one of the better ones from what I hear.‖   But when he was asked about 
the support from other supervisors he recounted experiences working on one of the 
ECT‘s changes: 
I don‘t think the support is that great…. When we were talkin‘ 
about the layout change… to line six and the first thing I showed 
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them a drawing, I said  ―what do you think?‖ and he said, ―is it 
going to increase production at all?‖  I said no, so he says, ―then 
why you doin‘ it?‖  So I said, ―it‘s just ergonomics.‖   I go, ―it 
MIGHT help.‖  So his main concern was the production and I 
think that‘s the biggest problem with the supervisors like I can‘t 
speak for all the rest I think that‘s the biggest thing they want to 
see a CHANGE, but to increase production to make their numbers 
better, not so much to make it better for the employees. 
Those supervisors who were unsupportive of the team‘s work did not get involved 
for several reasons.  The OHS manager noted that many supervisors felt that they were 
already doing many different jobs and resisted doing any more.  Additionally, there were 
fewer supervisors than there had been in the past and thus fewer to both carry out regular 
activities and also to attend ergonomic changes.  The environmental health specialist 
noted that, for supervisors, ergonomics was an additional responsibility that they had 
little time to perform, ―So when people—there‘s change when people don‘t like it, it‘s 
harder for them as supervisors because people complain more and its more time out of 
their day they have to train people on something, ‗here‘s another thing, train them on this 
too.‘‖     
There were also indications that for the supervisors, production rates took 
precedence over making ergonomic changes, and they did not want to adopt practices that 
jeopardized their throughput.  This impacted on their support for the ECT‘s changes.  As 
one worker representative said, ―I find a lot of supervisors just care about the numbers 
[pieces per hour] and are not so concerned about the ergonomics issues.‖   
5.3.4  Maintenance Manager Resistance 
The maintenance manager needed to be involved in the vast majority of the 
ECT‘s activities, and all aspects of implementation required the maintenance 
department‘s considerable temporal investment.  In many cases, prototypes, based on the 
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ECT‘s designs, were built from scratch.  They then needed to be installed on the 
shopfloor and then tested (and in some instances, adjusted based on workers‘ 
evaluations).  Typically, once workers had an opportunity to use a prototype and give the 
ECT some feedback, the team re-evaluated the change and tried to modify it accordingly.  
The plant manager, cognizant of the ECT‘s problems with the maintenance manager, 
noted that the maintenance department gave the ECT‘s activities low priority:  
one of our largest stumbling blocks in the beginning was because 
they [maintenance department] weren‘t involved in the ergonomic 
change team….We were just amongst the rest of the priorities so 
if we [plant] had equipment breakdowns they would take that as 
first priority and they have a PM [preventative maintenance] 
program…  So all of a sudden we [ECT] are the third person in 
line asked for those same resources.  So it was slow. 
Initially, the plant manager thought he could simply be an intermediary between 
the ECT and the maintenance manager.  Typically, at the intervention‘s outset the plant 
manager took the ECT‘s recommendations for change to the maintenance manager and 
asked that these be carried out.  However, the maintenance manager either did not 
comply with the ECT‘s requests or took what seemed to the ECT to be an unreasonably 
long time to do so.  Therefore, approximately eight months into the intervention, the plant 
manager brought the maintenance manager on to the team.  After several meetings it was 
evident that this only marginally improved the maintenance manager‘s cooperation with 
the ECT.  The maintenance manager attended the ECT‘s meetings and participated, but 
remained slow or uncooperative in getting the maintenance department to assist the team.  
Frequently, the maintenance manager told the ECT what they wanted could not be done, 
often invoking reasons why, or telling the ECT its requests would only be done if there 
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was time.  Other times, the maintenance manager said he was going to perform some 
activity but returned to the group without having completed the task.    
ECT members described the maintenance manager‘s attitude toward the ECT in 
its first 12 months as ―negative,‖ and they understood that if the team had any chance of 
getting something done, it needed to ask repeatedly because the maintenance manager‘s 
initial answer was invariably ―No.‖   
Team members‘ frustrations about their lack of progress and the maintenance 
manager‘s lack of assistance came to the fore in one meeting.  During a discussion of a 
specific change, the OHS manager – frustrated by the ECT‘s poor progress and the 
maintenance manager‘s repeated excuses for not accomplishing an implementation task– 
tersely told the maintenance manager to ―just get it done!‖  The change was eventually 
completed but it took 12 months.  
5.3.5  Production Pressure: “Keeping the Line Running” 
The maintenance manager‘s unwillingness to arrange for time to carry out ECT 
activities was shaped by competing demands on the maintenance department‘s staff from 
production, which slowed the pace at which ECT-related projects were completed.  The 
maintenance manager noted both during the change team meetings and in our interview 
that the ergonomic tasks received low priority because the maintenance department ‗s 
principal function was to ensure the line kept running.  In an interview twenty-four 
months into the intervention, the maintenance manager described the situation in the 
following manner:  
Usually…  the guys … [maintenance worker] …  in the morning 
he goes and does all the lubrication and oiling through the whole 
plant, so he comes back and then he works a few hours on it and 
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you‘re taken off—it‘s just not an easy task because it‘s not a 
primary function.   
The time that could be allotted to fabricate, modify, or install ergonomic changes 
was limited.  Typically, anything in the plant that needed to be dealt with, to keep 
production running, such as a machinery breakdown, took precedence over ergonomics.  
The maintenance manager was unequivocal about the maintenance department‘s 
priorities:   
If I have to choose, I‘ll pick production.  That‘s just the way it is. 
….  in general it‘s frowned upon having machinery down if, …, 
in doing something that‘s an ergo issue, and having that machine 
out.  We can‘t just let it go down; it‘s just not allowed, eh.  
Whether anybody actually would say that out loud, probably not.  
But like guaranteed it‘s a real (laughs) it‘s a real thing.  We—
everybody, every person that operates an industrial establishment 
is in business for one thing, that‘s to roll the machinery.  If the 
machinery isn‘t putting out the product, you‘re not gonna make 
the customer‘s order. 
Nevertheless, changes were made, but because of the subordination of ergonomic 
change to production goals, they typically took a long time to finish.  In an interview 
twenty-four months into the intervention, the maintenance manager described the 
precariousness of the time allotted to work on ergonomic changes and how the 
maintenance department went about finding time for the team‘s projects.   
What we do is we put the task out on the floor [of the 
maintenance shop] this is what we need to get done, work on it in 
our spare time….  So basically if they have— if they don‘t have a 
breakdown or anything to do other than that then that‘s what they 
work at.  So that‘s why it ends up taking them so long.  Because 
in some cases, for some of the guys, there virtually isn‘t any time.  
Trying to find ―spare time‖ for the maintenance staff to fabricate the ECT‘s 
changes or install them on the shopfloor was difficult.  Additionally, the maintenance 
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manager noted that tending to ECT-related activities was difficult because there were not 
enough department personnel.   
As a result of the limited time available and because that time could be interrupted 
by production problems, few projects were ever completed without some interruption to 
the process.  Crucially, maintenance personnel were frequently distracted from 
ergonomic work by production concerns, left projects in the midst of working on them, 
and on resuming work had to retrace their work and figure out what they were doing prior 
to the interruption.  When I asked the maintenance manager how he and his staff got 
things done he said  
Well, I can virtually guarantee there isn‘t a project, unless it‘s a 
very short variation, that… gets done in one piece.  It gets done in 
many, many starts and re-starts.  And that takes a lot longer to 
finish the project for one, cause… every time you walk away 
from something and come back you have a reinitiate.  Probably a 
third of the time of what you spent to get you back to where you 
were. …  this is common.  So a job that would take normally 
forty hours of work, would take a hundred hours by the time you 
get on and off back and forth and put all your tools away.  And 
for these guys [maintenance personnel] it‘s frustrating as hell 
sometimes we don‘t physically have the staff to leave those jobs, 
although we have a few people almost everyday now and then.   
The many ―starts and restarts‖ and the limited time that the maintenance staff had 
is illustrated by its attempts to build some workers an ECT-recommended adjustable 
table.  The maintenance department took several months to fabricate a prototype of the 
table.  One of the maintenance personnel spent about sixty hours trying to fabricate the 
table.  According to the maintenance manager, ―That‘s a horrendous amount of time to 
put it together.  Plus, we had to design it, plus it‘s a prototype where we decided we‘re 
gonna have to make changes.‖   
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The maintenance manager also felt that it was not the maintenance department‘s 
responsibility to design and fabricate equipment for the team.  This was, in his opinion 
the engineering department‘s jurisdiction.  Often, as the ECT discussed its changes, the 
maintenance manager stressed that it would be better, if possible, to get a contractor 
outside the company to fabricate something or to purchase it directly off the shelf rather 
than have it built it in house.  During an interview the maintenance manager said,     
 if the company was, would be driven from the top down 
ergonomically they would probably say we need people just to do 
that.  Or we‘ll put an engineer in charge of it and we‘ll get him to 
make drawings and send stuff out to get it manufactured outside.  
Where we have a committee to approve it or not, budget it, send it 
out, it‘s their job to get it done right now, that‘s their focus right.  
Our focus ISN‘T building stuff in here, it‘s not a focus, and 
THAT‘S a common issue.  The maintenance department, as far as 
I‘m concerned,… should never build anything.  We‘re here to 
repair machinery.   
In summary, for the program‘s initial fourteen months, the ECT‘s activities were 
hindered by key managerial personnel‘s lack of cooperation.  The ECT did not have 
authority to make changes on the shopfloor; it had little control over the fabrication and 
installation of changes; and, once changes were installed, front-line supervisors gave little 
in the way of support to ensure that changes to the work process would be effectively 
incorporated.  
5.3.6  Securing Authority to Make Change  
Responding to their difficulties in securing support, and slow progress, ECT 
members carried out activities associated with articulation work.  One important example 
of this is the health and safety manager and plant manager‘s recruitment of the production 
manager and maintenance manager onto the ECT.  Their positions within the factory 
gave them capabilities not shared by other ECT members.  Their involvement in the 
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ECT‘s meetings eventually changed the team‘s operation and, over time, improved its 
effectiveness and efficiency.  I explore these changes and the activities associated with 
articulation work below.   
5.3.7  Circumventing Roadblocks 
When the ECT was floundering, the OHS manager was very aware that its 
operation would have to be changed if it was going to be effective.  Moreover, she 
realized that part of the ECT‘s problem was its lack of requisite authority to make 
changes.  As she said late in the intervention, referring to her efforts to speak on behalf of 
the ECT, ―I can‘t walk up to a manager and direct him to do something.‖  Moreover, she 
noted that when she was dealing with ergonomics it was not about ―life and death,‖ that 
is, musculoskeletal disorders did not pose the same imminent threat as traumatic injury 
posed to workers, and thus ergonomics had lower priority for managers than other safety 
hazards.  To accomplish ECT-related activities, in spite of the challenges she faced, she 
developed an indirect approach by, in her words, ―going around the official structures,‖ 
or the regular chain of command.  
Some of the OHS manager‘s articulation work was rooted in the relationships and 
alliances she built in the plant.  She explained that, ―if you align yourself with those 
people you get things done‖ and added that it was important to ―foster those 
relationships.‖ She described the influence that she had as ―personal power‖ and 
differentiated it from power drawn from a title or position.  Personal power was rooted in 
the collection of relationships that the OHS manager had forged and maintained in the 
plant that she deemed important for accomplishing work.  She noted that personal power 
accumulated over time through her endeavours, and that the credibility the health and 
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safety department had built up rested on demonstrating that it was doing a good job.  The 
result was that ―people do stuff for you just ‗cause they think you‘re doin‘ a good job and 
they want to contribute.‖  The relationships that the OHS manager developed were 
important to her carrying out health and safety activities, and she said, ―I‘ve developed…  
relationships with other KEY people within this organization and you just know for the 
success of your career that‘s what you do and you use those when you need them.‖   
When the OHS manager was confronted with an obstacle to making changes she 
sought alternative ways of completing the change.  She said she went from one person to 
another, seeking someone who could push a change through.  If that person could not 
provide the support she needed, ―if he doesn‘t give me the answer I want, I go over his 
head to the next person.‖  She continued, ―If I can‘t get it one way, I can figure it out 
another way and go get it.‖   
One of her most important relationships was with the production manager.  Once 
recruited, the production manager collaborated on many of the ECT‘s changes.  The OHS 
manager explained that the production manager ―will do anything for me.… We work 
very well together.  I help him out and he helps me out.  We‘ve got the give and take 
built.  So he can facilitate stuff for me that I need doing, and I know that sounds a little 
subversive, but that‘s the way life is.‖   
The OHS manager said one of the things she did, even after the maintenance 
manager was on the team, was to use her connections in the plant to get around the delays 
that he created.  When the maintenance manager was unacceptably slow to move on a 
project, the OHS manager bypassed him and went to the production manager to 
accomplish things.  In reference to one of the excuses the maintenance manager 
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frequently invoked, the OHS manager remarked, ―There was never enough staff, so I 
began not to trust that statement because maintenance has always said that whether they 
had 20 or 10 [personnel] that they never had enough help so I think those things were in 
the way.‖  Consequently, the OHS manager said she ―shamelessly‖ manoeuvred around 
the maintenance manager at least a dozen times to increase the pace of change making 
activities.  
Another strategy she used to move changes along was to talk to the plant manager 
and point out that the slow downs in the change process were directly affecting the 
company‘s injury statistics and injury costs.  The OHS manager explained this process:   
you go to [the plant manager] and say this is an implication of 
[not addressing work hazard] We have to do this ergo project 
because I have three people with this injury that I can‘t put to 
work and are showing up on your statistics as make-work people 
every month and you really don‘t want that. And then bringing 
some of that information to bear on why we needed to get the 
next step done for an ergo project tended to move things. 
5.3.8  Enlisting the Maintenance Manager’s Assistance 
At about the eighth month of the intervention, and in an attempt to deal with the 
above concerns, the plant manager recruited the maintenance manager onto the ECT.  In 
the first meetings he attended, however, it was obvious that merely having him in the 
meetings was insufficient to secure his cooperation and assistance.  In the plant 
manager‘s words, ―Just having him on the team wasn‘t working.‖  In an interview late in 
the intervention, the plant manager explained the maintenance manager‘s orientation this 
way:  
Because [the maintenance manager], like other skilled trades … 
supervisors I‘ve worked with before, their natural filter to find out 
where the priorities are is to say ―no.‖ And if he says no and 
people go away, it‘s not important. So, even though [he] was on 
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the team he hadn‘t really bought in yet and [he] was giving us the 
same answers in the team meetings as [he] was outside the team 
meetings.   
To address the maintenance manager‘s lack of cooperation, the plant manager 
intervened and spoke to him about his reluctance to attend to the ECT‘s projects.  In their 
conversation, the plant manager told the maintenance manager that he needed to 
prioritize the ECT‘s work just as he prioritized his regular plant duties.  Recounting this 
meeting, the plant manager said  
I tried to get him to look at all three inputs and say, ―you got to 
balance them.‖ [production and ergonomics] You can‘t just work 
on one and the other ones will be ―when I get to it, when I get 
time,‖ because the other two will never be done.  Which means 
our projects and PMs [preventative maintenance] will just never 
get done if you just sit back and do your breakdowns… So, he‘s 
got to manage that, he‘s got to look at those three and say, ―how 
to meld them together and work on all of them everyday?‘ 
After their discussion, the maintenance manager soon became much more 
involved in the ECT meetings.  This reduced, though did not eliminate, problems of 
getting maintenance personnel involved in ergonomic projects.  He continued to stress 
that lack of enough maintenance personnel hampered efforts to handle both the 
company‘s work and the ECT‘s.   
5.3.9  Getting the Supervisors Involved 
Initially uncooperative, the supervisors eventually became involved for several 
reasons.  The ECT arranged for ergonomics training for the supervisors.  The team 
members closely monitored how its changes were being used and that supervisors were 
promoting the changes and intervened when necessary to assure that supervisors were 
taking the time to show workers how to properly use new equipment.  The OHS manager 
pointed out in an interview that the supervisors‘ orientations toward the ergonomic 
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program changed over time because they realised that the program was not going away 
and that they were going to have to cooperate with its goals. 
5.3.10  Production Manager  
Approximately twelve months after the program began, the OHS manager and 
plant manager brought the production manager on to the ECT and he began to attend the 
meetings.  The production manager put his recruitment this way:  ―the group was sort of 
working on their own and had a bit of a conflict with the things that I was doing so they 
asked me to join them so that… we‘d be moving in one direction, which was a good 
idea.‖ 
The product manager‘s membership gave the ECT direct access to authority over 
work processes.  No longer was there confusion concerning what the production manager 
and the ECT were trying to do.  The production manager also brought with him access to 
material resources in the form of personnel who could fabricate the ECT‘s solutions.  The 
production manager said that getting someone to do the fabrication work was ―a step in 
the right direction.‖ Without this person he said, ―I just couldn‘t get anything done.‖   
The production manager‘s authority over the workers in his department and 
ability to control an employee who answered directly to him meant that there was less 
dependence on the maintenance department to fabricate and install ECT changes.  In 
some instances, this lessened the time the team had to wait for its changes to be 
completed as the fabricator working for the production manager was less likely to be 
interrupted by machinery breakdowns or other unscheduled production demands in the 
same way maintenance personnel might be.  The production manager understood that, 
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―the team couldn‘t do it on their own really, unless they had somebody that would … do 
that.‖  
Another advantage of having the production manager appointed to the ECT was 
that, in the health and safety manager‘s words, the ECT could ―piggyback‖ its own 
activities on to changes this manager was already undertaking independently of 
ergonomics.  Piggybacking was a source of authority, opportunity, and money.  Intent on 
incorporating ergonomic projects into other changes in the plant, the OHS manager 
recalled that she kept apprised of the changes underway by talking with the production 
manager:  ―I used to sit him down every few weeks and ask about what he was doing.‖  
Armed with this information, she aligned the ECT‘s work with the changes the 
production manager was leading, which improved the ECT‘s efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Because these projects were already underway, were approved by senior 
managers, and were being overseen by the production manager and maintenance 
manager, they presented opportunities for the ECT to become involved in activities that 
could support its agenda without having to go through the often protracted process the 
team experienced when it initiated changes.  The OHS manager remarked that the 
production manager had the ―money, mandate and time.  And he‘d pay for them [ECT 
changes] if you were going to tear it up [significantly alter a work area] anyway.‖    
Late in the intervention, the production manager‘s ability to help the team actually 
increased when the company adopted lean production practices.  The production manager 
kept the team aware of plant changes and how ECT might integrate its projects into these 
changes.  Significantly, this meant the ECT did not have to seek legitimacy for its 
recommendations.   
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5.3.11  Securing Funding for the Ergonomic Changes  
No monies were exclusively allocated for the ergonomic program, even though 
the OHS manager had repeatedly requested a $100, 000 budget for occupational health 
and safety and the ECT‘s changes frequently involved significant investments of money 
to purchase expensive equipment or modify existing machinery.  As a result, for each 
desired change, the ECT searched for money from various sources.  The ECT used 
several means – both formal and informal – to secure the needed funding for changes. 
When the money for the ECT‘s changes came from budgets that the maintenance, 
production, and/or plant manager had some control over, they often reapportioned funds 
from plant budgets not intended for health and safety.  Once they determined the cost of a 
change, they looked for money that was not allotted for something else.  The maintenance 
manager referred to securing money that was not originally intended for ergonomic 
changes as ―stealing‖ or ―robbing‖ and talked about how the ECT‘s management 
representatives‘ looked for money to the support the team‘s proposed changes:  
Well, we look at the budget and say: ‗Okay we can squeeze some 
from there,‘ [Plant manager] says: ‗Well, I‘ve got a little bit over 
here I can squeeze.‘ But… – that‘s what happens when upper 
management is promising you funding. If they truly believe in 
this, there would be some money, which would help us, I guess 
that‘s the long and short of it.  So, if it doesn‘t start at the top, the 
funding is piecemeal.  So, [the production manager] has to go and 
beg for money.  And it has to come from somewhere else it 
wasn‘t intended to come from.  I have to steal money from 
accounts – save money so my budget doesn‘t go over.  [plant 
manager] has to do the same thing. [He] steals money from the 
same place where he has done well last month, so he‘ll steal 
money from there.  
 The maintenance manager described the work involved securing finances:  
it‘s just juggling the funds all the time, trying to get things done.  
Sometimes it means we may have to wait a month.  If I have a 
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bad month in maintenance, it means we don‘t have such a good 
month in ergo. That‘s just a fact of life.  It‘s not – I find that an 
issue in all safety stuff and not just ergo, ergo‘s part of the safety 
program.  So it‘s an issue for us because we don‘t have allocated 
funds specifically for that purpose.  
In the quotation above, the maintenance manager talks about reallocating money 
from one budget and applying it to something else, noting that if there was a budget 
exclusively for ergonomics it would have been unnecessary to undertake these activities.   
Significantly, he also notes the precarious position of the ergonomics funding when he 
says, ―if I have a bad month in maintenance, it means we don‘t have such a good month 
in ergo.‖  Additionally, he notes that if management genuinely supported ergonomics 
there would be money allotted specifically for ergonomics.  His observations point to the 
low place of ergonomics in the company‘s priorities.  Importantly, there was a connection 
between budget and the maintenance department‘s limited time to implement changes.  
For the maintenance manager, a dedicated pool of funds for ergonomic changes would 
have enabled him to outsource more of the ECT‘s projects, speeding up implementation 
because there were few maintenance personnel to handle it:  ―There‘s really no fund 
that‘s set up that says, ‗this is what were willing to spend on ergonomics this year.‘  And 
then allow us [ECT] to use that to get things done quicker.  Most of my stuff though 
doesn‘t get completed in a hurry because… the maintenance dept doesn‘t have any free 
time.‖  
The ECT also secured money by working through the organization‘s regular 
funding channels.  One person who needed to be involved in this process was the 
company‘s Vice President, who oversaw many of the ECT‘s purchases and whom the 
ECT‘s management members frequently consulted.  Both the maintenance manager and 
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production manager had close connections to the Vice President.  In an interview, the 
Vice President discussed the process that has to occur and the sorts of information he 
needed to see before endorsing a request: 
Well, normally I hear about it verbally and we discuss it verbally 
and I know there may be a problem there or, I may have known 
about the problem anyhow or somethin‘ or got feed back about it.  
…. so normally like I said we would sit down and discuss it 
verbally.  With the sound enclosure out there, [OHS manager] 
spoke to me she had some hearing… testing done, and voice 
testing and came up with the recommendation.  And then 
[maintenance manager ] got involved in it, went out to see who 
supplies this type of stuff and what do they recommend and then 
it gets put down into ….. what we call a CAR form….  a 
corporate capital appropriation request form… So that has to be 
filled out and then I have to… review it with the accounting 
department.  And if it‘s just,… a safety upgrade there‘s no return 
on investment required on the form because … it‘s just an 
upgrade.  But I still need accounting‘s signature on it, I need 
about five people to sign it, the president, the VP of finance, the 
VP of engineering, I sign it, and so, it gets about 5 signatures on it 
and it gets attached, a number gets attached to it and then it goes 
through the system and from that, people like [production 
manager ] or [plant manager] or [OHS manager] or whoever are 
given the okay to go ahead.  So…normally if they come up with a 
recommendation that requires capital, THAT‘S what you need to 
do.  It takes a little bit to get through the system sometimes but 
normally I can‘t think of one right now that when it came to 
health and safety work that….  your team [ECT] has 
recommended that… got turned down. 
Another way that the ECT found funding sources later in the intervention was to 
link its changes with changes in the factory that were already ongoing, or were scheduled 
to be undertaken as part of the plant‘s lean manufacturing, or continuous improvement 
program.  The ECT was closely connected to this program because the production 
manager, as well as being a team member, oversaw continuous improvement.  Not only 
was he cooperative when the ECT asked to integrate into larger continuous improvement 
changes, he also brought upcoming changes to the team‘s attention, often suggesting it 
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incorporate an ergonomic component into them.  Indeed, in ECT meetings and in 
conversations with the OHS manager, the production manager noted what he was 
working on and that the team could ―attach‖ its change to this project.  By incorporating 
its changes into these larger plant alterations, the ECT did not have to independently 
pursue a project and do the accompanying paperwork and justification, both of which 
hampered the ECT‘s efficiency.   
5.3.12  Improvements in the ECT’s Capacity to Make Changes  
With the maintenance manager and production manager recruited to the ECT and 
participating in its work, and the OHS manager continuing to push the ECT‘s agenda, the 
team was able to accomplish considerably more and do so more efficiently than it had in 
the past.  More than 24 months into the intervention, the OHS manager, who by this point 
was leading the team, stated that she wanted to make at least two work area ergonomic 
improvements per month.  She updated the team monthly to show what had been 
accomplished and what needed to be done.  The team members agreed that there was a 
substantial turnaround in the ECT‘s work in its second and third year.  The plant manager 
remarked that with the two managers on the ECT, ―our success rate improved 
dramatically.‖  The ECT exceeded its goal of making twenty-four changes in its third 
year.  Indeed, the changes that the ECT was making, both in number and efficiency, were 
impressive given their history.  As in program‘s third year, in its fourth the ECT averaged 
approximately two changes a month.  Its capacity to make changes in this period 
contrasted sharply with the intervention‘s first twelve months when few changes were 
successfully implemented.  The OHS manager recounted how her feelings about the 
program changed over time:   
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There was a while there where it was terrible.  I think that was 
last summer when we were ALL feeling like we hadn‘t made any 
DENT in this whole thing.  Since the fall, when we started to see 
a little bit of momentum build and I think when we added 
[production manager] and … [maintenance manager]. 
5.4  DISCUSSION  
In Courier Co. and Furniture Co., issues around lack of authority for 
implementation were never directly resolved.  In Courier Co., the locus of decision-
making about the ECT‘s changes remained at the senior-management level and the 
authority to make change was never delegated to the team to a degree that enabled it to 
operate efficiently.  Consequently, the ECT typically undertook time-consuming steps to 
negotiate with senior managers before it could make the appropriate changes.  
Additionally, management was often unaware of the ECT‘s activities, or if aware, 
unsupportive.  To a lesser extent, management was not amenable to the ECT‘s 
suggestions.  These issues were never resolved and the team continued to founder. 
In Furniture Co., for approximately the first year and a half of the intervention, 
the ECT made insignificant progress in its projects.  The process of change making, 
frustratingly slow for team members, led them to talk about the ECT‘s dissolution and 
prompted some senior managers to question its effectiveness.  
The ECT‘s problems at the intervention‘s outset can be linked with not having the 
maintenance manager and production manager‘s support.  These individuals, possessing 
considerable authority regarding changes on the shopfloor, were integral to the change 
process.  Recruitment of the maintenance manager and production manager improved the 
ECT‘s change making.   
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The findings discussed in the chapter are consistent with those in the literature on 
joint health and safety committees (Walters, 1985; Walters et al., 1995; Walters and 
Nichols, 2006).  In particular, the ECTs‘ inability to make changes without being 
constrained by management is similar to a central tension that hinders JHSC policies: 
how much influence these groups have (Leopold and Beaumont, 1982; O‘Grady, 2000; 
Tucker, 1995; Storey and Tucker, 2006).   
The findings also speak to a theme running through the OHS program literature: 
that management commitment is instrumental to the effective functioning of OHS 
programs.  Findings regarding the problems that the ECTs had in securing and 
maintaining management support converge with those in PE studies where there has been 
a lack of management support (e.g., Dixon et al., 2009; Fulmer et al., 2005; Liker et al., 
1991).  
This chapter extends the literature on JHSCs and PE programs by looking at the 
activities – especially articulation work – of the ECTs.  The chapter highlights the crucial 
role that both authority and articulation work played in the teams‘ pursuit of their 
objectives.  In Furniture Co. and Courier Co., ECT representatives used several 
―interactional processes‖ to accomplish their goals.  In the clearest instances of this in 
Furniture Co. the OHS manager, using her connections with power holders, ensured that 
ergonomic changes were prioritized.  Additionally, she persuaded the plant manager to 
prioritize changes that she felt were encountering resistance.  Similarly, in Courier Co., 
the OHS manager, and to a lesser extent, operations administrative assistant and 
ergonomist-facilitator used a mixture of persistence, lobbying, and allies to implement 
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changes.  Evidence from both settings highlights the individual and group efforts to 
create and maintain arrangements that change making was dependent upon. 
  The findings regarding the activities the ECTs‘ members engaged in to 
accomplish changes are consistent with the literature on articulation work (Hampson and 
Junor, 2005; Strauss, 1993; Strauss et al., 1985).  The articulation work enabled the ECTs 
to create important links so that change goals could be accomplished.  The interactional 
strategies used to forge the agreements crucial to articulation resemble those found in 
Prus‘ (1996; 1997; 2003) discussion(s) of tactical engagement.  For instance, the 
strategies used by the OHS managers in both settings were similar to what Prus (1996: 
157) refers to as the ―influence or persuasion process‖ which, ―reflects attempts on the 
part of people to ‗gain the cooperation or commitments of others‘ with respect to both 
‗one to one‘ and more diversified ‗group‘ situations.‖  The findings regarding the ECTs‘ 
articulation work bear similarity to the research by Broberg and Hermund (2004) who 
found that the OHS practitioners they studied endeavoured to create and maintain a 
network of people to support incorporation of healthy workplace features into the 
construction of an airport check-in area and manufacturing setting.  Though not 
discussing articulation work per se, these researchers suggest actors‘ attempts to improve 
working conditions are complex political endeavours.  
The amount of effort and the specific activities that constituted articulation work 
differed between the settings.  In part, this was due to differences in how the 
organizations were configured.  In Courier Co., senior managers, who were outside the 
depot, needed to authorize the team‘s suggested changes thus, someone, usually the OHS 
manager, contacted these managers and made the case for change.  In Furniture Co., 
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managers who needed to be involved in the ECT‘s changes were within the factory and 
brought on the team so little time was spent seeking these people out and making a case 
for change to them.    
Articulation work also differed between the sites in regards to its degree of 
permanence.  Strauss (1993; 1988) points out that if arrangements are created and 
followed, less articulation work is necessary.  In the courier setting, articulation work was 
done on a change-by-change basis very much akin to the ―one-shot negotiation‖ that 
Strauss (1978) describes.  These negotiations enabled the ECT, in some instances, to 
secure the support it needed to make changes.  However, these arrangements were 
transient and lasted only long enough to ensure the activity on one project was done.  
Conversely, in Furniture Co. some of the articulation work, such as recruitment, resulted 
in a stable commitment from the managers who were needed to authorize and carry out 
the ECT‘s tasks associated with implementation.  In the manufacturing setting a key 
consequence of this was that the ECT, at least after twelve months, did not have to start 
anew each time it requested a change and mobilize people.  Thus, one aspect of 
articulation work was minimized. 
 Unions can play an important role in occupational health and safety programs.  
Indeed, there are many examples of union support, if not leadership, of health and safety 
programs (e.g., Fernandez et al., 2000; Ochsner, 2002).  Therefore, in light of the 
problems the team encountered, the lack of union involvement in the process may come 
as a surprise.  However, if their lack of involvement is looked at within the history of 
health and safety committees in the settings, the inaction of the unions may make more 
sense.  In both companies, the joint health and safety committees (JHSCs) were seen by 
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the unions as ineffectual.  They may have seen the problems that the ECTs were 
encountering as paralleling the experiences of the JHSCs and felt intercession would have 
been non-productive.  Sometimes when faced with obstacles to pursuing health and 
safety concerns by one means, such as JHSCs, unions have sought other avenues to 
address OHS matters.  For instance, Walters (1987) reported that a union that 
encountered problems with management‘s support of a joint health and safety committee 
pursued other means of addressing their concerns. 
Chapter Five discussed the challenges of implementing changes.  Implementation 
was often constrained by the ECT‘s lack of authority.  Nevertheless, employing an array 
of interactional tactics the ECTs found ways to achieve some of their PE goals.  The 
division of labour is taken up in Chapter Six.  Implementation activities were divided 




“THAT’S THE CHAIN OF COMMAND”: EXPLORING THE DIVISION OF 
LABOUR IN IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES 
6.0  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Five explored the work the ECTs did to implement their changes and 
showed that the process was hindered by their lack of authority and budget.  Reacting to 
the problems they encountered, the ECTs adopted practices that eventually enabled them 
to achieve some of their goals.  This chapter extends the discussion in Chapter Five and 
focuses on the division of labour within the ECTs as they carried out their activities.   
A key principle of many participatory ergonomic programs is that worker 
representatives are involved in all facets of workplace re-design,
18
 including the 
implementation of solutions to address hazards.  For example, Imada (1991: 30), 
discussing PE, points out that ―the end user is vitally involved in developing and 
implementing the technology.‖  Similarly, Wilson and Haines (1997: 492-493) state that 
PE should involve ―people in the planning and controlling of a significant amount of their 
own work activities, with sufficient knowledge and power to influence both processes 
and outcomes in order to achieve desirable goals.‖   
Generally, participatory workplace schemes imply that there are opportunities for 
individuals to be involved in decision-making and to have a say in the organization of 
work in ways they do not under traditional Fordist production conditions.  Participatory 
arrangements depend upon workers to do something that they generally are not 
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  It is important to note that participatory ergonomic programs vary in the level of worker involvement. 
Moir (2005) provides a detailed discussion of this topic. 
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accustomed to doing: giving management input regarding the production process.  
Typically, the relations of production have been the opposite.  That is, management 
directs workers to carry out tasks, usually with little input from them.   
An important factor that may shape individuals‘ involvement in these 
participatory arrangements and the form involvement may take are the workers‘ 
expectations of how others will respond to their requests and concerns.  A crucial part of 
understanding people‘s willingness to negotiate with others is their ―stance‖ (Strauss 
1993: 88-89).  Stance pertains to people‘s assessments of how much leverage they have 
on their object of influence and how well they think they will do in negotiating 
arrangements.  Stance, as Strauss (1993:89) notes, is intertwined with context:    
What enters into the stances are not only the perceptions of power 
to influence broader conditions but also the history of the 
workers‘ past interactions, the meanings of their arrangements to 
them, their perceptions of how arrangements should work, their 
knowledge about the nature of the work and what is necessary to 
carry it out, and also their personal or organizational values, 
ideologies, and interactional skills.  Each arrangement is built also 
upon history, including personal histories, and the history of the 
organization, the interactions within and between departments, 
the power distribution within the organization, and the past 
experiences with both the current arrangement and similar ones.    
Evidence in the health and safety literature supports Strauss‘ line of thinking.  
Some studies suggest that workers‘ willingness to approach management about OHS 
concerns is affected by their perceptions of how management will react.  In a study by 
Gray (2002), if workers foresaw a conflict with management they tended not to pursue 
OHS concerns, or pursued them in ways that allowed them to avoid confronting 
management.  Studying joint health and safety committees, Walters (1987) demonstrated 
that worker representatives who felt that management would listen to them participated to 
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a greater degree than those who perceived management as less supportive (Walters et al., 
1995).  Moreover, as Walters (1991) has pointed out, many of the mechanisms outlined 
under the internal responsibility system
19
 ask workers to ―depart from the typical social 
relations of production.‖  Therefore, if participatory OHS arrangements are going to be 
effective workers need to believe that managers will treat their suggestions fairly and that 
they can raise OHS concerns without fear of reprisal from or confrontation with 
management.     
In this study, in both settings implementation activities were unevenly distributed 
among the ECTs‘ membership; they were predominantly carried out by managerial 
personnel.  I submit that both the trajectory of the change initiative as well as the 
initiative itself, in so far as it shaped the ECTs‘ division of labour, were influenced by the 
interplay among three main factors:  the type of activities that needed to be carried out, 
workplace hierarchy, and, stance, or participants‘ views about their ability to act 
effectively.  Although the types of activities required to implement change in the 
workplaces differed, they frequently involved coordinating with middle and senior 
managers to get permission to implement changes and organizing practical activities, 
such as gathering resources, to make changes.  Involving worker representatives in these 
activities necessitated challenging the workplace hierarchy, which worker representatives 
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 The internal responsibility system (IRS) is the philosophy that underpins OHS legislation in Canadian 
jurisdictions whose central premise is that both workers and employers have a responsibility in keeping the 
workplace safe.  Emerging in the 1970s, the IRS is generally associated with three rights: the right to refuse 
unsafe work, the right to participate in decisions about OHS, which often takes the form of participation on 
a joint health and safety committee, and the right to know about work related health hazards (O‘Grady, 
2000). 
 186 
were reluctant to do.  Workers‘ reluctance highlights the important limits on agency in 
organizational programs.   
6.1  COURIER CO. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, at Courier Co. the ECT‘s implementation work 
involved conferring with senior management and often a good deal of negotiating which I 
referred to as articulation work.  Articulation work was a response to the obstacles that 
the ECT encountered, in particular lack of authority to pursue changes independently of 
senior management.  The ECT did not have the authority to unilaterally make changes 
and had to consult with local and, depending on the scope of the change, senior 
management, before it carried out its proposed changes.  Usually, discussing potential 
changes with local managers was not a problem for the ECT, which was in regular 
contact with these managers and who were typically supportive of its recommendations.  
However, consulting with senior managers was more difficult.  Management was 
specialized, and various units in the company, such as fleet, facilities (depots), 
engineering, retail, and operations, were overseen by different individuals, meaning that 
the ECT had to confer with a different person for each of its projects.  Additionally, 
senior management were located at corporate headquarters, approximately 180 kilometers 
from the depot and thus were spatially removed from the ECT.  As discussed in Chapter 
Five, some senior managers were indifferent to the ECT‘s proposed changes while others 
were unaware that the participatory ergonomic intervention was in place in the company.  
Further, a small number of senior managers resisted the ECT‘s proposed changes.  
Consequently, when the work of implementation involved conferring with senior 
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managers, which over half of the ECT‘s proposed changes did, it had to be handled by 
someone with the requisite negotiating skills. 
 6.1.1  Delimiting Manager and Worker Tasks   
Early in the intervention, an understanding developed among ECT members that 
the worker representatives would not contact management about proposed changes.  In 
part, this understanding was based on the ECT worker representatives‘ difficulties 
carrying out implementation activities that involved contacting and communicating with 
senior managers.  In a couple of instances, workers were unable to reach managers.  In 
other instances, worker representatives were able to contact managers but unable to 
persuade them to accept the ECT‘s recommendations.  Additionally, worker 
representatives were reluctant to take on these tasks because of their low position in the 
workplace hierarchy and their perceptions that management would not be receptive to 
their requests.
20
  As a result, worker representatives eventually asked the ECT‘s 
management representatives to contact senior managers.  Accordingly, it was the OHS 
manager, and to a lesser extent, the operations administrative assistant and ergonomist-
facilitator, who typically consulted with management about the ECT‘s proposed changes.  
One of the changes in Courier Co. in which the OHS manager intervened was the 
removal of equipment referred to as ―reweigh stations‖ from the depot.  These stations, 
no longer in use, had been used to weigh packages, and were positioned such that they 
forced dockworkers near the depot‘s main conveyor line to work in awkward, strain-
inducing postures.  The operations administrative assistant contacted a senior manager 
and requested that the stations be removed.  This request was denied because the stations 
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 I explore this point in detail later in the chapter. 
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may be used in the future.  She then approached the OHS manager for assistance, who 
then spoke with the manager involved, and, after some convincing, this issue was 
resolved and the reweigh stations were removed.   
In another instance, a worker representative tried to remove from service delivery 
trucks that posed hazards to couriers.  Phone messages left by the worker representative 
with the fleet manager responsible for such decisions received no response.  After waiting 
several weeks and receiving no response, the worker representative became discouraged 
and asked the OHS manager to intervene and talk with the fleet manager.  This turned out 
to be an effective strategy, as the trucks were removed from operation shortly thereafter.    
The ECT management representatives‘ regular successes at completing 
implementation activities indicated to worker representatives that managers were 
effective at both contacting senior managers and pushing the ECT‘s agenda.  One worker 
representative said that part of the management representatives‘ role on the team was to 
contact senior management, which was ―natural,‖ and the reason the team had joint 
management-labour composition.  Another worker representative stated unequivocally 
that relying on management‘s assistance was the only way to effectively contact or 
negotiate with senior managers.     
Several factors contributed to the understanding that the OHS manager was in the 
best position within the company‘s managerial structure, relative to other ECT members, 
to carry out the ECT‘s articulation work.  In the ECT‘s meetings, the idea of using the 
OHS manager as a resource was reinforced in three ways.  First, the ergonomist-
facilitator frequently noted that the OHS manager was a ―resource‖ to be used by the 
ECT when it came time to contact upper-level management.  Second, the OHS manager 
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himself noted on a number of occasions that he talked to senior management informally 
during his regular duties.  Often, the team would need to consult with a senior manager 
about a change, and the OHS manager would volunteer to do it, noting that he was going 
to be talking to a manager about another matter, unrelated to the ECT, anyway.  The 
facilitator‘s promotion of the OHS manager as resource, and the ease that the manager 
would have had in talking to others managers combined with a third element: his 
consistent willingness to confer, and often, negotiate with senior managers.  
Another factor that contributed to the ECT‘s uneven division of labour was that 
the team‘s membership was not trained in the steps necessary to acquire solutions.  When 
the ECT required money to make a change, it needed to complete an acquisition form, 
which required the following pieces of information: a description of the item or service 
required, a rationale for the purchase, and an estimated cost.  Once completed, it was 
submitted to a senior manager for his/her review.  At least half of the ECT‘s changes 
required that the ECT complete paperwork for acquiring funding to make changes and 
seeking permission from managers outside of the depot.  Most ECT members knew little 
about what went into completing the required paperwork.  For the duration of the 
intervention, the operations administrative assistant and OHS manager typically executed 
these paperwork tasks.  
Several months into the intervention a working style had evolved in which 
typically the OHS manager, and to a lesser extent, the operations administrative assistant 
and ergonomist-facilitator, were responsible for contacting and conferring with senior 
managers about the ECT‘s proposed changes.  These roles were maintained from 
approximately the fourth month of the intervention to its termination 26 months later.  In 
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the following section, I discuss the sources of worker representatives‘ reticence to 
become involved in implementation activities, which were linked largely to their lack of 
both connections with management and authority.   
6.1.2  Connections with Senior Management  
A theme running through the ECT members‘ interviews was that implementation 
tasks were divided among members, in part because of their differential links with 
management.  In interviews with worker representatives, when asked why it was the OHS 
manager‘s responsibility to do certain tasks, they typically said that it was because of his 
―connections‖ to senior managers.  About 16 months into the intervention, in a dramatic 
example of the importance worker representatives attributed to connections, an ECT 
worker representative who had hitherto enthusiastically headed up a project, relinquished 
the leadership role he had played.  When asked whether he was continuing to lead the 
project, the worker representative said, ―No, I am going to let the suits and ties handle 
this; they have the connections.‖    
 In another worker representative‘s words, the OHS manager seemed to ―know 
everyone‖ in the company and because workers did not know those in senior 
management, using them to contact management would have been ―counterproductive‖ 
and extremely time consuming.  Therefore, involving workers would have delayed the 
ECT‘s already slow pace.  The quotation below from a worker representative contains 
typical sentiments shared by other ECT worker representatives: 
[OHS managers‘] connections played a large part in getting things 
done. ―You would never see me, lowly [dockworker] in [City], 
sending an email to [general manager ]. [saying] ―Listen, [general 
manager] buddy.‖ It‘s not going to happen. [OHS manager], 
however… and the connections that [he] has can do something 
along those lines and with his connections come results, [he] can 
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go to somebody higher up and say, ―Listen, we need this, this, 
and this and they‘ll say, sure no problem.‖ [OHS manager] is part 
of that inner circle, the upper echelon, that gives  [him] a certain 
amount of authority and flexibility that the rest of the group does 
not have.  
Q: And, why doesn‘t the group have it? You said that YOU 
couldn‘t call [VP Operations]… 
Theoretically, I could, but looking at it from an honest to 
goodness practical standpoint, an email from [OHS manager] 
versus an email from [dockworker], which one is going to get 
more priority? [OHS manager] every time. Why? [OHS manager] 
is IN management, [OHS manager] is someone that [VP 
Operations] knows because they run in the same circles. 
[Dockworker] is a faceless dockworker down in [City] and [as if 
senior manager is talking to him] ‗He‘s on the change team, 
what‘s he want?‘ ‗Hmmm… yeah, whatever.‘ It‘s a simple fact of 
life, but it‘s true. 
The worker highlights several reasons for his reluctance to represent the team in 
its discussions with management, all of which centre on the importance that accompanied 
being known to senior management versus the low standing of being a production 
worker.  First, the dockworker said he was ―faceless‖ or unknown in contrast to the OHS 
manager who was, ―in the same circles,‖ in the ―upper echelon,‖ and in the ―inner circle.‖  
Second, the dockworker said that because of the OHS manager‘s connections, he could 
get positive results.  Third, because he was unknown to, and would not be taken seriously 
by, senior management it was impractical for him to try to contact senior managers 
because a response would not be forthcoming.  
The OHS manager‘s perspective on the situation corresponded to worker 
representatives‘ views.  Indeed, when I asked the OHS manager what he expected would 
happen if a worker representative tried to contact senior managers he said:  
It would be difficult… if someone like a worker rep calls V.P. or 
a director of an organization it ends up as a phone message.  The 
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first call is, ―who the heck‘s this and why are they trying to 
contact me?‖ Can you find this out for me? Whereas I may phone 
… and they may say, ―Oh yeah I know [OHS manager] we used 
to work over here and blah, blah blah.‖ And give me a call back 
and it‘s a lot simpler process.  It would be a lot more difficult and 
you may get the run the around. …if it‘s [a message] just sitting 
there as a note on someone‘s desk saying, ―so and so called‖ – 
―Who the heck is this?‖  It takes on a different face.  The reality 
of the situation comes in because it might not have – if they can‘t 
put a face to the name therefore, it might not be given the 
legitimacy it should be.  I think a worker rep could do it, but it 
would be a lot more difficult getting stuff moved along… 
Similar to other ECT members, the OHS manager noted that worker 
representatives would have found it difficult to gain access to senior managers.  Notably, 
he said workers‘ progress would be slow because management would not recognize them 
or, in his words, ―put a face to the name,‖ again drawing attention to the anonymity of 
worker representatives versus their management counterparts.  Conversely, the OHS 
manager‘s shared history with the managers gave him some ―legitimacy.‖  His 
affiliations with senior managers meant that his requests would receive attention faster 
than would worker representatives‘.    
6.1.3  “Lowly Workers,” Disparaging Managers, and Reluctance to Act 
Low status also contributed to worker representatives‘ lack of influence in the 
company.  On several occasions, one worker member said that management would never 
listen to a ―lowly worker.‖  Another worker representative said, indicating the different 
status between him and management, they were ―the suits,‖ and, referring to the couriers‘ 
uniforms, ―at the end of the day, I was just a guy in the polyester pants and the funny 
jacket.‖  When I asked one worker representative about contacting senior management he 
said, ―Would you, as an outsider, take me, a worker, seriously? I wouldn‘t.‖   The worker 
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representatives‘ perceptions of their low standing weakened their willingness to contact 
management about the ECT‘s implementation issues.   
Several of the ECT‘s worker representatives expected that their lack of status 
would prompt senior management to respond to their requests derisively.  When I asked 
an ECT courier representative what would happen if he called a senior manager, he said: 
Well, if you made a cold call like that, ―Hi I‘m [Courier], I‘m a 
courier.  I‘m working on the Ergonomics Committee and we need 
funding for this,‖ they‘d go ―YEAH, right,‖ hang up the phone 
and then he‘d get hold of the district manager and say, ―One of 
your drivers just called me up trying to piss me off.  Look after 
him.‖ That‘s how it would work.  I‘m sure. ..[Interviewee takes 
on voice of manager] ―Well, what‘s the Ergonomics Committee?‖ 
I‘m sure that‘s the way it would work. 
Worker representatives‘ expectations that management would respond to their 
requests disparagingly were intertwined with their belief that generally management‘s 
treatment of employees suggested that workers‘ value was limited to fulfilling roles 
outlined in their work descriptions for the attainment of production goals.  One worker 
said management considered workers incapable of providing input about creating a 
healthier workplace and only wanted workers to get the parcels out the door.  Similarly, 
another worker representative said that management undervalued the skills workers 
possessed to perform ergonomic activities and their regular jobs.  This worker noted that 
management was unappreciative of worker representatives‘ ergonomics training and 
treated workers as only able to carry out their regular, presumably low-skilled, tasks. 
They look at us as though we are all brain dead.  Regardless of 
ergonomics. We‘re drivers.  We‘re dockworkers… As far as they 
are concerned we‘re unskilled labor.  We‘re lucky [in 
management‘s opinion] if we can wipe our own asses in the 
morning.  They think we‘re idiots.   
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Significantly, the fact that worker representatives had received ergonomics 
training and were repeatedly told by the OHS manager and ergonomist-facilitator that top 
management was supportive of the ergonomic intervention did little to diminish their 
belief that management would dismiss their requests because of their low standing in the 
company‘s hierarchy and expectations of unfair treatment by management.  Moreover, 
even a visit by the company‘s vice president of operations in which he invited members 
to call him personally for assistance with PE program needs did not alter the worker 
representatives‘ understanding that their attempts to contact and confer with management 
would go nowhere.  The deep mistrust between workers and managers was not resolved 
throughout the duration of the program.    
Worker representatives‘ understandings of their lack of influence on 
implementation activities were shared by others on the ECT, including the ergonomist-
facilitator and OHS manager.  When I asked the ergonomist-facilitator about the 
distribution of tasks among ECT members, he said that tasks concerning hazard 
identification and solution design were spread fairly evenly.  However, the ECT‘s 
implementation activities were not, and these were typically performed by the OHS 
manager.   
That poor guy [OHS manager] gets stuck every time because it 
revolves back at Corporate so he gets the .. tasks.  Every other 
meeting he‘s running on ten things [he] needs to do.  And [worker 
rep ], who‘s a worker, didn‘t volunteer for anything.  Why? 
Because he is gonna sit on the phone and wait. [OHS manager] 
gonna walk into the office and say, ―[Vice President Operations], 
I need this.‖ And [mechanic] gonna talk to corporate for 30 
minutes and he‘s never gonna get by the secretary.  So that is just, 
that‘s the chain of command in the company. And because we‘re 
doing this in [City] and not company-wide, how do you get up 
that chain of command?… how do you get past it?  The secretary 
doesn‘t really know about it but [Vice President Operations] 
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knows about it.  [Vice President Operations] says, ―Go ahead and 
call me.‖ They called him, waited for half an hour, and he never 
got on the phone.   
The preceding comments capture a number of points about how the company‘s structure 
affected the ECT‘s functioning.  First, the ergonomist-facilitator acknowledges that the 
ECT‘s worker representatives attempted, but were unable, to contact managers.  Second, 
he acknowledges that the management‘s centralization required that the OHS manager 
take on the responsibility of liaising with senior mgmt.  Finally, like the worker 
representatives, he indicates that because of the ―chain of command in the company,‖ the 
way the team was working was inevitability the only way it could productively 
implement changes.   
In the intervention‘s latter months, when I asked the OHS manager if the ECT 
relied on him, he said ―yes‖ but noted that the extent of his involvement was related to 
the type of activity the group was carrying out.  When the ECT assessed hazards and 
devised solutions to address those hazards, apart from getting some contact information, 
it typically did not need his assistance and functioned independently.  However, when the 
ECT needed to discuss its proposed changes with senior managers outside the facility the 
OHS manager was clear about the team needing an ―advocate‖ like him to act as a 
spokesperson.  
Not for the [initial] stages [assessing and solution building], 
maybe for stages three and stage four [implementation].  You 
need someone who is an advocate. [Operations administrative 
assistant] could be that advocate.  Absolutely.  She doesn‘t have 
to be at corporate. [Operations administrative assistant] has those 
connections. [Operations administrative assistant] has to 
understand is that, ―No‖ isn‘t ―No.‖  For instance, the reweigh 
stations.  I argued, I discussed.. It wasn‘t an argument, with a 
senior engineer about why we needed the reweigh stations 
changed.  [Operations administrative assistant] could definitely do 
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the advocate job if she just got a little more pushy.  She needs to 
know how and where to push.   
In the above excerpt, the OHS manager not only points to his crucial role in the 
ECT‘s activities, but also the necessity of persistence in the articulation work he was 
doing.  In his view, worker representatives, already reticent to confer with senior 
managers, who were sometimes indifferent or resistant to ECT recommendations, would 
likely have greater problems with ―arguing‖ when consulting with a senior manager or 
department head.  
To communicate effectively with management and meet the challenges associated 
with senior management‘s offsite location, the ECT relied on its management 
representatives to bring its concerns to senior management.  Although this way of 
working enabled the ECT to make changes, it severely limited worker representative 
involvement.  
6.1.4  Summary  
The allocation of implementation tasks among ECT members in Courier Co. was 
uneven.  Generally, if implementation involved conferring with senior managers the 
worker representatives were only marginally involved and instead, the OHS manager, the 
operations administrative assistant, and ergonomist-facilitator were involved in this 
activity.  Worker representatives stressed that when the team was engaged in certain 
types of activities, and specifically conferring with senior managers about potential 
changes, management representatives took on these responsibilities.  Typically, it was the 
management representatives who possessed the connections and influence required for 
positive results.  Worker representatives‘ inability to influence senior management was 
conditioned by both their lack of connections and their lower status, where were related.  
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Conversely, it was his affiliations with senior management and elevated standing that 
enabled the OHS manager to engage senior managers in discussions about the ECT‘s 
recommended changes and more significantly, gain their support for these changes.    
6.2  FURNITURE CO.  
In Furniture Co., the changes the ECT typically tried to implement involved 
introducing or modifying equipment and tools, and/or altering factory layout.  These 
changes often required discussions with suppliers, consultations with those who had 
significant authority in the plant, and practical activities, such as the coordination of tasks 
to ensure changes were incorporated on the shopfloor.  Typically, because of their 
authority and their expertise, only the team‘s management representatives undertook 
implementation activities.  Worker representatives‘ lack of requisite authority and 
expertise led to an uneven task distribution within the ECT.   
6.2.1  Delimiting Manager and Worker Tasks  
The ECT‘s worker representatives were rarely involved in implementation, only 
infrequently playing a very minor role.  For the program‘s first eight months, a 
management representative, usually the plant manager, brought solution designs to the 
maintenance department.  After the maintenance manager and production manager were 
recruited, they were most often responsible for carrying out the ECT‘s implementation 
tasks.  Regardless of the type of changes, the maintenance department was ultimately 
responsible and its manager was well aware of his integral role in the ECT activities: 
I‘m basically the go-to guy for anything that the committee 
invents.  I‘m the guy to follow it through to make sure it gets 
done even if it‘s stuff we buy.  It‘s gotta get installed, right? 
…you think of anything to be done on the committee, there isn‘t 
anything you can find that I haven‘t been involved with.  
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One of the ECT‘s management representatives distinguished between ECT 
members as ―doers,‖ and ―thinkers.‖  Doers were members who could productively carry 
out implementation tasks on the shopfloor, such as the maintenance manager and 
production manager.  Thinkers were those who knew the production process and could 
participate in solution design.  To use the management representative‘s classification 
scheme, a worker representative, who could be characterized as a ―thinker,‖ described a 
typical sequence of events:  ―For me to do something…  I come up with a drawing or 
idea; I usually go to [production manager].  [Production Manager] will check with 
[maintenance manager] and then together they‘ll discuss if it‘s important and what‘s 
involved and where we‘re going to use it.  Like that fold-up table, I drew it up; they did 
the rest.‖  This account describes the process as it generally occurred: Almost always, 
once the team identified a hazard and agreed how to proceed, implementation activities 
were coordinated and carried out by management representatives.   
Few opportunities arose in which the ECT‘s worker representatives could actually 
effect changes themselves, as the changes usually required the maintenance personnel‘s 
mechanical expertise.  However, even for two changes that did not require technical 
expertise, the ECT workers‘ activities were hindered because they did not have the 
authority to acquire the resources to complete their implementation activities.   During 
one project, the workers needed more supplies to complete the changes and were told by 
the purchasing department that they could not get supplies simply by purchasing through 
the maintenance department and that the proper paperwork needed to be completed.  In 
the other project, the worker representatives struggled to free up time to put in place 
simple platforms to reduce workers‘ exposure to shoulder and arm injuries.  In both 
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instances, the OHS manager had to intervene so that the tasks could be carried out 
successfully.  
Worker representatives were further excluded from participation because much of 
the discussion about, and actual work on, implementation of changes occurred outside the 
ECT meetings among the plant manager, maintenance manager, production manager, and 
OHS manager, who were in regular contact with one another.  Typically, worker 
representatives only learned about a project‘s status during ECT meetings, when 
managers reported on their findings and activities, or during chance encounters with the 
maintenance manager or production manager on the shopfloor.     
6.2.2  It’s Part of Their Job 
When I inquired why implementation activities were carried out almost 
exclusively by management personnel, ECT members said that these activities were an 
extension of regular management duties and that the tasks required to implement changes 
necessitated particular skills.  Noting that the division of labour was natural, the OHS 
manager said, ―all the upgrades regarding production are going through the [production 
manager] and the maintenance manager is the one who coordinates any outside contracts 
and his own people would be doing the fabricating changes.‖   
The OHS manager said the work that the managers were doing on behalf of the 
team ―just fits with what they do on a day-to-day basis.‖  Because of their positions 
within the plant they had discretionary time, knowledge of suppliers and how to order 
from them, and technical expertise concerning the complexity of the changes.  One of the 
ECT‘s worker representatives, echoing other representatives‘ views, remarked that there 
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were certain implementation tasks that could only be done by specific team members on 
account of  their position in the plant:   
… certain tasks like fabricating of anything can‘t be done by just 
anyone on the team, That IS A MAINTANENCE ROLE… so 
[the maintenance manager] may have a lot of that thrust on him or 
certain things may be thrust on [the production manager] because 
of their roles here at work…   
 6.2.3  Lack of Authority 
Another reason why implementation tasks were also concentrated among ECT 
management members was because of the authority associated with their plant position.  
When I asked one worker representative why manager representatives were often most 
involved in implementation activities, he said ―authority.‖ Asked to expand on that he 
said, ―[The production manager] has the most authority to get things done on the 
shopfloor. [The plant manager] he has got the most authority to get cash.‖  Echoing 
responses to this question from other team members, the worker stated that he could not 
perform some of the tasks that the management representatives were doing.   
When I asked one of the ECT members about the distribution of tasks and why 
the maintenance and production manager were so heavily involved she said,  
 ‗Cause they‘re the supervisors for the employees that do the 
work. …especially if it‘s doing any actual… installations or 
anything.  It‘s [maintenance manager‘s] guys that do the 
installations so he‘s the one to tell them to do it. ―These are your 
jobs for today, and this is what I want you to do.‖   
Importantly, she noted that in terms of installation, it would have taken her 
significantly longer to track down people and have them move equipment.  Conversely, 
the management representatives had decision-making authority associated with their 
plant position, which gave them the opportunity to be involved in implementation.  This 
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lack of authority excluded other representatives, and especially worker representatives, 
from implementation activities.   
The OHS manager noted that she had little power in situations that involved 
asking for changes to be made and said that, because of her position, she was unable to 
directly ask the supervisory staff to adopt new work practices or change a work area‘s 
layout, but that the production manager could.  In an interview with the OHS manager, 
she said that, ―The [production manager] walks into any area like the press shop and says, 
‗This needs to be changed.‘ And people say, ‗Yep, No problem.‘ And it gets done.‖    
When I asked the OHS manager about task distribution, and in particular worker 
representatives‘ involvement in ECT activities she noted that their limited influence 
within the plant circumscribed their ability to accomplish implementation tasks 
independently and that other ECT members were better suited to make changes:  
… what I have found is as good as those people [worker 
representatives] are, because they bring intimate knowledge of 
the…product [and]… how we make it, they don‘t have the power 
to get anything done.  And it ends up being ME pulling them off 
their jobs, talking to the supervisors and saying we need this 
much time to do this, … and it‘s a LOT of hassle getting them off 
their regular hours and giving them projects to do.  And then 
empowering them to do it and basically going around and making 
sure they‘ve got everything they need.  A salaried person on the 
team can go get their project done.  They‘ve got the power to go 
ask the RIGHT people.  Nobody worries about them being off the 
line. … that‘s a whole lot easier for me as the chair than it is for 
the hourly people.  Although they make a good contribution, I 
would not—I do not necessarily feel any compulsion to add more 
hourly people to our team.  We go and ask people [workers] and 
certainly bend their ear and ask their opinion if we‘re working on 
a project on someone‘s line but they don‘t have the resources to 
really pull their weight as a team member, and that‘s for me that‘s 
been a HUGE drawback, ‗cause none of us do this for fun.  We all 
have other things to do, so. 
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The quotation above contains a number of important elements pointing to the fact 
that although worker representatives made important contributions in assessing hazards 
and devising solutions to address them, their low position in the plant‘s hierarchy 
diminished their involvement in implementation tasks.  This is evidenced in the OHS 
manager‘s comments that relieving the worker representatives from their regular duties 
was a ―hassle,‖ and ―empowering them‖ so they could carry out tasks was time 
consuming.  Conversely, management ECT representatives completed their projects in 
part because of their shopfloor influence, areas of expertise, and discretionary schedules, 
which enabled them more easily to integrate ergonomic tasks into their regular daily 
duties.        
6.2.4  Summary  
To a large degree, worker representatives‘ involvement in the ECT‘s 
implementation activities was influenced by the types of activities required, which in turn 
affected which team member was perceived to be most capable to get the work done.  
Importantly, the team members‘ perceptions of what personnel could effectively carry out 
implementation tasks were shaped by the lack of authority they felt that worker 
representatives‘ had on the shopfloor.  The heavy involvement of the maintenance 
manager and production manager and to a lesser extent, the plant manager and OHS 
manager in the implementation of the ECT‘s changes enabled implementation activities 
to proceed, but worker representatives were generally excluded from the process.   
6.3  DISCUSSION 
In both settings, worker representatives rarely partook in the implementation of 
changes.  In Courier Co., the majority of the ECT‘s changes were discussed with senior 
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managers because the ECT did not have the decision-making latitude to proceed 
independently.  Frequently this meant contacting and often re-contacting managers about 
changes as some were unaware and/or indifferent while others, to a lesser extent, were 
resistant to the ECT‘s suggestions.  Typically, when the ECT aimed to make a change 
that involved conferring with senior managers only the ECT‘s management 
representatives carried out articulation work and were involved in implementation 
activities.  
Implementation played out differently in Furniture Co.  In this setting, the ECT 
needed to consult with management, but unlike in Courier Co., those who had to endorse 
changes were within the factory; in fact, some of the managers who needed to be 
included in discussions of the changes, such as the plant manager, maintenance manager, 
and production manager, were ECT members.  Because the ECT‘s changes in Furniture 
Co. often required both expertise and a level of authority that only some managerial 
personnel possessed, usually only the team‘s management representatives were involved 
in implementation.  They coordinated implementation with actors outside the company, 
supervised the in-house modification and fabrication of equipment, and arranged its 
integration into the plant‘s work processes.  
What were the reasons for the sharp demarcation in worker involvement in design 
and implementation responsibilities?  Worker representatives‘ lack of participation in 
implementation was connected to the type(s) of tasks that constituted implementation, to 
their lack of influence, and to their position in the plant/depot hierarchies.  At Courier Co. 
worker representatives said they lacked the connections and authority to effectively 
represent the ECT‘s concerns to senior management.  Therefore, worker representatives 
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did not discuss the ECT‘s changes with management when these discussions needed to 
include upper-level management.  Similarly, at Furniture Co., worker representatives 
noted that it was the day-to-day responsibilities of the managerial personnel to undertake 
implementation activities.  Additionally, they noted that they themselves did not have the 
influence on the shopfloor to do so. 
The division of labour in the ECTs was also conditioned by the workers‘ and 
managers‘ understandings of their typical workplace roles.  At Courier Co. in particular, 
worker representatives were uncomfortable with the idea of consulting with senior 
managers, expecting them to react to their requests with derision and enmity, and 
doubting their conversations with management would be productive.  Additionally, 
worker representatives felt they did not have the influence or the connections to 
communicate with senior management to secure their endorsement of changes.  In 
Furniture Co., the team‘s task distribution was unquestioned, and worker representatives 
and management said that the management representatives‘ day-to-day jobs corresponded 
to the types of tasks that were necessary for the ECT to implement changes.  Further, the 
OHS manager, who had a key role in arranging when and what tasks were done, found it 
difficult to involve worker representatives in implementation activities.   
The types of work that were required to carry out implementation in both 
companies configured the division of labour among the ECTs‘ members, which supports 
Strauss‘ (1978) suggestion that circumstances can limit what is negotiable.  He pointed 
out that context will affect what topics can be negotiated and even whether the actors 
decide to negotiate.  As Strauss (1978:254) notes there are several 
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[r]elevant impingements on negotiation: (1) the organizational 
setting within its intraorganizational properties, (2) the external 
setting ―within‖ which the organization is located, (3) the large-
scale setting (for example, national), (4) historical as well as 
contemporary considerations, and (5) power, dominance, and 
political considerations.  
 In Hall and Spencer-Hall‘s (1982) words, the context for ―negotiative activity‖ is 
of fundamental importance for understanding whether there is negotiation and the form it 
takes.  A negotiative context has multiple-layers – immediate, organizational, and 
structural – and this chapter‘s findings make clear that elements of all three influenced 
how the division of labour was worked out in these case studies.  In the immediate 
context, the ECT members in their interactions with each other and with those outside the 
change team concluded that making use of the established division of labour was a 
practical way to share responsibilities.  Organizationally, in neither setting was there a 
history of participatory decision-making.  On the structural level, the companies were 
functioning according to the economic imperatives of the capitalist mode of production, 
which meant that time was devoted to production rather than other concerns.  ECT 
members were aware of time constraints and anticipated that management would place 
limitations on them.  
An implication of the findings is that while there may be spheres where 
participatory activity is declared, such as within PE programs, factors at the 
organizational or broader level may subvert participation.  Instructive here are studies on 
employee ownership in which conditions are favourable for participation.  Grunberg‘s 
(1986a) study of occupational health and safety in an employee-owned company found 
that although workers highly valued OHS, attention to conditions that exposed workers to 
injury suffered because of worker concerns about the company‘s market position.  In 
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Russell et al.‘s (2004) study of a worker-owned steel mill, the authors found that 
programs set up to facilitate participatory decision making were displaced by 
management‘s responses to market pressures.  Grunberg (1986a) and Russell et al., 
(2004) remind us that even under the most favourable conditions for worker participation, 
contextual elements external to the workplace can influence negotiative activity.  
An element of both management and worker ECT representatives‘ perspectives 
on the division of labour was the element of time.  In both settings, actors‘ views on task 
distribution were influenced by concerns about the extra time it would take worker 
representatives to carry out tasks that management representatives could readily 
undertake.  This concern was part of the context and it was connected to the pressures to 
produce in the capitalist mode of production.  Team members were aware that the change 
process was protracted and time was limited.  Individuals on both teams were responsible 
to carry out their change team related tasks with the least amount of intrusion – time wise 
– on their regular duties, thereby mitigating any infringement on production.  The 
responsibility ―to get things done,‖ in Strauss et al.‘s (1985) words, and do so in a timely 
fashion undermined worker representatives‘ more direct participation in implementing 
changes.    
Revisiting a principle that underlies many definitions of participatory ergonomics, 
PE typically involves including workers in the design and implementation of workplace 
changes that reduce MSD.  As the findings presented in this chapter highlight, workers 
were only partially involved in implementation: they were kept apprised of what went on 
and infrequently carried out some tasks related to implementation but typically were on 
the sidelines.  In each setting, the level of involvement was defined by the type of work 
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required, representatives‘ perspectives about their level of influence, positions in the 
organizational hierarchy, and the requisite skills needed to make changes. 
  Findings concerning worker representatives‘ limited involvement correspond 
with other literature on participatory arrangements.  Specifically, these findings are 
consistent with other examples of how the typical relations of production affect joint 
labour-management committees, both in the literature devoted to participatory workplace 
arrangements and in the literature on teamworking aimed at enhancing quality and 
production (Ollilanen and Rothschild, 2001; Ollilanen and Calasanti, 2007).  The findings 
also converge with the literature on elements of participatory occupational health and 
safety schemes such as the right to refuse (Gray, 2002; Walters, 1991) and participation 
in joint labour-management OHS committees (Hall et al., 2006; Tucker, 1995; Walters, 
1985; Walters et al., 1995).  The authors of these studies point out that the utility of these 
participatory OHS schemes are conditioned by workers‘ positions of power vis-à-vis 
management.  Additionally, the findings with regard to the limitations on worker 
representatives‘ involvement concur with findings from studies by Thompson and 
Wallace (1996), Dunphy and Bryant (1996), and Delbridge et al., (2000).  A common 
theme in these studies, which corresponds to findings reported here, is workers‘ lack of 
autonomy and failure to transfer responsibility to production workers.  In Delbridge et 
al.’s (2000: 1474) examination of lean teamworking in several automotive parts 
manufacturers they note the following,  
[T]he technical role [quality inspection, rework effort, 
maintenance activities and machine setting] of production 
workers is rather limited. Operators have responsibility for 
routine quality tasks but have not been upskilled in order to play 
significant roles in activities such as maintenance.  Neither do 
operators have significant responsibility for production 
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activities…  These findings question the claim that workers in 
teams have substantial autonomy and that lean teams are self-
managing in a meaningful way. 
The influence of organizational hierarchy on the ECTs‘ functioning raises 
questions about the nature of participation in joint labour-management occupational 
health teams.  It prompts us to examine the diversity of tasks involved in making changes 
and to distinguish between those that workers may have some reasonable likelihood of 
participating in and those that they do not.  If worker representatives in a PE program are 
to be involved in the tasks required for implementation they must have the latitude to do 
such tasks.  At a more fundamental level, the typical social relations of production must 
be transformed, or at least bent, in such a way that workers are enabled to perform tasks 
beyond their regular duties and management cedes some of its control over the 
workplace.  In the settings examined in this dissertation, such was not the case.  Worker 
representatives had a good deal of involvement when it came to identifying hazards and 
discussing how they might be addressed but were excluded from many of the activities 
required to implement changes.  The typical relations of production, or in the words of an 
interviewee, ―the chain of command,‖ challenged the ECT‘s ability to fully incorporate 
workers‘ potential to implementing workplace change.   
The uneven distribution of tasks across the ECTs‘ membership was the subject of 
Chapter Six.  Worker representatives had limited involvement in the ECTs‘ 
implementation activities.  Largely, this was attributable to the hierarchical relations in 
the settings between management and workers and worker representatives‘ expectations 
about their ability to successfully carry out implementation tasks.  Departing from 
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previous chapters, which discussed matters around change design and implementation, 
Chapter Seven will focus on whether the PE programs were able to continue over time. 
 210 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUSTAINING THE PARTICIPATORY ERGONOMIC PROGRAMS 
Veritas dies aperit 
Time reveals the truth 
(Tattoo on a worker representative‘s forearm in Courier Co.) 
7.0  INTRODUCTION 
In Chapters Four through Six I examined the ergonomic change teams‘ (ECTs‘) 
design and implementation activities and the contextual factors that influenced these 
activities.  Chapter Seven continues the discussion of how the ECTs functioned by 
examining how they were able to acquire and maintain the resources required to continue 
their programs over time.     
The chapter gives a strong indication of the ways that social structure influences 
the participatory ergonomic (PE) program.  It also highlights the role that influence work 
played in negotiating the PE programs‘ continuation
21
 and the impact of power on the 
ECTs‘ activities.  Further, the central role multiple social worlds and their different 
definitions of results play in continuation is illuminated.  Crucially, the analysis connects 
management‘s assessment of the PE programs to the broader social context and 
especially the regulatory environment. 
Evidence from the literature on sustainability suggests that just because a program 
is working well does not necessarily mean that it will be maintained.  Rather, there must 
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 When I am using the words continuation or sustainability I am referring to the maintenance of the PE 
programs over time not individual changes the ECTs‘ made and whether these changes received continued 
use.  
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be some advocacy on behalf of the program to maintain a sponsor‘s continued support 
(Goodman and Steckler, 1988).  For example, Nilsen et al., (2005), in a study of 
community-based injury prevention programs noted that factors such as social networks 
that advocated on behalf of the programs were better predictors of sustainability than 
objective evidence of the programs‘ outcomes.   
An important part of achieving sustainability may be convincing the people in a 
setting‘s multiple social worlds
22
, who may have incompatible views, of a program‘s 
worth.  People in a work setting, especially management, who have the authority to 
continue or suspend a program, have to be persuaded that an injury-prevention program, 
such as PE, is a viable means of reducing injury or more simply, is a good investment.  
Strauss (1993) and others (Clarke, 1991; Fujimura, 1987) have pointed out that when 
activities involve participants from multiple social worlds, persuading those participants 
to pursue a course of action typically involves a range of interactional strategies, such as 
negotiation and lobbying.  These activities are shaped by local circumstances and broader 
social factors.   
Building on the aforementioned literature and insights from negotiated order 
theory and a critical perspective, several questions guide this chapter. What activities did 
the PE program supporters engage to endeavour to sustain the programs? What 
conditions shaped the form that these activities took and what were their outcomes?   The 
outcomes differed: in Courier Co. the program was discontinued, whereas in Furniture 
Co. it was maintained.  I suggest in both settings the PE programs continuation was 
                                                 
 
22
 ―Social worlds are loosely or rigidly structured units in which people share resources and information.  
They are characterized by a commitment to common assumptions about what is important, and what should 
be done‖ (Garrety, 1997: 731).  
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affected by the program supporters‘ activities, and that the form these actions took and 
their outcomes were shaped by conditions both internal and external to the organizations.   
Foremost among the conditions were management‘s view of health and safety and the 
occupational health and safety regulatory framework.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I discuss some of the salient macro 
conditions under which the ECTs‘ attempted to sustain their PE programs.  Then, I 
present the narratives from each setting concerning the ECTs‘ activities intended to 
sustain the PE programs and what organizational-level factors affected these processes.  I 
conclude by comparing some of the key findings across the sites.  
7.1  EVALUATING AN OHS PROGRAM’S WORTH   
  Program maintenance requires a continuous flow of resources, which itself often 
needs stimulation through demonstration of a program‘s impacts to key organizational 
decision makers.  Demonstrating program viability can be difficult because different 
actors judge its value differently.  Actors in multiple social worlds may have discrepant 
and sometimes conflicting views about whether an endeavour, such as an organizational 
program, is worth pursuing or maintaining (Clarke, 1991; Garrety and Badham, 1999; 
2004; Fujimura, 1987; Prus, 2003; Strauss, 1993).  Keeping with the negotiated order 
approach, one social world may use one set of evaluative criteria to assess a project, 
while constituents of other worlds may use others, with radically different assumptions 
about what is important, leading to discrepant valuations of a program.  Successfully 
demonstrating an OHS program‘s worth may involve highlighting program outputs that 
appeal to an organization‘s multiple social worlds.  Typically, to do so, actors need to 
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convince benefactors, for example, that a project is a viable means of achieving 
objectives.       
Although an OHS investment may bring about a healthier workplace, this is 
usually not a central criterion in management decision making.  Determination of the 
worth of an OHS program is shaped by the extent to which health and safety is valued.  
Critical theory would see occupational health and safety as contested (Krahn et al., 2007; 
Smith, 2000: 43) as capital may see investment in health and safety as a ―surplus value 
loss‖ (Schatzkin, 1978; Walters, 1985).  OHS investment may be evaluated based on 
cost-saving value and not as something good in itself; in this instance it is likely to be 
subjected to a cost-benefit analysis as would any other business cost.    
Workplaces embedded in the capitalist mode of production face competitive 
pressures that encourage managers to minimize their OHS expenditures (Littler and 
Salaman, 1984; Nichols, 1997; Spencer and Carlan, 2008; Walters, 1985).  But, as some 
researchers in the critical perspective have reminded us, managers cannot neglect OHS in 
order to meet economic imperatives without the risk of threatening future production.  
Rather, to sustain capital accumulation, managers need to ensure that health and safety 
conditions are maintained to a certain degree.  Hall (1993; 1999) notes that health and 
safety programs are affected not only by their link to economic imperatives but also by 
management‘s concerns about maintaining production.  Management‘s decisions about 
investing in health and safety, though influenced by maintaining profitability and a 
competitive market position, are also conditioned by an awareness on the one hand that 
health and safety costs can be substantial and on the other that injuries can negatively 
affect capital accumulation (Hall, 1993; 1996; Walters, 1985).    
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7.2  CALCULATING THE COST-SAVING OF HEALTH AND SAFETY 
PRACTICES 
Evidence suggests that management is often not convinced that an occupational 
health program may reduce physical demands (Cole et al., 2003: 398; Hendrick, 2003; 
Kerr et al., 2008; Oxenburgh and Simpson, 2005).  Often, management wants a cost 
saving to be associated with OHS investment.  Calculating the effects of OHS programs 
is not straightforward, however (Cole et al., 2003; Kerr et al., 2008; Oxenburgh and 
Simpson, 2005; Tompa et al., 2008).  Kerr et al., (2008) and Hendrick (2003) note that 
assessing the financial benefits of an ergonomics intervention is generally difficult, and 
can lead to an ―underestimation‖ of these benefits.  Compounding this problem, 
calculating the costs of an ergonomics intervention may be easier than calculating its 
benefits (Koningsveld et al., 2005: 577-578).   
One feature of evaluating the benefit of OHS programs that affects a cost-benefit 
analysis is the type of injury under examination.  The nature of musculoskeletal disorders 
(MSDs) poses some challenges for cost-benefit calculations.  Due to the long onset of 
MSDs there is a time lag between introduction of an ergonomic change and 
improvements in health outcomes.  As a result, managers often do not see a short-term 
return on their investment in ergonomic changes to reduce MSDs.  Moreover, because 
MSDs are often created by a multiplicity of factors (Norman and Wells, 2000; 
Shainblum, et al., 2000), addressing a hazard may not fully address the causes of 
musculoskeletal strain and therefore not reduce OHS costs because workers continue to 
be exposed to myriad sources of injuries.      
Management‘s appreciation of the full range of OHS program outcomes may also 
be limited if only decreases in compensation costs are considered (Dempsey, 2007; 
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Tompa et al., 2006; Tompa et al., 2008) rather than other measures such as workers‘ 
reports of pain reduction and pain reports.  Some researchers (Kerr et al., 2008; 
Oxenburgh and Simpson, 2005; Tompa et al., 2006: 376) have suggested enlarging the 
scope of effects that are measured to include benefits, such as productivity improvements, 
decreased re-training costs, reduced costs associated with absenteeism, reductions in 
filing of injury claims.   
7.3  REGULATORY PRESSURES 
Examining features of the regulatory environment clarifies why both 
compensation costs may be of more importance to employers than workers‘ reports of 
pain reduction and how regulatory pressures may shape management decisions to 
continue an OHS program.  Germane to this chapter‘s analysis are the links between the 
principles underlying Ontario‘s OHS policies and how these policies are enacted by 
workplace personnel.  A central part of the occupational health and safety system in 
Ontario is the internal responsibility system (IRS).  Two tenets underpinning the IRS that 
are relevant to this analysis are that workers and management are responsible for 
monitoring health and safety and that government should not interfere with day-to-day 
workplace operations (Storey and Tucker, 2006; Nichols and Tucker, 2000; Tucker, 
1995; Walters, 1983).   The premise that underlies mandated self-regulation in Ontario is 
that employers will act to address health concerns to meet broad OHS targets rather than 
yield to regular inspections of their facilities by health and safety inspectors (Storey and 
Tucker, 2006).  Importantly, regulators are more concerned about employers meeting 
health and safety standards, not how the standards are met (Nichols and Tucker, 2000); 
consequently, employers are relatively free to develop the means they feel are necessary 
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to create and maintain healthy workplaces (Nichols and Tucker, 2000).  Managers may 
have even more latitude when addressing MSDs versus other types of injuries because 
there are so few enforceable MSD exposure regulations.   
  Another assumption underpinning the IRS is that employers will attend to OHS 
matters based on the financial importance of OHS, also known as the ―safety pays 
argument,‖ that employers invest in health and safety because doing so will lead to 
considerable cost saving.  Although intuitively ―safety pays‖ may make sense, when 
safety pays policies are actually put into practice they may not serve the interests of 
workers and protect them from harm (Cutler and James, 1996; Frick, 1990; Hopkins, 
1999).  For instance, management may avoid investing in OHS because they do not 
expect to incur the costs of hazards (Cutler and James, 1996).  Cutler and James (1996: 
761) point to the vital issue that underlies the safety pays argument, ―namely… the 
identification of potential costs of accidents.  This in turn requires that those making the 
case (e.g., safety officers) and those to whom the case is made (e.g., business managers) 
operate within a common framework of ‗rationality.‘‖   
In Ontario, one way the safety pays thesis is enacted is in the form of workers‘ 
compensation boards‘ injury insurance schemes, which include the experience-rating 
compensatory system.  In this system, the premiums that employers pay annually to the 
workers‘ compensation board are in some degree tied to a business‘s health and safety 
performance.  The amount of premium a firm pays is determined by its injury rate, 
relative to the average for similar companies in the same sector.  Firms with above 
average injury rates pay higher premiums and surcharges, while firms that report lower 
than average injury rates receive rebates from the board.  The experience-rating system is 
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based on the idea that a taxation system linked partly to an individual organization‘s 
performance or injury rate ―experience,‖ rather than solely on universal tax, will spur 
companies to address health and safety conditions (Thomason and Pozzebon, 2002; 
Tompa et al., 2007). 
Although the threat of higher premiums and surcharges is intended to induce 
employers to commit resources to health and safety, a key problem with experience-
rating is that employers‘ efforts to reduce reported injury rates and thereby their 
premiums may not take the form of improved health and safety conditions (Harcourt, 
1996; Kralj, 1994; 1995; 2000; Lanoie, 1992; Thomason and Pozzebon, 2002).  Instead 
of addressing workers‘ exposure to the risk of injury, employers may use short-term 
claims management practices, such as placing workers on modified duties to reduce the 
reported number and severity of recorded lost-time claims
23
 (Thomason and Pozzebon, 
2002).  As a result, an employer‘s claims on paper are reduced but workers‘ risk of injury 
and illness may remain.  The significance of this feature of the experience-rating system 
is threefold.  First, it links the definition of health and safety to reported compensation 
claims and not to the creation or maintenance of healthy workplaces.  Second, activities 
devoted to reducing claims may channel resources away from OHS programs that 
actually address the source of health and safety problems, such as PE programs, which 
jeopardizes the establishment and continuation of these programs.  Third, OHS programs 
are evaluated based on the degree to which they reduce compensation claims not by how 
much they reduce work hazards.   
                                                 
 
23
 Lost-time injuries are those for which an employee is off work due to work-related illness or injury. 
While an injury may be recorded in a company‘s health and safety statistics generally it is not viewed as 
serious unless a worker has to take time off because of it.   
 218 
7.4  DIFFERING LEVELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 
In addition to the challenges of establishing a program‘s worth, individuals 
attempting to maintain a health and safety program may also face problems if they have 
low status within the organization.  In work organizations, as power is unevenly 
distributed among organizational subunits, not everyone has the same authority to 
advocate for the adoption of occupational health programs.  Management may consider 
that some organizational subunits are more valuable than others to an organization's 
workflow or survival.  These more valuable subunits generally have more control over 
resources and more authority than other lesser counterparts (Ranson et al., 1980: 7-8).  
Other subunits, such as a health and safety department, may not be regarded as 
contributing to an organization‘s central activities (Frick, 1990; Fulmer et al., 2006; Liker 
et al., 1991; Perrow, 1983; Thomas, 1994), and so their requests for funding and other 
forms of support may be are rejected or at least questioned.  If those who favour 
sustaining occupational health programs have low status, limited capacity to advocate, 
and cannot adequately lobby key decision makers, the likelihood of program continuation 
is diminished.   
7.5  SUSTAINING PE PROGRAMS IN THE WORKPLACES  
In both settings, the ECTs and the research team hoped that the programs would 
be continued as a permanent part of each company‘s health and safety management 
system once the research team, represented by the ergonomist-facilitator, had withdrawn.  
However, in Courier Co., support for the PE program waned over time, and it was 
eventually discontinued.  Initially, in Furniture Co. support for the program was weak, 
but it increased over time and the PE program was maintained for a number of years.  
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The analysis below shows that the PE program was weakly integrated into the 
organizational structure at Courier Co. in part because of management‘s perspective on 
its worth; conversely, the PE program in Furniture Co. was well integrated into the 
company, due, in part, to the ECT‘s alignment activities and the company‘s increasing 
need to address musculoskeletal injuries.  
7.6  COURIER CO. 
Courier Co.‘s top management, intent to address the high injury frequency and 
severity rates plaguing the company, was supportive of the intervention at its outset.  The 
company was spending a great deal of money on injury claims, so reducing injury rates 
would result in a significant cost saving.  In fact, during an interview, Courier Co.‘s 
national health and safety director estimated that, on average, a single lost-time injury 
cost the company approximately $16,000.  Therefore, the company had an in interest in 
addressing its high injury burden through the participatory ergonomic program.       
Between the intervention‘s twelfth and eighteenth months, the ECT met but was 
unable to make genuine progress on its projects.  As discussed in Chapter Four and Five, 
the ECT‘s activities were dogged by attendance problems that began around the twelfth 
month of the program and by managerially-induced headwind that slowed project 
implementation. Both the depot manager and a more senior manager noted that the ECT 
was not working well.      
7.6.1  Senior Management’s Ebbing Support: Questioning the Deliverables 
By the program‘s twelfth month, senior management‘s initial support had begun 
to wane, giving way to concern about lack of results, and the PE program‘s continuation 
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was in jeopardy.  Specifically, the PE program‘s value was questioned by both a key 
senior manager and locally from the depot‘s district manager.     
Approximately ten months into the intervention, the company hired a new 
national director of health and safety, and part of his responsibilities was to oversee the 
ergonomic project.  Initially an enthusiastic supporter of the PE program, the national 
OHS director, on a visit to an ECT meeting, noted that he liked the participatory format 
and praised its members for how well they functioned as a team.  However, about two 
months after, he indicated he wanted, to see ―results,‖ that is, indications that the program 
was making a genuine impact on the company‘s injury statistics.  At the same time, he 
reiterated his support for the program and noted that other senior managers eventually 
would ask questions about the program‘s value.  The regional OHS manager, who was 
championing the PE program, said that the national OHS director, ―could not get past the 
need to see RESULTS.‖  He noted that he and the national OHS director frequently 
talked about the ergonomics program, and the national director regularly asked, ―How 
many injuries have we stopped?‖ and ―What benefit are we getting out of this?‖   
The national OHS director‘s questions concerning productivity were not 
unreasonable: the PE program was both a significant temporal and financial investment 
for the company, and he wanted to see positive outcomes.   The director was particularly 
interested in whether the PE program was decreasing the frequency and severity of 
injuries in the depot and much less in whether the ECT was addressing the depot‘s 
sources of injury.  This narrow definition of results reflected the evaluative criteria that 
the province of Ontario‘s Workplace and Safety Insurance Board (WSIB) uses to assess a 
company‘s health and safety record: injury frequency and severity rates.  As explained in 
 221 
the preceding discussion, if a company is able to keep its injury frequency and severity 
rates low, it stands to decrease the costs of its WSIB premiums.   
Approximately sixteen months into the initiative, in a meeting held to discuss the 
PE program‘s continuation, the national health and safety director told the research team 
that other senior managers in the company wanted to see that the ECT‘s activities and the 
time and money invested in PE were reducing the injury frequency and severity rates 
and/or leading to decreases in production costs.  In other words, he wanted to know that 
the PE program was having an impact on revenues.  He said that the company measures 
the success of initiatives, such as the PE program, in ―dollars and cents.‖  That managers 
wanted to see if the program was having a positive financial effect and to evaluate it 
primarily on its economic impact corresponded to the company‘s concerns.  When I 
asked the OHS director where health and safety ranked on the company‘s priority list he 
said, ―Probably I‘d say fourth. Productivity number one, costs slash profits number two, 
quality number three, safety number four. That‘s the reality. It‘s like any company, 
‗safety is number one‘ right, but it‘s not.‖  In an interview eighteen months into the 
intervention, the national OHS director noted that managerial personnel needed to be 
convinced that there were outputs coming from a project that had a direct bearing on their 
performance; otherwise, they were uninterested in supporting the projects.  
They [production managers] are very much hard numbers people. 
―What kind of numbers are we getting out of it [ergonomic 
program]?‖ We have a scorecard here [in the company]. Every 
manager is measured on their scorecard, and if it‘s not affecting 
the numbers on their scorecard, they don‘t see a direct link. As far 
as they are concerned, there‘s no value in it….. If you could show 
them that connection, then they‘re supportive. If you can‘t show 
them that connection, then they don‘t have any time for it. They 
have way too much on their plate already.  
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 To demonstrate the success of an OHS initiative, the director said that a 
―business case‖ needed to be presented for OHS investment because that was what 
management understood.  Further, he pointed out that even in instances in which 
managers were told they needed to invest in OHS because it was law, which had been the 
traditional approach within the company to address OHS concerns, it had little persuasive 
impact on management.   
 A problem for the members of the ECT was that the benefits of their work were 
not easily measured or quantified in ways that satisfied management.  Their activities did 
not easily or immediately translate into decreases in injury frequency and severity rates.  
Typically, the time between when an ergonomic change is introduced and when 
workplace parties see a difference can be lengthy (Dempsey, 2007; Koningsveld et al., 
2005: 569-578; see also Tompa et al., 2006), and this may have been the case with some 
of the ECT‘s changes.  Further, the number of changes the ECT was able to undertake 
was hindered in part by its slow progress.  Lack of authority to make changes and the 
previously discussed problems in accessing members‘ time to make changes were the 
sources of the ECT‘s slow progress.  Its limited headway, lessened the likelihood 
management was going to see significant reduction in injuries, decreased production 
costs, and/or increased production, all key elements in calculating a good return on 
investment.  The PE program may initially have been attractive to management because 
the ECT‘s changes potentially improved productivity.  However, these improvements 
also were difficult to discern.  In the courier depot, the ECT‘s changes potentially could 
reduce the amount of double handling and rework necessitated by the depot‘s poorly 
designed work methods and layout, which in turn could increase productivity.  The 
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district manager and senior managers, however, did not see these benefits.  Regarding 
one change, the district manager said:  
So as much as the process suggested that it would save rework, 
and reduce whatever, I haven‘t seen it yet.  Now, I am not 
complaining because it did lessen the stress on the employees 
working there six and half hours a day, so to me that is a benefit.  
But, from the numbers on paper I am not seeing anything.   
The ECT measured its successes by examining the feedback from depot workers 
about the changes it was making, and decreases in the biomechanical loadings on 
employees (Reid et al., 2003; Rivilis et al., 2006).  Additionally, the ECT fought an 
uphill battle against statistics.  Some of the ECT‘s projects, modest in scope, impacted a 
small number of the depot‘s personnel and therefore their effects did not register on 
frequency and severity measures.  As Wells et al., (in press) note, there are problems with 
seeing positive health outcomes of PE interventions because of the multiplicity of MSD 
sources, the fact that some injuries may not be reversible, so workers will continue to 
report pain regardless of the change, and the possibility of an insufficient intensity of 
change to create positive health outcomes changes. 
7.6.2  Diminishing Returns 
Around 18
 
months into the intervention, the national OHS director concluded that 
the ECT‘s work had ―plateaued‖ or progressed as far as it was going to and that further 
investment would have diminishing returns.  According to the director, the fact that the 
program had plateaued prompted, or at least underlined, the view that it should be re-
evaluated, an opinion connected to his idea that programs had a regular evolution; in his 
experience, a program initially accomplishes things and then its worth needs to be 
reassessed, and if need be, in his words, ―reinvented.‖  From the director‘s perspective, 
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the project‘s benefits came in the program‘s first 12 months when the team had, in his 
words, picked ―all the low hanging fruit.‖  Additionally, eighteen months into the 
program, he noted that the project‘s timeline had been too long and should have been 
assessed for its benefits at the one-year mark:  ―I think… it‘s been too long – two years is 
too long.‖  In an interview 18 months into the intervention, the national OHS director 
elaborated on his perspective that the intervention had reached a point where 
management should reassess its value: 
I think we also have to realize like with any initiative it starts off 
… and you are going to be doing great things and you are going 
to hit a point where it‘s going to be an S-curve where you are 
going to slow down and you‘re going to have to realize that at 
that point you have to celebrate its successes, cut it off, and say, 
―Thank you for your involvement, it was a great success, now 
going forward it‘s going to be something different.‖ And I think 
that my vision of that timing is that from what I‘ve seen at [City 
depot] that probably happened within, that plateau probably 
started happening around nine months, a year, fifteen months 
somewhere around there.  And I think that at point you had to sort 
of cut it off and …celebrate the successes and then change the 
way you do it… That‘s the other component.  We see that in all 
safety programs, …where you can develop great programs and 
get them out there and get them implemented and they go great 
guns and we get great results, but they always tend to plateau at 
some point.  
He acknowledged that the ECT faced hindrances from within the organization, 
such as the team‘s relation with the engineering department and the attitude of the depot‘s 
district managers, but did not think these were important considerations when evaluating 
the program‘s worth.  Instead of reviewing the challenges the PE program faced and 
adjusting it accordingly or addressing conditions in the organization that hindered 
progress, he felt the program had run its course.   
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In the project‘s eighteenth month, the national OHS director said that his support 
was conditional upon seeing the program‘s value: ―As far as continuance, I will need to 
be convinced that there is a reason to continue the project in [the depot].  If there is value, 
then I would support it.‖ 
Importantly, at the same time he started to express reservations about maintaining 
the PE program, he was developing a company-wide return-to-work initiative.  He 
ushered this new initiative into company depots in the last days of the PE program and 
later touted it as a significant cost-saver for Courier Co.  The return-to-work program had 
substantial cost savings for the company in terms of its potential to reduce lost-time 
numbers and did not require addressing root causes of injury the way the PE program 
did.
24
  The director was becoming invested in this return-to-work initiative, which had 
goals that potentially reduced injury costs, as did the PE program, but with fewer 
investments.  Significantly, this initiative was related to his waning interest and/or 
support for the PE program.   
7.6.3  Depot-Level Support  
At the twenty-month mark of the program, not only was senior management 
support for the PE program ebbing, local level support also became tenuous.  As 
discussed in Chapter Four, after the initiative‘s twelfth month the district manager had 
difficulties relieving workers from their regular duties to attend the ECT meetings and 
later began to complain that the ECT‘s activities were producing limited outcomes.  From 
this point in the intervention, the district manager said on several occasions that the team 
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 During the period 2002 to 2005 the number of days lost to injury was reduced from 9,721 to 6059.  This 
reportedly saved the company an estimated 10-15 million dollars. 
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should be combined with the joint health and safety committee and meet once a month.  
Such a plan would reduce the hours that he would have to relieve worker representatives 
from their regular duties.  As evidenced by this argument, similar to the national OHS 
director, the district manager was concerned about the ECT‘s cost effectiveness.     
The district manager was also concerned that the ECT was not making adequate 
progress given the time it was spending in its meetings.  Approximately 14 months into 
the intervention, the district manager attended one of the ECT‘s meetings and said that, 
―it was stuck in the mud‖ and that ―it was stalled.‖ He attributed the ECT‘s meagre 
progress to team members‘ lack of motivation.  He did not recognize that the team‘s 
problems were, in part, beyond its control.  Nor did he recognize problems were rooted in 
senior management‘s lack of support for the team and his own inability to relieve worker 
representatives to attend ECT meetings and carry out ergonomic activities.  Both of these 
problems contributed to the protracted change making process.  
To address what he saw as the team‘s poor motivation, which otherwise might be 
seen as declining morale the district manager said members needed to be ―rejuvenated.‖ 
In an interview, however, he noted that he was not prepared to rejuvenate the team in his 
depot and suggested that the program be tried elsewhere:  
We‘ve burnt the resources and spelled off drivers to get you 
[ECT] the people you need for the meetings, but from my 
perspective I‘m reading the same thing [in the minutes] that was 
there three weeks ago.  They didn‘t seem to be going anywhere. 
They were reviewing it and they were meeting, but I didn‘t see 
anything happening.  So that was what made me say  … [to the 
ECT] ―take a look‖ and say, ―Where are we?‖  Like maybe this 
group has had enough and it‘s time to get a fresh group, a group 
with new ideas, more energy… 
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The district manager‘s sentiments about the ECT‘s lack of progress contrasted 
with those of the ergonomist-facilitator and OHS manager, who lobbied for the PE 
program‘s continuation.  Attempting to garner support from senior managers, the 
ergonomist-facilitator emailed two of Courier Co.‘s senior managers and the health and 
safety manager and apprised them of the ECT‘s difficulties.  The ergonomist-facilitator 
noted that he did not question the district manager‘s endorsement of the ECT, as he had 
been very supportive of it.  However, the ergonomist-facilitator was concerned that the 
district manager may not fully appreciate the challenges and resources involved in 
initiating and maintaining a PE program.  He explained to the managers that the 
complexity of the program, the resources required, and the lengthy timeframe needed to 
for an ECT‘s efficient operation meant moving it elsewhere would be a waste of 
resources and little would be accomplished.  He suggested that to ensure the PE 
program‘s continuation the ECT remain in the depot and engage with senior management 
to discuss ways to support the program‘s sustainability and future development.   
The district manager‘s concerns about the team‘s lack of progress were partly 
connected to his unease about the ECT‘s effects on production.  He was having trouble 
relieving worker representatives so they could attend ECT meetings, and at the same 
time, meet production goals.  In a meeting in which the continuation of the program was 
discussed that included members of the research team, the ergonomist-facilitator, and the 
national health and safety manager, the district manager made it clear that production was 
the main priority.   
The participatory ergonomics program faced considerable neglect in its later 
months.  The outcomes of the ECT‘s activities did not convince the company‘s key 
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managers that the program represented a genuine benefit to Courier Co.  These managers 
were increasingly reluctant to support investment in the participatory ergonomic 
program.  With few demonstrable outcomes that could be linked with cost savings for the 
company, key local and senior managers treated the program as a hindrance to production 
goals and a drain on the company‘s resources rather than something consistent with 
reaching revenue goals.  
7.6.4  Reluctance to Take on Leadership  
In the later part of the intervention, ECT members struggled with lack of 
leadership and ownership as it attempted to meet regularly.  Their capacity to negotiate 
the PE program‘s continuation was affected by their limited power.  When the 
ergonomist–facilitator withdrew from the setting in the twentieth month, the OHS 
manager became the ECT‘s unofficial leader.  For him, if a committed group of 
individuals from within the depot coalesced, the PE program could be sustained.  In a 
conversation about 18 months into the intervention he said, ―we need a core group to lead 
things,‖ and explained:  
So we need them [local members] to take charge… [operations 
administrative assistant], [dockworker] , and [courier]. It‘ll be 
good if [courier] stays. ……. They need an identity, it‘s not my 
team. The nucleus that the team had has broken apart… [ops 
administrative assistant]  will be a good person to keep them on 
track…  
However, no one in the depot would agree to take a leadership role and no one had the 
authority to call and schedule meetings and ensure that the team‘s worker representatives 
were relieved to attend.   
Reluctance to take on key leadership roles was not openly discussed among the 
ECT members: it was not discussed at ECT meetings and worker representatives did not 
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convey their unwillingness to the OHS manager or ergonomist-facilitator, neither of 
whom fully appreciated the barrier the ECT members‘ reluctance posed to the team.  
Instead, there was talk among team members about how the team could be rejuvenated.  
In another conversation 18 months in, the OHS manager said, ―When we get into the 
New Year we will put on the ‗renaissance‘ and get new members,‖ noting that to regain 
some momentum the team would have some weekly meetings.  The New Year began 
auspiciously, with a string of weekly meetings but after a couple of months attendance 
problems re-emerged.  The OHS manager and the ergonomist-facilitator discussed 
getting the ECT ―leadership training‖ or ―team training‖ several times but not with other 
ECT members, except in passing.  In these discussions, the ergonomist and health and 
safety manager assumed that team members lacked knowledge about how to properly 
function in a group, which was not the case; ECT members, though not experienced 
meeting attendees or ergonomists, nevertheless could ably run a meeting, identify MSD 
hazards, and devise solutions based on ergonomic principles.  Rather, the problem was 
that the ECT‘s survival was contingent on a member possessing the authority to schedule 
meetings, to take action to carry out its activities, and to relieve workers.  Team training 
would not have addressed these contextual factors.  In the end, the OHS manager 
requested a training course for the team, but management did not approve this request.    
Worker representatives‘ views on change team leadership were contrary to the 
OHS manager‘s.  Worker representatives believed that the role could not be filled by just 
anyone on the team, or even from within the depot but needed to be filled by someone in 
a managerial position.  In one worker representative‘s words 
Well, you need a guy like [OHS manager].  You need a guy, if it 
isn't [OHS manager], you need somebody else that has an idea of 
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what's going on.  If he gets another job within the company, he 
doesn't want to do this anymore, that is DEFINITELY gonna be 
the death of this.  It's on its last legs now, it's hanging by its 
fingernails… but if he leaves, it's gone.  It's toast, it's finished.  It's 
gone.  
Another worker representative agreed that management needed to be involved to 
keep the ECT going but specified that it had to be a management representative who was 
interested in ergonomics:  
It would mean more to them [manager who is interested in 
ergonomics] than to… a management member who was outside 
the ergonomics team who would be like, ―Oh that‘s fine, that‘s 
nice, however I have ten couriers that I have to deal with right 
now.‖  It‘s not as high on the priority list and yeah they might be 
interested and ―Yeah it could work, we should keep it going.‖  
But whether or not they do anything beyond that, yeah fuck, 
doubtful.  I think mostly any management member who is 
involved in ergonomics would be more likely to put forth an 
effort to continue it. 
Although workers felt the team needed someone in management, local 
management was not interested in pursuing the ergonomic program, which was 
significant because without upper management support, the program likely would fold.  
The ECT needed management personnel who possessed the necessary connections to 
lead the team, and, in particular, negotiate for the PE program‘s continuation.  Worker 
representatives, when interviewed, agreed that the likelihood of program sustainability 
would be increased if a supportive senior manager was involved: in one worker 
representative‘s words, ―at that [local] level you are really limited …because cost wise, 
hourly wise, to take time off you have to work with the depot [personnel].  If you can‘t go 
above that, you have to do whatever they say at this level.‖ 
The OHS manager was aware of his seemingly contradictory position.  On one 
hand, he knew that his participation was absolutely essential for the group‘s progress.  On 
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the other hand, he knew that local membership needed to take control of and lead the 
team if it were to continue.  Members were never in a position to formulate a plan for 
taking control of the ECT because many of them lacked the influence to determine if and 
when the ECT could continue.  Unfortunately, there were never discussions about these 
structural constraints among the ECT‘s membership.  
7.6.5  “It’s Their Show” 
By month twenty-four, the intervention was in its last days.  At this point, the 
ECT worker representatives did not negotiate with management about the PE program‘s 
continuation, but instead said it was management‘s to do with as it wanted.  For them, 
management‘s ownership of the means of production was incontestable, and they were 
generally fatalistic about their chances of success in negotiations with management 
regarding the ECT‘s continuation.  One worker representative, resigned to the fact that 
management controlled the program and that worker representatives had no influence, 
said,  
None of the employees are gonna fight for it because there's no 
use fighting for it. They're [management] just gonna tell us that 
the problem's solved. … It's their [company] initiative, and [OHS 
manager ] is the leader on this as far as that's concerned. He's 
gone, we're gone.  
Similarly, another worker representative articulated the constraints of his position: 
I can‘t go tell employees to come to the meetings, I don‘t pay 
their wages, [Courier Co.] does. And if they were paying the 
people to attend, to me it was up to them, but with the team, sit 
down and say, ―Look, we can‘t have three drivers here. We can‘t 
just take them off the road. But we can have one at a meeting.‖ 
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Noting that, above all else, management was interested in production, and that the 
ergonomic program was under management‘s control, a worker representative said it did 
not matter what he, or the rest of the ECT members, thought the program achieved:  
It‘s just their game, it‘s their show.  They can call the shots.  I 
mean regardless of how good this can be or how bad it is, or how 
awful it is or what a money- saving thing it could be, it doesn‘t 
matter. The bottom line is… that if things don‘t get delivered, if 
the freight sits on the floor, somebody‘s ass is going to be in a 
sling. 
One worker representative stated that it was management‘s prerogative to allocate 
resources so the ECT could function:  
The employee group – I feel – in this terminal can‘t take 
leadership.  The leadership, even though it‘s supposed to be an 
equal partnership, the natural leadership comes from the 
company.  And it didn‘t come from them. …because they have all 
the resources basically, all the power to say, ―Ok it‘s going to go, 
this is what we are going to do.‖ You know for me as a courier, 
[courier] as a courier, [dockworker] as the chairman even didn‘t 
have the ability – I don‘t think – or the confidence to say to 
[district manager]…  ―Hey …we are having a meeting next 
week,‖ or call [OHS manager] and say ―Hey, you know what? 
This thing is going to roll. We are going to do this next week.‖… 
I don‘t know what the right word is, but we didn‘t have the 
confidence to do that, even though it‘s supposed to be an equal 
partnership I think the management has the better ability to take 
the bull by the horns in that instance and make it happen, where it 
is a little harder for us. … we could have called [Vice President] 
and said, ―Do you know what? Let‘s go.‖ And you know he 
would have then jumped on management and said, ―Let‘s get this 
thing rolling.‖ Probably. In my mind it‘s more their role …to 
keep this thing alive and moving and on track and I think they‘ve 
failed. All I can, all we can do as members is… say, ―Hey, 
…what‘s going on? We want to get this thing rolling.‖ We don‘t 
write the cheque, which is the bottom line, right. We have very 
little power.  
Clearly, then, the idea that the ECT‘s members could take on key leadership 
positions and lobby for the PE program‘s continuation was hindered by members‘ limited 
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say in the PE program‘s sustainability.  Workers‘ lack of ownership of the ECT‘s 
direction was tightly connected to their limited workplace power and lack of ownership 
of the means of production.  They said management controlled the resources that the 
ergonomic program needed to function, and thus by extension ultimately ―owned‖ and 
controlled the program as well.   
7.6.6  Discontinuing the PE Program 
Approximately 24 months into the intervention, the OHS manager‘s attendance at 
the ECT meetings became more infrequent and this contributed to the ECT‘s lack of 
activity.  The team depended on him to be a conduit of information between it and senior 
managers; thus when he was absent, communication broke down and the ECT‘s work 
slowed.  At this point, the ECT was having great difficulty organizing meetings, and 
when it did, the meetings were rarely productive.  Around this time, as well, the national 
OHS director withdrew his support and instructed the regional occupational health and 
safety manager to cease traveling to the depot and assisting the ECT.  
Two and a half years after it had been introduced, the ergonomic program at the 
depot ceased operating.  There was no formal announcement of cancellation, no 
consultation with the ECT‘s worker or management representatives, and no meeting to 
inform them of management‘s perspective on the program – meetings were simply not 
scheduled anymore.  Even the visible evidence of the ECT was removed from the 
building.  Worker representatives recalled their surprise when they arrived for the 
beginning of their shift and the ―ergonomics board,‖ a large bulletin board that was a 
central means of communicating with employees in the depot, had been removed.  
Around this time, a new district manager was brought into the depot who knew little 
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about the ergonomics program.  One worker representative indicated his surprise to learn 
the PE program had been shut down and said that, ―according to the new manager, the 
project‘s dead, and that‘s news to me.‖  Other worker representatives also indicated their 
surprise that no cancellation announcement was made, and expressed they were 
disappointed to see the program‘s ending, especially in such a manner; in one worker‘s 
representative‘s view  
The end of it was dealt with piss poor... Very unprofessional from 
a company standpoint that prides itself in …couriers‘ professional 
appearance and all that stuff but everything they do internally is 
very unprofessional at times.  I‘m very disappointed in the 
company for the fact that they just let it die a natural death. Not 
happy at all with – if it was going to be finished they should have 
had everybody together or whatever or something. Some sort of 
communication to people that, ―Look this is what is going on this 
is what we should do?‖ Do you want it to continue or you don‘t 
want it to continue. It‘s your ball type of thing. Let‘s see what 
happens.  They didn‘t do it they didn‘t bother so it‘s they get a 
new guy [district manager] in town and he knows NOTHING 
absolutely NOTHING about it other than it‘s not there anymore 
and [OHS manager ] gets a new boss and you haven‘t seen him in 
months, no communication, no nothing.  I‘ll have to get myself 
on the health and safety committee I guess to find out if anything 
else is going to happen.  But very poorly handled, very 
unprofessional….   
Some of the ECT‘s projects remained unfinished.  At the point when the PE 
program concluded, change to one of the depot‘s workstations that the ECT was in the 
midst of investigating was incomplete, a cart for pulling freight that the team had 
invested much time and energy into and waited months for, was delivered to the depot 
but went unused by couriers because it was awaiting modifications that never came, and 
an investigation that the ECT was in the middle of into the hazards associated with 
courier trucks was not completed.  
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7.7  FURNITURE CO. 
The sustainability of the participatory ergonomic program in Furniture Co. 
changed over time and was influenced by: (1) the company‘s organizational environment, 
and, in particular, by occupational health and safety regulatory bodies, such as the 
workers‘ compensation board; (2) the company‘s restructuring efforts; and, (3) the ECT 
members‘ attempts to integrate the PE program into the plant‘s existing health and safety 
programs.  Attempting to align itself with elements of the corporate structure, the ECT 
raised awareness of the PE program and complemented extant OHS programs, enhancing 
their worth.  In this section I describe the ECT‘s endeavours to maintain the program and 
how they were affected by the factors noted above.    
7.7.1  Lack of Progress  
Initially, support came from some of Furniture Co.‘s management in the form of 
provision of time for workers to meet and carry out ECT activities, but as discussed in 
Chapter 5, managers did not initially provide the personnel and necessary authority to 
implement changes.  After approximately twelve months, because of the slow process by 
which it was making changes, the ECT had little to show for its efforts.  Despite early 
setbacks, the ECT‘s output increased over time, and the program continued for 
approximately 40 months.   
The ECT‘s inability to make change in its first twelve months was noted by some 
of the plant‘s managers.  In fact, the team‘s progress was so slow in its initial year the 
plant manager noted that, ―It took forever to get through things‖ and that was thankful 
that it was he, and not another more senior manager, in the ECT‘s meetings.  Similarly, 
the human resources manager said to the OHS manager that the ECT appeared not to be 
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making any progress.  In an interview twenty months into the intervention, the health and 
safety manager described this concern and her response: ―My boss asked me at the end of 
the first year whether [the ECT] had done ANYTHING at all because as far as she was 
concerned she couldn‘t see anything…And I was conscious after that, that we needed 
‗A,‘ to be visible, and ‗B,‘ to prove that we‘d done something.‖ 
Responding to the challenges to maintaining the PE program, the ECT developed 
a set of strategies in an effort to ensure its long-term viability.  Some of these strategies 
were aimed at demonstrating to management that the ECT was having a positive impact. 
7.7.2  Promoting and “Proceduralizing” the PE program  
Attempting to preserve the PE program, the OHS manager endeavoured, in her 
words, to ―integrate‖ the program into the plant‘s existing health and safety practices.  
Integration, she said, was difficult but would ensure the PE program had enough status 
that managers would not treat it as a ―flavour of the month.‖  As part of integrating the 
ergonomics program into OHS practices, she, in her terms, ―proceduralized,‖ the PE 
program in a set of practices that could be evaluated by company personnel.  As part of 
this, she put together an ―Ergonomic Policy‖ in a document that codified the PE 
program‘s procedures and protocols.  It outlined what the ergonomics program was, what 
it aimed to achieve, what it needed to function, and who was responsible for its operation.  
This document was reviewed and signed by both the VP human resources and company 
president.  Additionally, she attempted to regularly share information about the ECT‘s 
goals with the plant‘s senior management.  When I asked the OHS manager about 
integrating the PE program into the OHS practices she said:  
Well, to make it part of the workplace culture you have to make a 
procedure… and in the procedure it says what you‘re gonna do 
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and then you have to do that stuff, and PROVE that you do it.  
When you‘re in safety and you‘re dealing with regulatory 
agencies and external audits you have to PROVE everything.  
There has to be signatures, and dates and proof of training and a 
document trail and all the rest of it.  Now in ergonomics it‘s not 
as if I‘m gonna kill somebody so… it‘s a little less onerous than it 
would be to keep the machinery guarded, for example.  But if it 
doesn‘t say who‘s responsible for what, and there isn‘t any 
accountability to hold people responsible for this thing, it‘s just 
gonna die. And if I ever change ROLES, the ergo program would 
just go boom.  So for me it was really important to write it up 
with all those responsibilities of what we‘re doing and put it 
together.  And MAKE it just part of how we live our life here, 
which is then in practice, which is impacting our culture…  
Annually, I have to prove that I reviewed them all as part of my 
program; that they‘re still current and they‘re still functional.  If it 
gets put in with those procedures it‘ll become part of that regular 
review process. … that‘s how everything functions here so it has 
to be put into the way we do our business…   
In addition to proceduralizing the program, the OHS manager tried to create and 
maintain awareness about the PE program among management at various levels.  She 
spoke about the ECT in the plant‘s weekly Safety Committee and Return-to-Work 
Committee meetings.  Frequently, she informally talked to the Vice President about the 
ECT‘s work to keep him apprised of its activities.  Another way that the OHS manager 
kept management informed about the ECT‘s activities was to create an ―Ergonomic Audit 
and Evaluation Sheet‖ (Figure 7.1), which detailed what the team had done, what projects 
it was currently working on, and what prospective projects it was looking to undertake.  
Copies of these documents were regularly circulated to managers.  Further, the OHS 
manager organized ergonomic training for the plant‘s workforce, in part to highlight the 
fact that PE program was not just another initiative but that it was a primary component 
in the facility‘s OHS management system.   
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2003 Oct ‗03 5 0 38 4 25 
Jan ‗04  9 Production 
Supervisors, Hourly 
Workers 
  3 
Feb ‗04  2    3 
Mar ‗04  1    3 
Apr ‗04    48  2 
May ‗04    13  2 
June ‗04    29 2 1 
July ‗04  2  14  1 
WSIB Firm Profile 
 # NLTI # LTI # Fatal LTI # Total Injuries 
2004 (as of May 26) 19 1  20 
2003 102 20 0 122 
2002 143 28 0 171 
2001 211 28 0 239 
ECT – Ergonomic Change Team 
NLTI – No Lost Time Injury 
LTI – Lost Time Injury 
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Table 7.1  Ergonomic Audit and Evaluation Sheet (con‘t) 
Project List Update 
Project Description Champion Status 
1 Loading skids – fold-up table prototype for 3000 ISL Line. WR/PMgr ETA June 
2 Jig Project. Unable to change station.  Added PHAU‘s 
instead.  Re-design of line pending. 
Sup Complete 
3 Tilt Stand Project OHS Mgr/ 
WR/WR 
Hold 
4 Plating Project – hold No easy answers! Test Tilter there for 
unracking. 
MMgr/Sup Hold 
5 Tilt stand and fixed platform – Press 135 done, Presses 70, 
138 & 85 in May ‘04. 
Sup/PMgr ETA May 
6 Half bin project – recommendation to management.  Cost 
prohibitive. 
OHS Mgr Complete 
7 Personal Height Adjustment Units provided in 9000 and 
Assembly  
Sup/WR Complete 
8 Ergo Chairs – Fast Track project.  Provided throughout 
plant. 
OHS Mgr/WR Complete 
9 Plastics work stations – chairs, adjustable tables, chutes 
done. Degaters being added may ‘04. 
PMgr ETA Aug ‗04 





11 Plating – lazy Suzan, ball sizes, layout changes, automation Env H&S Mgr ETA shut-
down ‗04 
12 Welders #12   
13 Plastic Retainer Press – changes to cart to eliminate need for 
bending to pick product 
Claims Mgr ETA Aug ‗04 
14 Office Workstations – reception workstation complete Eng/OHS Mgr  
15 Press 9 – elevate 4 inches MMgr Complete 
June ‗04 
16 Foot Pedals – matting with Velcro attached WR/WR ETA Aug ‗04 
17 Rod Machine – modifications based on Ergo assessment Claims Mgr Complete 
18 Vacuum ball bearings PMgr  
19 General Welding – lifting arm, combining processes PMgr  
Workstation Changes (Goal: 2/month) 
2002 Workstation change for Worker, Ergo chairs investigated and purchased for plant 
2003 Personal Height Adjustment Units provided in 9000 and Assembly, workstation change for 
Workers 
Jan ‗04 Toolroom computer station set up correctly; Press 52 tilter installed 
Feb ‗04 Plastics workstations – chairs, adjustable tables, chutes 
Mar ‗04 Press 135 platform & tilter/ crimping of narrow channel/ reception workstation re-design/ foot 
pedal 
Apr ‗04 None 
May ‗04 6 Retainer press guards installed/ 3 Press platforms with tilters (70, 138, 85) 
June ‗04 4 Degating units/ 3000 ISL Line layout improvements 
July ‗04 Retainer press cart re-design/ Turn Lift Table – Keyboard Tray Assembly 
Aug ‗04 Plating 6800 Line Changes/ 3402 adjustable table (Slide Assembly/ Press 9 replaced for height 
issues)  
WR – Worker Representative 
PMgr, MMgr, PLntMgr,– Production Manager, Maintenance Manager, Plant Manager  
Sup – Supervisor 
OHS, Env H&S, Eng – Occupational Health and Safety, Environmental Health and Safety, Engineer 
ETA – Estimated Time of Arrival  
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The ECT, and, in particular, the OHS manager, through both promotional 
activities and the ―proceduralization‖ of the PE program, attempted to define it as an 
important part of the plant‘s regular operation and thus to ―routinize‖ (Pluye et al., 2004) 
it as something that could not be easily sidestepped or neglected.  The OHS manager‘s 
attempts to secure support for the PE program unfolded in a facilitative context in which 
the plant‘s restructuring efforts and the workers‘ compensation board put pressure on 
plant management to take ergonomics more seriously than it previously had.  These 
topics are discussed further in the next sections.    
7.7.3  Restructuring  
The plant‘s reorganization in reaction to market changes is a pertinent part of 
understanding management‘s acceptance and continuation of the PE program.   
Decreasing product demand, rising global competition, and soaring material costs 
translated into layoffs and a push to increase the plant‘s operational efficiency.  A side 
effect of restructuring was that it complicated the company‘s accommodation of injured 
workers and, as I demonstrate below, this provided an important condition contributing to 
the PE program‘s relevance.  Laying-off employees significantly reduced the spots in 
which modified-duty personnel
25
 could be accommodated, or given a task, which had 
previously been plentiful.  Late in the intervention, a senior manager remarked, ―It‘s just 
most of those jobs have been eliminated because of a drop in volume.  So you may still 
have one person [performing a task] when you had three people, six people doing it 
before.‖  When I asked one of the plant‘s senior managers about that he said,  
                                                 
 
25
 Modified-duty personnel are individuals suffering from either permanent or temporary injury who need 
to be assigned work that does not lead to re-injury.  Modified-duty personnel may also be referred to as 
light-duty and restricted-duty personnel.  
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Well,… first of all we had about 700 employees here 3/4/5 years 
ago.  Today we‘re down to about 260 hourly employees. So…  
there‘s been 450 jobs that have been lost here and by those jobs 
being eliminated it certainly has -- along with those being 
eliminated there‘s a number of jobs that maybe were just putting 
washers on a riveter or something that was quite light work and 
… it was jobs that we used when people had injuries.  Some of 
those jobs have disappeared now so that‘s made it… more 
difficult to find work for these people. 
Plant management also considered the financial ramifications of laying-off 
injured workers.  Laying-off injured workers resulted in extra costs for employers due to 
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) policies.  Under the WSIB policies, 
employers are obligated to try to ―provide injured workers with work that is both safe and 
restores their earnings before the injury‖ (WSIB, 2006).  If an employer is unable to do so 
then an employee enters the ―labour market re-entry program‖ for retraining (WSIB, 
2006).  Although employers do not directly pay for rehabilitation and retraining costs, the 
inability of employers to accommodate injured employees is recorded in WSIB appraisals 
of a plant‘s health safety record and may result in increased premiums.  Thus, laying-off 
employees who were injured meant an added cost.  With fewer places to provide workers 
who suffered from permanent injuries, management was aware of the importance of 
preventing such injuries and creating work areas where injured workers could be 
accommodated.  As a senior manager in the plant said,    
I am comparing it to other companies, we‘re still higher and we 
still have more lost-time injuries or injuries that require some type 
of modified work restrictions.  And, like I said, it‘s very costly.  
For a young worker if they‘re injured to go into the market [need 
to be retrained] it… may be the only alternative but… it costs 
several hundred thousand dollars to retrain a worker to do 
something else. 
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7.7.4  Surcharges: Making Management “Stand Up and Take Notice”   
Another, more direct way that Furniture Co. was affected by the plant‘s regulatory 
environment was through the surcharges it incurred under the experience-rating 
compensation system.  During the intervention, the plant received a series of penalties for 
its high lost-time injuries rate.  These encouraged senior management within the plant 
and at corporate levels to carefully consider how musculoskeletal disorders were 
addressed.  
As mentioned in the previous description of the experience-rating system, the 
Workplace Safety Insurance Board imposes a surcharge on companies that have higher 
than average injury rates.  Furniture Co. had received rebates due to its low injury rates 
for several years prior to the PE intervention.  However, the plant‘s injury numbers 
increased over time; mid way through the program, they exceeded the average injury 
numbers for its rate group, the rebates stopped, and Furniture Co. incurred three 
consecutive hefty surcharges from the WSIB, each close to a million dollars.   
The surcharges affected Furniture Co.‘s profitability and pressured plant 
management to focus on health and safety and decrease injury costs.  Company officials 
considered the surcharges to be very serious, and in the words of the OHS manager, they 
made managers, ―stand up and take notice.‖  Further, the surcharges also produced 
pressure from Furniture Co.‘s parent company.  The company‘s other plants, located in 
the United States and Taiwan, had significantly lower health and safety costs than 
Furniture Co. did, adding to the pressure on plant management to control OHS costs.     
The fact that plant and corporate management regarded the surcharges as a 
substantial and avoidable cost gave justification for investment in MSD prevention and 
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increased the legitimacy of the participatory ergonomic program.  I asked a senior 
manager about the corporation‘s response to the state of health and safety and he said 
…they have a real concern…   that we could spend eight or nine 
hundred thousand dollars on a – just on a surcharge fee this year 
and that comes off the bottom line.  So they‘re very concerned 
about it, I mean that‘s what drives businesses. 
The plant manager recounted how corporate management responded to the surcharge, and 
how it gave the factory‘s management some leverage in terms of their spending on 
ergonomics:  
…it [surcharge] was eight hundred thousand dollars and went 
right to our CEO of our corporation in the United States. He was 
not blaming us but blaming himself, more or less saying as a 
company, wouldn‘t it have been smarter for us to spend that eight 
hundred thousand dollars in interventions and improvements 
rather than spending it on fines. Now we have to do both. We got 
to still pay the eight hundred thousand dollars, but we should be 
budgeting and spending money in a way as we move forward to 
avoid that from occurring. So that‘s what allowed us to then put 
forth better budgets for spending to say we were going to spend a 
hundred or two hundred thousand dollars a year on making 
improvements. 
Within this context of high surcharges and management‘s eagerness to address them, the 
ergonomic program was seen as one means to decrease the high numbers of injury claims 
and reduce, if not avoid, future surcharges.   
Pressure from the WSIB and an intensely competitive market motivated the 
plant‘s management to make changes, which affected the participatory ergonomic 
program‘s status.  The surcharges encouraged senior managers to reassess how they 
addressed work-related musculoskeletal disorders.  Downsizing and a shift to lean 
manufacturing had previously reduced the spots where employees hitherto worked on 
modified duty.  These pressures meant that the ergonomics change team‘s activities were 
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considered a viable part of the way the plant was to reduce OHS costs.  They also created 
conditions under which the participatory ergonomics program‘s and management‘s 
interests could be aligned and created opportunities for the ECT to gain more legitimate 
status.  
7.7.5  Demonstrating the PE Program’s Utility  
 In the context of plant restructuring and surcharges, linking the ergonomics 
program to other parts of the plant‘s health and safety framework would highlight its 
utility and lend it some security.  To this end, the ergonomics team attempted to 
demonstrate its relevance to management, and show itself as a viable injury-prevention 
program.   
The ECT‘s efforts to link its activities to the pre-existing health and safety 
framework could be seen in the team‘s meetings.  A pattern emerged approximately 18 
months into the intervention, whereby at the beginning of the ECT‘s meetings, the team 
reviewed the plant‘s weekly ―accident report,‖ a record of any injuries reported to the 
health and safety personnel.  As each of the injuries was described, team members 
deliberated and decided whether and how it could address the circumstance that had led 
to the injury.  In reviewing the weekly accident report, the ECT was attempting to 
directly reduce the facility‘s musculoskeletal hazards.  
The ECT also enhanced its profile as an effective injury-reducing and cost-saving 
mechanism by capitalizing on return-to-work concerns.  The ECT did this by modifying 
work areas so that employees who had musculoskeletal injuries could work safely.  It was 
able to do this by responding to issues that arose in the plant‘s ―Return-to-Work 
Committee,‖ (RTW) a group consisting of management and labour representatives 
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devoted to arranging work with minimal risk for employees on modified duty due to 
work-related injury.   
 Ideally, in RTW programs, employees who have been injured are brought back to 
work as quickly and safely as possible when they are ready.  Injured workers may benefit 
as they can slowly transition back to work, receive better pay than workers‘ 
compensation may provide, and, generally, improve their physical and emotional state as 
they recover from injury; employers may benefit in that workers are doing value-added 
tasks and their lost-time claims are reduced (Baril et al., 2003; Loisel et al., 2005).  
Meeting the goals of return-to-work programs can be challenging, as reintroducing 
employees to work requires consideration of several factors, such as availability of 
positions, union concerns that employees receive pay similar to what they did pre-injury, 
and reinstating employees before they have fully recovered (IWH, 2005: 39-43; Krause et 
al., 2001; MacEachen, et al., 2006) 
In its decisions concerning the placement of workers, Furniture Co.‘s return-to-
work committee considered the employee‘s work restrictions, the availability of spaces to 
do value-added work while on restricted duty and the influence a worker on modified 
duties may have on production.  Contractually, the company was obligated to give 
employees who received layoff notices the option between being laid off or ―bumping,‖ 
transferring from one job to another in a different area of the plant and thereby displacing 
the employee in that area who had lowest seniority; whether an employee could bump 
was based on his/her seniority.  In the area a worker decided to transfer into, a worker for 
whom the opportunity was available would either exercise his/her own bumping option or 
be laid off.  Therefore, each round of lay offs typically triggered bumping, which had a 
 246 
cascading effect in which workers bumped others until the lowest-seniority employee 
was laid off.  If an injured worker was bumped, had enough seniority, and chose to 
exercise her/his bumping option, the RTW committee searched for a place on the 
shopfloor where s/he could be accommodated.   
Layoffs, bumping, and the reduction in positions that were suitable for modified 
duty employees complicated the RTW committee‘s work, making it difficult to assist 
workers with physical restrictions.  The OHS manager described the RTW committee‘s 
deliberations concerning where they should place modified duty workers, as ―painful‖ 
and a ―nightmare.‖  She said that, ―the ergonomic team became a mechanism to deal 
with‖ these staffing issues as it altered work areas to accommodate injured workers.  
With its mandate to improve working conditions, the PE program gave the RTW 
committee more options of where workers could be placed and thereby relieved some of 
the pressure on the committee. 
The ECT‘s change-making activities not only allowed the company to 
accommodate modified-duty employees, but also ensured the work that these employees 
were doing was value-added.  In one work area in particular the plant manager noted 
accommodating modified duty workers paid back in big dividends: 
The biggest example here is the systematic machines… where the 
systematic machines requires people to bend into bins, lift 
quantities of parts, put them on a shelf, feed them through an 
automatic machine, they [parts] go through the machine and back 
into a bin, they [operators] got to reach down again and try to 
straighten them around.  So they [ECT] are coming up with lifting 
devices, lift and tilt devices to bring the parts right up to the 
employees‘ level and then all you got to do is to pick parts one at 
a time out of a container and place them on a conveyor and feed it 
in.  Then people we had on light duty at the time could go in and 
do the job. …we [company] had two of them [machines] running 
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on two shifts at a time, so really that that creates some 
employment for three people that we were taking off of light duty 
job and they were now on direct work.  So it wasn‘t a lot of 
investment but it was probably six or seven or eight thousand 
dollars worth of lifters and modifications and things like that. So 
that would be very quick payback. 
The ergonomic change team‘s ability to create spaces for modified duty workers 
improved its profile among management.  When asked about whether the ECT‘s 
activities were facilitating the placement of modified duty workers, the plant manager 
was categorical about this, ―Oh most definitely.  I mean THAT‘S the focus that we used 
in a lot of cases.  It was justification to spend the money [on changes].‖ He noted that the 
high numbers of employees on modified duty meant that, ―we had to look at making 
improvements, we had to look at doing things differently because not only have we got a 
lot of people on light duty that we now have to somehow accommodate but the workforce 
is getting older.‖  Significantly, management understood the participatory ergonomic 
program to be one important means to address a key issue arising from workplace 
injuries: financial costs.  
 7.7.6  The Upshot of “Trending Downward” 
One of the most convincing pieces of evidence for maintaining the ergonomic 
program was that the injury rates had fallen since its initiation.  During the time that the 
ECT had been operational, the number of both lost-time and no-lost-time injuries were 
decreasing, or as the OHS manager said, the injury numbers were ―trending downward.‖  
Indeed, the number of lost-time injuries in the plant had consistently dropped, from 28 in 
2001 to 10 in 2004.    
Crucially, the plant‘s senior management felt that the ECT‘s activities reduced 
injury numbers.  In a visit with the team, the company‘s president praised the ECT‘s 
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work, noting that it was integral to the company‘s health and safety practices.  Late in the 
intervention, one of the company‘s Vice President‘s noted that the ergonomic program 
had value but confessed that he was surprised there were still such a high number of 
repetitive strain injuries given the company and ergonomic team‘s efforts to reduce 
injuries.  He noted that, ―if we hadn‘t have done those things we [the company‘s injury 
numbers] could‘ve been right off the radar.  So it‘s hard to say, BUT IT HAS TO.  IT 
DEFINITELY has improved.  I mean just the way people work today on those 
workstations that we changed versus the way they worked a year – two years ago.  It‘s 
much better.‖  When asked about his impressions of the group over time the company 
Vice President said:  
…at first I thought this was going to be great and then it sort of 
hit a bit of a lull where I thought, ―is anything really happening?‖ 
Is anything good coming out of this? … and then you know you 
see some of the things that are changing and you say, ―Yeah it is 
good. It‘s been a worth while program.‖ 
The plant manager was seeing results too.  He explained that injury reduction was 
due to several factors, including not only the ergonomics program but also the plant 
layoffs and the other elements of the health and safety system in the factory:  
When we first started this we were between six and eight hundred 
hours a week in light duty costs – indirect costs. And through a 
combination of three things. … Part of work also working with 
them is to let them know that we have to try to find some work 
for these people and get them on direct work even though we can 
modify the workstations so that they can do the work which 
would incorporate some ergonomic interventions and try to come 
up with some different ways so they are not lifting and bending 
and twisting. So if we come up the ideas as supervisors where we 
can make improvements and we‘ll [ECT] work on them in the 
group if necessary to make improvements getting them to do 
direct work rather than [can‘t understand] So, that month after 
month after month we could see that that was getting better. 
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Another indicator that the company‘s approach to health and safety was 
improving was that it scored high on an external review of its occupational health and 
safety (OHS) program.  Because the company had high injury rates, it was subject to a 
WorkWell audit.
26
  In this audit, carried out by a WSIB assessor, a company‘s OHS 
program is reviewed and if improvements are required, these are stipulated and then an 
inspector returns six months later to see if these recommendations for improvements have 
been acted on.  The company successfully passed both audits; part of the reason for this, 
according to the OHS manager, was the plant‘s ergonomics program that was reducing 
risk of injury.    
7.8  DISCUSSION 
The chapter began by describing the difficulty encountered when a group attempts 
to satisfy multiple social worlds that may have interests that are inconsistent with its own.  
Despite the changes that the ECT made, the participatory ergonomic program was not 
accepted by management in Courier Co. as a worthwhile way to address OHS concerns.  
Support for the program‘s maintenance, strong in the beginning, receded over time and 
management was unprepared to provide for its continuance.  Conversely, in Furniture 
Co., support grew over time and management accepted the PE program as an important 
means of addressing high OHS costs.  The chapter‘s findings demonstrate how the 
programs‘ sustainability differed and how these variations were related to (a) the ECTs‘ 
                                                 
 
26
 In Ontario a WorkWell audit is conducted if a company routinely has an unsatisfactory health and safety 
record.  See  http://www.wsib.on.ca/wsib/wsibsite.nsf/public/Workwell . The consequences of failing the 
audit on the return visit by the assessor are considerable.  If a company fails the second review, its principal 
annual insurance premium can increase from anywhere between 10%-75% in addition to already imposed 
surcharges. 
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capacity to make a case for PE program continuation and (b) the organizational and 
broader social context in which the programs were embedded.   
In both settings, actors‘ perspectives in different social worlds played a role in 
shaping program continuation.  The physical demands on workers were lessened through 
the ergonomic change teams‘ activities.  The reduction in the physical demands on 
workers in Courier Co. did not, however, coincide with a discernable drop in lost-time 
injury rates.  As a result, management did not deem the PE program a success.  
Congruent with a negotiated order perspective (Strauss, 1978; 1993), alignment of the PE 
program‘s aims with the perspectives of multiple social worlds was necessary.  
Management wanted to see that there was some impact on lost-time injuries for the 
investment in PE.  This made making the case for the PE program‘s utility difficult for 
the ECT in Courier Co. as it was unable to address those concerns.   
The findings concerning how the PE program results were evaluated based on 
reductions in lost-time injury rates draw attention to the connection between what is 
interpreted as positive OHS program outcomes and the external regulatory environment.  
Managements‘ decisions about the PE programs‘ continuation were shaped by the 
prevailing occupational health and safety regulatory context, which emphasizes 
evaluating an OHS program‘s viability by the extent to which it reduced lost-time injury 
rates.  Moreover, judgements about the PE programs‘ worth were affected by concerns 
related to OHS investment; specifically, minimizing this investment.  This finding is 
congruent with Walters‘ (1985; see also Hall, 1993) contention that managers‘ choices 
concerning workplace hazards are embedded in the structural contradictions between 
capital‘s interests and the promotion of and investment in health and safety.  
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Another finding is that the strength of the efforts to maintain the PE programs by 
the ECTs differed markedly.  The ECT in Courier Co. did not demonstrate to the 
company that it was a viable part of the health and safety system and could provide a 
good return on investment.  Part of the reason for this was worker representatives‘ 
reluctance to take their case for PE program continuation to management; the main 
reason for this was their lack of influence.  In contrast, in Furniture Co., the OHS 
manager and plant manager pursued ways of integrating ergonomics into the company‘s 
OHS system.  They did this in three ways: they attempted to promote awareness about the 
PE program, they proceduralized the program, and they established PE as complementary 
to the plant‘s OHS programs, and specifically its Return-to-Work program.  Moreover, 
they aligned participatory ergonomic program goals with key organizational objectives, 
in particular the reduction of health and safety costs.  As a result, the PE program was 
considered by management as one way to address high OHS costs.     
The findings regarding the differential outcomes in the programs are consistent 
with some of the factors identified in the public health literature that support 
sustainability (Goodman and Steckler, 1988; Nilsen et al., 2004; Schreir, 2005).  Three 
factors identified in this literature are particularly relevant to the findings here: a program 
needs to be (a) seen as fitting with an organization‘s goals, (b) advocated for by program 
supporters, and (c) producing benefits for an organization that are apparent to key 
organizational benefactors.  In Courier Co., according to management, the program did 
not converge with the organization‘s goals, there was little campaigning on the part of the 
ECT for the program‘s continuation, and the benefits of the program were not 
immediately apparent to key managers.  Conversely, in Furniture Co., the PE program 
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was aligned with the organization‘s cost-saving goals, advocated for by the ECT, and 
especially the OHS manager, and recognized by senior managers as benefiting the plant.   
Consistent with the literature that points to influences on the sustainability of 
health programs from sources external to an organization (Buchanan et al., 2005a; Pluye 
et al., 2004; Shediac-Rizkallah and Bone, 1998), the organizational environment played 
an important role in creating the conditions under which the ECTs‘ functioned.  The 
experience-rating system affected management‘s orientation to the PE programs in 
dramatically different ways.  In Courier Co., the company sought to handle its injuries in 
a different way than through the PE program.  In Furniture Co., the ECT was able to align 
its interests with larger company objectives.  The findings highlight the importance of 
examining the influence of government health and safety policy on programs which may 
be enacted within workplaces.  These findings also suggest the importance of attending to 
the unintended consequences of policy on programs such as OHS.   
The regulatory environment was also important in terms of its influence on 
multiple levels of management in Furniture Co.  In Furniture Co., the PE program‘s 
relevance was enhanced when pressure was put on local management by senior 
management, who were reacting to the poor health and safety record and attendant 
surcharges from the province‘s compensation board.  The company also sought to 
accommodate injured employees, an objective that restructuring and lean manufacturing 
made more difficult because they reduced the number of positions in which workers 
could perform light work.  These factors, related to the regulatory environment, gave the 
problem of soft-tissue injuries more legitimacy and contributed to management‘s 
decisions to continue supporting the PE program as they saw it as one way that injuries 
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could be addressed.  The ECT‘s capacity to alter workstations so that modified-duty 
workers could be accommodated and perform value-added work enhanced the PE 
program‘s legitimacy. 
In Furniture Co., senior managers felt that the PE program decreased injury 
numbers and that the program contributed to the improvements in the plant‘s health and 
safety record.  The PE program‘s positive impacts encouraged management to maintain 
the program, despite its slow start.  In particular, the PE program enhanced the 
company‘s capacity to decrease the financial costs by reducing modified-duty hours.  
This status gave the ECT the recognition and resources it needed to continue.  In sum, 
management‘s continued support of the participatory ergonomic program was linked to 
the local context and broader regulatory climate and the alignment of the ECT‘s and 
organization‘s objectives.     
One of the central ideas underpinning Ontario‘s regulatory environment is that 
safety pays, or that if organizations attend to health and safety they will benefit 
financially.  A key aspect of the safety pays approach is experience-rating.  As Thomason 
and Pozzebon (2002: 287) explain  
The link between the employer‘s claims experience and workers‘ 
compensation assessments provides employers with incentives to 
reduce the frequency and severity of claims. Broadly speaking, 
there are two ways in which employers may do this. They may 
improve the health and safety conditions at the workplace, which 
reduces the probability that worker will suffer a workplace injury 
or disease and possibly the severity of injuries that do occur. 
Alternatively, firms may engage in a variety of practices known 
as claims management, which reduce the cost of injury or disease 
without necessarily affecting workplace health and safety.    
(emphasis in original) 
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Both of the companies engaged in claims management.  Experience rating did not 
encourage Courier Co.‘s management to continue the PE program, which was intended to 
address the source of injury.  In the final months of the PE program, management was in 
the process of adopting a large-scale return-to-work program: a claims management 
approach to reducing OHS costs.  In Furniture Co., management was interested in claims 
management as well, and in addressing this accommodated modified-duty employees.  
However a feature of their approach was to address the source of injury through the 
ECT‘s activities, enabling modified-duty workers to perform value added tasks.  That the 
companies engaged in claims management is consistent with literature on experience-
rating (Kralj, 1994; 1995; 2000; Thomason and Pozzebon, 2002).      
The different outcomes between Courier Co. and Furniture Co. are partly 
attributable to whether the ECTs could demonstrate they were addressing health and 
safety costs.  In Courier Co. there were no indications that the PE programs were 
reducing OHS costs; conversely, in Furniture Co., management saw the program saving 
OHS costs.  These companies‘ different reactions to the regulatory environment highlight 
that local circumstances mediated how the experience-rating system was translated within 
the organizations.  The complex interactions between internal and external conditions, 
multiple, competing valuations of the OHS programs, and different actions by the ECTs 
that led to the differential outcomes in the workplaces are in accord with the findings of 
Buchanan et al.’s (2005) survey of sustainability studies.  They (203) note,  
No simple prescription for managing sustainability emerges from 
this review.  However it seems appropriate to recommend 
strategies sensitive to context, complexity, ambiguity, uncertainty, 
competing stakeholders and to the range of potential interlocking 
influences.  It is also evident that sustainability depends on a 
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number of externalities beyond direct management control and 
manipulation. 
Given that unions are generally supportive of initiatives to protect workers‘ health 
(e.g., Becker and Morawetz, 2004; Johansson and Partanen, 2002), it was unexpected that 
they did not get involved in efforts to sustain the PE programs in Courier Co. or Furniture 
Co.  In Courier Co., the union steward was on the team, saw the ECT and PE program as 
a good thing and was upset about its demise.  Nonetheless, he did not make efforts to 
alter the course of the program.  Perhaps there was no protest from the union in Courier 
Co. because it saw the program‘s discontinuation as another example of program that had 
been started and then discontinued as so many other programs had in the past and 
therefore felt that protesting the PE program‘s cancellation would have been futile.  In 
Furniture Co., perhaps the absence of involvement of the unions was due to the fact that 
the PE program was receiving continued support from management and no union 
assistance was required. 
Chapter Seven described the challenges that the ECTs encountered while 
attempting to ensure the PE program continuation.  In Chapter Eight, the dissertation‘s 
significant findings, lessons for practitioners, and future research directions are discussed. 
 
 256 
CHAPTER EIGHT   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: ENCOUNTERING LIMITATIONS AND 
OVERCOMING OBSTACLES   
8.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines two participatory OHS programs designed to reduce 
the incidence and prevalence of work-related musculoskeletal disorders.  Employing 
direct observations recorded over the course of the programs and interviews, I examined 
the participatory ergonomic (PE) programs.  The dissertation addressed the following 
research questions:  What actions were undertaken by individuals to ensure the PE 
program‘s functioned and continued? How did the organizational and societal context 
enable or constrain, the pursuit of PE program activities?  Considering the influence of 
both the actors and the structural conditions in the settings, the dissertation‘s analysis 
draws on insights from negotiated order and critical theory frameworks. 
This chapter discusses some of the key findings in light of the theoretical lens that 
guides the analysis as well as some of the literatures relevant to the dissertation.  The 
chapter begins with a brief review of the theories and a presentation of the key findings.  
Then I discuss themes that permeate the dissertation‘s findings.  Following that, I 
consider the issue of the success or failure of the interventions.  In the chapter‘s 
penultimate section I discuss the dissertation‘s contributions to the participatory 
ergonomics literature.  A brief discussion of future research directions concludes the 
chapter.  
8.1  RESTATEMENT OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
I examined the ECTs‘ activities using conceptual material from two perspectives. 
The first is negotiated order theory, which focuses on the micro and macro aspects of 
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phenomena.  Negotiated order considers organizational life as an ongoing 
accomplishment.  In terms of organizational programs, the perspective does not see them 
as pre-given but as enacted by those in the setting.  Negotiated order considers 
organizational life as unfolding in ways that may differ from stated organizational rules 
or regulations.  Instead it considers these as being ambiguous and possibly unknown to 
some actors.  Even actors who are familiar with rules and regulations may interpret them 
in different ways.  Negotiated order theory presumes organizations are composed of 
heterogeneous actors whose interests are myriad.  In part, because of these diverse 
interests among actors and that different actors carry out distinct tasks, actors need to 
forge agreements about how they will achieve goals.  There may be, to borrow Strauss‘ 
words, multiple ―social worlds‖ in a setting and these worlds may be in conflict.  
Moreover, actors may have varying levels of interest in a program and therefore treat it 
with indifference or even resist it.  Also, differential distribution of power in workplaces 
among groups can affect a program‘s functioning and outcomes.     
Critical theory also offered important insights that informed the dissertation.  I 
used critical theory to locate the analysis in the economic conditions affecting the PE 
programs.  The critical paradigm has been used successfully to understand OHS 
conditions and their alteration.  As it applies to OHS, it predominantly considers the 
influence of structure and economic and political factors involved in the creation of 
hazards and how and if they are addressed.  Using the framework, I consider the 
important role that the profit motive may play in the realization of OHS intervention 
goals or health and safety generally (Grunberg, 1983; Littler and Salaman, 1982; Nichols, 
1997). The critical paradigm also presents a framework for understanding labour and 
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management‘s asymmetrical access to resources that affect their power, and, in turn, how 
differences in power affect the capacity of each to alter the workplace.  With respect to 
OHS, the paradigm highlights the differences in resources among groups within 
workplaces.  It also considers the role of the economic conditions that shape the decisions 
of management; most importantly, about production.  Finally, it highlights the fact that 
management and worker interests are not always shared when it comes to health and 
safety concerns.   
By considering an organizational change program from negotiated order and 
critical perspectives, the dissertation focuses on how individuals and groups carry out 
activities that are required to achieve program goals.  These activities entailed 
establishing and maintaining the arrangements that these programs relied upon to 
function.  To describe how these arrangements were forged, I looked at the actors‘ 
interactional strategies, or the means employed to advance agendas, such as persuasion 
(Strauss, 1988; 1993, Strauss and Corbin, 1993).   
8.2  RECAPPING THE FINDINGS 
Chapter Four explored how different types of and access to knowledge affected 
both the levels of worker participation and the solution design process.  Workplace 
features such as design parameters, production pressures, the nature of the knowledge 
required to design solutions, and the differential distribution of that knowledge among 
workplace personnel, influenced involvement and solution design.   
In keeping with the precepts of participatory ergonomics (Wilson et al., 2005), the 
teams drew heavily on workers‘ knowledge of the production process and combined this 
with ergonomic knowledge in their attempts to effectively address musculoskeletal 
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disorders.  Having been provided with an introduction to ergonomic principles and task 
analysis techniques, the ECT members recognized hazards and incorporated worker 
knowledge of job tasks into their thinking.  Workers‘ experiential knowledge, although 
crucial to understanding job tasks was, at times insufficient to devise solutions.  This had 
important consequences on workers‘ involvement during solution building.  In the case of 
Furniture Co., in the intervention‘s initial months, because the development of solutions 
required more specialized technical knowledge than was available to the ECT, ECT 
members had great difficulty designing practicable solutions to address hazards.  In part, 
this was because the vast majority of changes involved alteration of the production 
process which was mechanized and production flow interdependent, so the ECT needed 
to consider in its solution design many features of the production process, such as the 
movement of parts and functionality of machinery.  Conversely, in Courier Co., the 
nature of the labour process involved predominantly manual hand tools and only 
infrequently required that the team engage in complex tasks such as integrating or 
altering machinery.         
In Furniture Co., the team‘s capacity to generate workable solutions was vastly 
improved when the maintenance manager and production manager were brought on to the 
ECT because of their formal training and practical knowledge of machinery, production 
processes, and factory layout.  However, their increased involvement diminished the 
participation of the worker representatives in the design process.   
Chapter Five described the ECTs‘ activities when trying to address the hazards 
they had identified and created solutions for.  In both settings, the ECTs‘ difficulties 
securing permission from management to carry out changes and lack of budgetary 
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authority led to protracted change initiation and implementation processes and, on 
occasion, resulted in no change at all.  The sources of this problem differed for each 
setting.  In Courier Co., the problems resided primarily with the fact that senior managers 
were located outside of the depot but had authority over the depot‘s work processes and 
equipment.  In Furniture Co., it was middle management who either resisted or were 
indifferent to the ECT‘s recommendations and therefore impeded the ECT‘s 
implementation activities for the intervention‘s first 12 months.  Protracted processes of 
change implementation led to a set of common consequences in both settings: frustration 
among team members and questions from managers and non-ECT workers in the 
facilities about the ECTs‘ slow progress.  
The ECTs reacted in different ways to the problems that they encountered.  In 
Courier Co., the OHS regional manager, and to a lesser extent, other team members 
employed a set of interactional strategies to secure management‘s endorsement for 
changes.  In Furniture Co., the OHS manager and the plant manager recruited the 
maintenance manager and production manager onto the ECT and secured their 
cooperation.  Although change making progressed more smoothly with the presence of 
the production manager and maintenance manager, it was not without its problems.  The 
OHS manager still had to shepherd ergonomic changes around some roadblocks after the 
managerial personnel‘s enlistment.   
Chapter Six examined the ECTs‘ division of labour during the change process.  
Implementation tasks were unevenly distributed across members, with management 
personnel typically carrying them out.  The ECT members‘ stances, or their perspectives 
on who would have success in carrying out implementation tasks, profoundly affected 
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who came forward to act.  The workplace‘s hierarchical nature and members‘ 
understandings of the typical relations of production contributed to their perspectives and 
subsequently to the division of labour.    
Chapter Seven discussed the fate of the PE programs.  Like so many 
organizational programs that are short lived (Beer and Nohria, 2000), the PE program in 
Courier Co. was discontinued after approximately 30 months.  Conversely, in Furniture 
Co., at the conclusion of the research, 48 months after it had started, the PE program was 
still operating. 
Senior management in the settings took different attitudes toward the programs‘ 
sustainability.  In Furniture Co., senior managers were supportive; conversely, in Courier 
Co., senior and local managers were not.  In Courier Co., the national health and safety 
manager did not consider the program to have achieved valuable results.  Primarily 
interested in whether the program reduced the depot‘s lost-time claims, this manager did 
not support the continuation of the program.  In Furniture Co., WSIB surcharges and 
plant restructuring prompted management to continue to invest time and money in the PE 
program.     
In neither company were the programs evaluated based on whether they were 
having a positive effect on worker health, as reported by workers‘ self-reports of pain.
27
  
Instead, a key criterion in management‘s thinking about the PE programs‘ continuation 
was that they should reduce the lost-time injury rates.  I suggest that the experience-rating 
system‘s emphasis on the importance of reported lost-time claims for assessing the utility 
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 However, in Courier Co. the research team examined the PE program‘s impacts on workers‘ self-reports 
of pain.  The results of this analysis are reported in Rivilis et al., 2006. 
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of a prevention strategy diminished the significance attached to other criteria, such as 
worker self-reports of their health.  These regulatory conditions affected management‘s 
orientation toward OHS and willingness to continue the programs in each setting, 
although in markedly different ways.  
In both of the settings, managers‘ decisions about program continuation can also 
be linked to the fact that the partial self-regulation model of OHS legislation in Ontario 
does not specify what companies should do to reduce high lost-time rates (Nichols and 
Tucker, 2000; Storey and Tucker, 2006).  As a result, managers are relatively free to 
decide how they will endeavour to ensure their companies stay under the average injury 
rates for their industry sector.  They may choose to engage in short-term claims 
management practices without addressing the sources or primary causes of injury.  
Importantly, the ways that management choose to address injury did not necessarily focus 
on addressing root causes of MSDs.  
The ECTs varied in the ways that they sought to continue the PE programs. In 
Courier Co., the ECT did little to push for the PE program‘s continuation.  Worker 
representatives supported the program, noting it had achieved some successes; however, 
they did not petition management for its continuation, citing the fact that their opinions 
would do little to sway management.  The OHS manager assisted the ECT into its 
twenty-eighth month, but at the national health and safety manager‘s direction, ceased 
championing the PE program after that point.  Conversely, in Furniture Co. the OHS 
manager pushed strongly to ensure that middle and senior managers understood the PE 
program‘s relevance and that the program was integrated into the plant‘s health and 
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safety management system.  She strove to have the PE program recognized as 
supplementary to other programs as well as worthwhile for its own sake.     
8.3  REVIEWING CROSS-SITE THEMES  
In my description of the cases, I did not adopt a standard set of dimensions upon 
which to compare the settings.  Instead, in each of the findings chapters, I looked at the 
two cases independently and discussed some of the relevant similarities and differences 
between them.  In doing so, I endeavoured to minimize the chance that an important 
distinguishing feature might be ignored, downplayed, and/or rejected.  I hoped to allow 
salient elements to be given the attention they deserve, thus contributing to the validity of 
the overall study‘s results.  In this section, I turn to a more extended discussion of the 
common themes that arose across sites.      
8.3.1  Participatory Ergonomics Programs Unfold in a Social Context  
Scholars such as Collins (1998) and Dawson (2003a; 2003b) suggest that 
organizational change programs do not exist independently of the dynamism that 
characterizes organizational life: scarcity of resources, multiple and conflicting interests, 
and the capacity of actors to hinder or facilitate a program‘s functioning.  Rather, 
elements such as these shape programs over time.  The PE programs were conditioned by 
actions of those within the settings as well by organizational and societal conditions.  In 
particular, the study demonstrates how the PE programs were affected by discrepant 
interests, power, and the actions of ―interested parties,‖ to use Strauss‘ (1993) 
terminology.     
Agreements regarding how the PE programs would operate were in place at the 
outset of the interventions: the arrangements were made with management for time and 
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finances; the teams were composed, were trained in ergonomics and were assisted by an 
ergonomist-facilitator for more than a year and a half; and the ECT had a plan to follow 
in the form of the blueprint.  However, some key elements of the agreements concerning 
the support the programs would receive were challenged in practice.  The teams‘ design, 
implementation, and continuation activities changed markedly over time as contingencies 
arose and the ECT members responded to these.  Alterations to the way the ECTs 
operated over time are consistent with Strauss‘ (1988: 163) line of thinking: 
Projects characteristically have narrative histories: they evolve 
over time.  While that evolution may entail the alteration or 
elaboration of the original goal or goals, the work and the work 
itself and the work relationships of project members do develop 
over time.  Hence their efforts to achieve and maintain the ―fitting 
together‖ of their work are permeated by temporal considerations.  
Any analysis of the ―fitting together‖ must take that temporality 
into consideration.  
Structures in the settings had erosive effects on some agreements, which in turn 
influenced the PE programs‘ functioning and continuation.  For instance, the production 
imperative limited the available time to carry out changes.  Additionally, the uneven 
distribution of power played an important part in the ECTs‘ attempts to make changes.  
This was manifest in management‘s control over the time that actors could devote to the 
programs and affected how implementation activities proceeded.  Variations in actors‘ 
perspectives regarding the importance they deemed health and safety and PE influenced 
the programs.  In particular, PE program support differed among different managerial 
levels and responsibilities.  Conditions internal and external to the organizations, such as 
production pressures, managerial indifference and resistance, and economic imperatives 
all shaped the programs.  One of the main consequences of these influences was that 
participants continuously faced contingencies, such as scarce resources, which they 
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responded to by attempting to ―work things out‖ in order to meet PE program goals.  
Ultimately, the programs did not function according to plan or the precepts of 
participatory ergonomics alone; rather, they operated as a product of ongoing 
arrangement making of the ECTs within their organizational and structural contexts.  
These findings align with the literature referred to in the dissertation‘s introduction, 
which suggests that organizational change is fundamentally social, emergent, and 
processual (Dawson, 2003a; 2003b; Dawson, 2005; McLoughlin, 2005; Thomas, 1994).  
The findings also point to the micro-politics of change or individuals‘ activities 
directed toward making change and continuing the programs.  The significance of these 
factors converges with the insights of the negotiated order framework (Fine, 1996; 
Garrety and Badham, 1999; Strauss et al., 1985).  ECT members‘ understandings that the 
programs were not operating effectively motivated them to alter course and modify their 
operation.  For instance, the slowness and ineffectual functioning of the teams‘ 
implementation of changes prompted them to adjust their activities accordingly.  The 
ECTs‘ reactions to the contingencies they faced and their ability to create new ways of 
operating highlight the local creativity that shapes organizational programs.  The next 
section explores some specific instances of the dynamics of micro change by examining 
change work.   
8.3.2 Activities Involved in Making Change  
 Regarding change making as interactional directs attention to the arrangements 
participants make in order to ensure program goals are accomplished.  The findings 
demonstrate the practice of change as a product of agreements sown and maintained 
among various heterogeneous groups in the settings, each with their own interests and 
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perspectives.  Agreements amongst the groups often resulted from the interactional 
strategies adopted by the ECTs.  I submit that in the same way that the production of art 
(Becker, 1974; 1982), theatre (Lyon, 1976), science (Fujimura, 1987; Sundberg, 2007), 
and policy (Hall and McGinty, 1997; Prus, 2003) are wholly reliant on a number of 
actors‘ collaborative endeavours, so too is making workplace changes.  Admittedly, the 
idea that accomplishing program goals requires group collaboration is not news; indeed, 
it might even be a sociological truism.  The analysis of organizational change is not 
merely about identifying the multiple parties that are involved; it is also about examining 
what these people are doing, the agreements that they construct among themselves about 
a course of action, how these are maintained over time, and the conditions under which 
these understandings can be reached.    
As Strauss (1988) has pointed out ―fitting together‖ lines of action involves 
getting people moving toward a common objective.  Gathering material resources, 
coordinating who would physically carry out a change, scheduling time to meet and 
design changes, and getting permission to alter the workplaces were all practices of 
making change that typically required the involvement of multiple individuals and 
interactional strategies, such as persistence.  In various ways, making change was about 
the continuous forging of arrangements and aligning the different activities that needed to 
be carried out, to ensure that organizational change was possible with interactional 
strategies that would promote change work.      
The dissertation provides insight into the interactional strategies used to meet the 
goals of an organizational change program.  To overcome the roadblocks they 
encountered, the ECTs, in Prus‘ (1999: 167-208) words, ―engaged in a tactical 
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enterprise.‖   Recall that Chapter Five examined how the ECTs drew on a number of 
strategies to overcome problems with managerial indifference and resistance to the 
team‘s recommendations.  For example, persuasion was used at times.  In other cases, the 
ECTs used persistence and in still other cases, they used allies by enlisting others who 
had influence in the setting.  Frequently, more than one strategy was used simultaneously.  
In Furniture Co., much of the team‘s energy was directed to attempting to institutionalize 
the PE program in the company.  In this effort, the ECT drew on a wide array of tactics 
such as educating personnel about the benefits of the PE program, drawing attention to 
the ECT‘s accomplishments and goals, promoting the complementary nature of the 
programs to already institutionalized OHS programs, and what the OHS manager referred 
to as, ―proceduralizing,‖ or formalizing the ECT‘s activities so they would be readily 
integrated into the company‘s policies.   
The ECTs‘ activities highlight that change making was a political venture.  The 
complexity of these activities is consonant with Strauss‘ (1993: 92) comments:  
To actors themselves, the working out-process appears to be a 
series of strategies and counterstrategies aimed at convincing, 
educating, discussing, negotiating, threatening, extracting, 
demanding, and/or dominating.  By interacting strategically, they 
are attempting to shape the specifics of a given arrangement, thus 
to exert control over the work, resources, and working conditions. 
Treating the PE programs as negotiated orders foregrounds the interactional strategies 
involved in the establishment, maintenance, and occasional re-establishment of 
agreements.  Evidence of the politics that are involved in health and safety is found in 
other studies, although many of these do not focus on micro dynamics of organizational 
life per se. Walters et al. (1995) discussed some of the ways that joint health and safety 
committee members go about pushing the health and safety agenda.  Gray (2002) 
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highlights the strategies workers undertook to ensure their safety while avoiding 
confrontation with management around the right to refuse unsafe work.  More recently, 
Hall et al., (2006) illuminated the activities carried out by joint health and safety 
committee members as they attempted to gather information about health risks, which 
could be used as resources in the struggle to alter the workplace.  These studies and the 
dissertation‘s findings remind us that making change involves interactional work.  
According to Strauss (1993:89):  
Interaction refers first of all to the articulated collective act of 
work performance. Interaction also refers and [sic] to the 
strategies used in working out the arrangements that allow for the 
articulation of those collective acts within any given structural 
/organizational context.   
8.3.3  Moderated Autonomy 
There were very few attempts by ECT worker representatives to participate in 
implementation activities.  Generally, the division of labour during implementation 
mimicked the typical relations of production in that worker representatives did not take 
on tasks that were usually carried out by management, such as ordering equipment from 
suppliers.  Similarly, we saw that the change team‘s worker representatives in Courier 
Co. did not attempt to negotiate with management about extending the PE program‘s 
tenure, in large part because they doubted the likelihood their efforts would be successful.  
In both settings, worker and managerial representatives felt that using worker 
representatives for implementation activities would have delayed the process and reduced 
the probability of success.  Organizational hierarchies structured which personnel carried 
out the integration of the ECTs‘ preferred changes.  In particular, ECT members‘ 
perspectives concerning the success they would experience in articulation work affected 
what they offered to undertake.  Prus‘ (1999: 167-168) comments on tacticians are 
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helpful in understanding both management representatives‘ assumption of the majority of 
tasks and worker representatives‘ reluctance to undertake certain tasks:  
it is important to recognize that people may engage human targets 
with a wide range of stances.  Thus, tacticians may sometimes 
envision themselves as exceedingly advantaged relative to the 
other, as implied in notions of being in total control, being 
resource-laden, having authority, being revered, or being able to 
apply extended sanctions to the other.  At other times, tacticians 
may see themselves on comparatively equal grounds relative to 
those they encounter, or they may see themselves as both 
advantaged and disadvantaged relative to the targets they plan to 
engage.  In still other instances, tacticians may view themselves 
as greatly disadvantaged or essentially powerless relative to 
prospective targets.   
Chapters Four through Seven provide examples of the conditions, at multiple 
levels, that shaped the ECTs‘ activities.  The ECT members encountered constraints in 
various forms and were compelled to circumvent these to achieve their goals.  For 
example, the production imperative shaped management‘s willingness to invest time to 
the projects.  The low priority that OHS was given in the settings affected the ECTs‘ 
functioning.  The OHS regulatory climate also had a role in shaping the PE programs.  
Additionally, the physical environment affected the level of difficulty of the changes that 
the ECTs sought to make.  In examining these concerns, the dissertation provides 
evidence that social life is nested amidst local physical structures and the local and larger 
societal structures.     
  Consistent with the negotiated order approach, negotiative activity evolved 
within an organizational and broader context (Fine, 1994; Hall, 1997; Maines, 1982; 
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Maines and Charlton, 1985; Strauss, 1978:248-254).
28
  A number of studies have 
examined the limitations that mark negotiations in different settings.  In their comparative 
study of the functioning of school boards, Hall and Spencer-Hall (1982: 344) noted that 
negotiative activity was linked with a number of organizational-level conditions:  
(1) the nature and organization of operational tasks; (2) the 
organizational size and complexity; (3) the distribution, use, and 
effectiveness of power; (4) the leadership and administrative 
style; (5) the degree of organizational change; (6) the nature and 
relationships of organizational personnel; and (7) the number and 
significance of organizational problems. 
   In his analysis of restaurant workers, Fine (1996: 3) notes that the influential 
backdrop against which human action plays out goes beyond the organizational level:  
People are able to define situations but these definitions have 
consequences.  For organizations, ecology, political economy, 
and authority hierarchy have this character.  Micronegotiations 
that are so compelling to interactionists are organized by an 
obdurate, enveloping reality.  To understand persons and their 
settings, we must oscillate between their ―free‖ acts and the larger 
environments in which these actions occur. 
The findings regarding the constraints on the ECTs‘ functioning are also 
consistent with those found in studies of joint health and safety committees (JHSCs)
29
  
(Lewchuk et al., 1996; Milgate et al., 2002; Tucker 1995; Walters, 1987; Walters, 1985; 
Walters, et al., 1995; Walters and Nichols, 2006).  A common thread in these studies is 
that JHSC activities played out under circumstances in which the committees had limited 
influence or authority to take actions independent of management.  In the present 
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 Or, in Strauss‘ (1978) words, ―negotiative,‖ ―organizational,‖ and ―structural‖ contexts. 
29
 The findings of the dissertation also converge with some studies in the PE literature, which have found 
that management commitment is integral to the success of PE programs (Fulmer et al., 2006; Laitinen et 
al., 1997; Motamedzade, 2003; Van Eerd et al., 2008; Whysall et al., 2006; Westlander et al., 1995) and 
the OHS literature more generally (e.g., Shannon, 2000). 
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analysis, an uneven power distribution in the workplaces manifested itself perhaps most 
significantly in management‘s control over the means of production and lack of worker 
participation in addressing health and safety, both of which affected the ECTs‘ 
functioning.  The findings highlight that for some managers OHS was not a priority 
compared to other concerns in the settings, in particular production.  As a result, the 
process of change making was often slowed.  Tucker‘s (1995: 256) words well 
summarize what bodies such as JHSCs and ECTs are up against in terms of the 
imbalance of power:  
Management guards its control over basic investment decisions, 
including what, when, where and how to produce.  JHSCs have 
been unable to change these prerogatives and are unlikely to be 
able to do so unless there are dramatic and unexpected changes in 
the direction of more economic democracy.  
The findings in this study support Tucker‘s assertion that ―management guards its 
control‖ over the production process.  However, the findings presented here also indicate 
that managerial control varied; the ECTs had some room for manoeuvring. The latter 
point is consistent with Shain‘s (1999: vi) argument that OHS is the only domain in 
which management rights, as laid down in common law, can be encroached upon at all.  
Management was more protective of some features of the production process than others.  
If the ECTs‘ activities did not interfere with production they more often were able to 
carry on.  Further, management exercised control by limiting what the ECTs‘ could 
spend.  There was money to invest in changes though management was reluctant to 
relinquish budgetary control; they preferred to oversee the financing of the ECT‘s 
projects rather than giving the ECTs a pool of company money and the discretion to 
spend it as they required.   
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An important element of the dynamics of organizational change explored in this 
dissertation is that the changes the teams sought to make often were somewhat removed 
from what management deemed most important.  Generally, the teams were ―free‖ to 
design the solutions that they felt best suited the ergonomic problem that they aimed to 
address, so long as this did not interfere with production.  One expects that if the ECTs 
proposed changes that significantly threatened to decrease capital accumulation then 
there would have been more management resistance. 
The interventions highlighted the importance of management‘s control over the 
production system.  The ECTs did not have authority to change what they reasoned 
should be changed without first consulting with management.  This consultation was, at 
times, a drawn out process and, at other times, an unsuccessful one.  Under current 
conditions, workers‘ reports of pain, injuries and illnesses are generally insufficient to 
alter the production processes.  A similar problem has faced, and continues to face, joint 
health and safety committees since their widespread introduction in Canada and other 
jurisdictions in the 1970s (Tucker, 1995; Walters et al., 1995; Walters, 1985, Walters and 
Nichols, 2006).  Under current legislation these committees often do not have adequate 
power to intervene in the workplace and management can ignore their recommendations.  
The problems that bodies such as ergonomic change teams and joint health and safety 
committees encounter reflect the link between ownership over the means of production 
and ownership over the means of prevention.  Workers‘ and non-production managers‘ 
lack of ownership over the means of production makes it difficult for them to control the 
means of prevention.    
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8.3.4  PE Programs: Creating and Partitioning Participatory Spaces    
One of the key concerns underlying this analysis is worker participation: what it 
entails and how it is enabled and constrained.  Participation can be examined along 
different dimensions.  There is both shallow and deep involvement in participatory 
programs.  In some PE and OHS interventions a practice is to consult with workers, with 
no, or at least few, provisions for following up on those consultations.  Others attempt to 
fully involve workers in the processes of identifying hazards, designing solutions, and 
implementing those solutions (see Moir, 2005 for a discussion of this).  St. Vincent et al., 
(2006: 125-127) provide a detailed description of how they attempted to involve workers 
and managers in a series of PE programs.  Participation can be looked upon as a staged 
continuum, such as the one provided by Tybjerg Aldrich et al., 1995 (cited in Jensen 
1997: 1079-1080).  These authors describe five stages of involvement:  ―(1) consultation, 
(2) active involvement in gathering information about injuries‘ causes and how to address 
them, (3) development of a strategy to address injuries, (4) recommendations regarding 
the best solution, and (5) implementation of a change.‖  In the settings examined here, the 
ECT members were quite involved in stages one, two, three, and four, although less so in 
stage four at Furniture Co.  In both settings, worker representatives had limited 
involvement in stage five.  
In this study, as mentioned above, participation varied based upon the stage of 
change making that the ECT was undertaking; in some stages, the ECT members had 
more involvement than in others.  In large part, the examples of limitations on worker 
representatives‘ participation can be connected to the underlying problems of differential 
access to knowledge and material resources, which was linked to the division of labour 
within the facilities, and managerial control over the production process.     
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Focusing on the different ways in which workers and others are involved in the 
participatory OHS programs and how they contribute may reduce the ambiguity that 
presently exists around the notion of participation (Granzow and Theberge, 2009).  It 
may force us to ask whether worker representatives are merely sources of information or 
sharers and appliers of their knowledge.  Investigations of these concerns will get us 
closer to understanding how participation actually is enacted in practice.  Is participation 
the equivalent to being involved in all the stages of change making?  Is it having the 
responsibility and the necessary power to not only identify hazards and design solutions 
to address them but also implement these changes?  Is participation episodic and 
dependent on what stage of change a group such as an ergonomic change team is working 
through?   
George Strauss (2006: 779) helps to answer some of these questions by 
distinguishing between involvement and influence:  
For me the distinction between ―influence‖ and ―involvement‖ is 
significant. Involvement is often passive; influence is active.  I 
may be involved in a sporting event or a good book; I don‘t 
influence them.  Many forms of ―financial participation,‖ such as 
stock options, may involve workers, but make no provision for 
them to exercise influence. 
In this study, as noted above, worker representatives‘ opportunities for influence varied 
based on the stage of change making in which the ECT was engaged.  For instance, for 
implementation tasks, worker representatives were in a position of involvement rather 
than influence, if Strauss‘ distinction in used.  Research that conceptualizes participation 
as involvement and influence and then examines the conditions, which enable 
involvement and/or influence is central to furthering our understanding about 
participation in OHS programs.  
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8.4  MANAGEMENT 
Management support was crucial for the PE programs to function, which is 
consistent with other studies on OHS (e.g., Shannon, 2000).  Support among managers 
varied on a number of counts.  Discrepancies in support among managers are partly 
attributable to the fact that managers have diverse responsibilities, they have limited time 
to attend to these, and they have to attend to pressures from changing organizational 
conditions, all of which may affect their willingness and capacity to support 
organizational change programs, such as PE.   
The dissertation‘s findings demonstrated that managers were embedded in 
organizational and societal contexts that made maintaining their long-term support for the 
program difficult.  Significantly, there were competing demands placed on managers to 
both maintain production goals and support the PE programs.  Often, the needs of the 
program were subordinated to those of production.  The finding that managers face 
choices between attention to production and other concerns, such as health and safety or 
ergonomic programs is consistent with evidence in the literature on organizational change 
(e.g., Balogun, 2003; Harley et al., 2006).     
Additionally, as I noted earlier in the dissertation, there were differences in power 
among managers.  Generally, managers who are involved closely with production have 
more power than non-production managers, such as those in human resources and 
occupational health and safety.  Those managers with less power have less ability to 
undertake activities, such as the marshalling of resources, required for organizational 
change programs to function or continue (e.g., Dawson, 2003b).  Generally, OHS 
managers have a weak power base and because of this have difficulty addressing health 
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and safety concerns (e.g., Fulmer et al., 2006; Garrigou and Piesel-Cottenaz, 2008; 
Perrow, 1983).  In part, their lack of power is explained by the fact that the activities they 
oversee are non-essential to production and this affects how other managers respond to 
their concerns.      
The dissertation also shows that notwithstanding their limited power base, OHS 
managers played a crucial role in the activities of the ECTs, frequently pushing the 
teams‘ agendas forward.  The OHS managers were able to use interactional processes, 
such as persistence and lobbying, to advocate for ergonomic changes.  Such findings 
show that actors who do not possess institutional power can nonetheless affect the 
operation and outcomes of programs, such as ergonomics initiatives.  These findings 
contrast with evidence in the literature, such as Fulmer et al., (2006), concerning OHS 
managers‘ lack of influence regarding their recommendations to address occupational 
health and safety matters.   
A detailed examination that focuses exclusively on the strategies that managers 
might use to advance OHS goals would contribute to improved understanding of how 
OHS programs evolve.  One research direction of possible interest is to examine how 
OHS managers‘ activities are influenced by different organizational contexts; for 
example it would be of interest to examine differences between organizations that 
predominantly attempt to reduce injury numbers by addressing the sources of injury and 
organizations that for the most part intend to reduce OHS costs through claims 
management.  Another possible avenue of research is to examine the broader conditions 
that influence managers‘ actions.  For instance, in jurisdictions, where MSD legislation is 
present, such as British Columbia, the legislation may influence managers‘ choice of 
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strategies to reduce MSDs and the outcomes of these efforts.  Does the presence of MSD 
legislation enable OHS managers to make a stronger case to other managers for 
investment in measures to reduce injury?     
8.5  UNION INVOLVEMENT IN THE PARTICIPATORY ERGONOMIC 
PROGRAMS 
Nichols (1997) notes that the presence of unions can counteract management‘s 
unilateral control over health and safety.  Empirically, Nichols‘ argument is buttressed by 
studies that demonstrate joint health and safety committees (JHSCs) function more 
effectively in unionized workplaces than non-unionized settings (Reilly et al., 1995; 
Walters, 1996).  In both of the workplaces examined in the dissertation the unions were 
involved in the agreements struck with management at the outset of the PE programs.  
However, they figured little in the story of how the interventions unfolded.  The 
literatures on organizational change and JHSCs offer some insights into why unions do or 
do not get involved that may help understand their non-involvement in the settings 
examined here.  Drawing on this work, below I discuss possible reasons why the unions 
were largely uninvolved in the period following ECT formation and reflect on some 
actions the unions may have undertaken had they been more involved. 
 One possible reason for the unions‘ lack of involvement after the initial phase of 
the intervention was that labour never came to see the PE programs as related to its 
interests.  In some other settings in which OHS programs have been attempted, the fear 
that labour‘s interests were infringed on became a hurdle to program functioning; indeed, 
in some cases it threatened to derail the projects entirely.  St Vincent et al., (2001) 
recounted how labour-management relations prevented ergonomic teams from 
functioning effectively.  Yassi et al. (2004) reported that trust between union and 
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management also affected a participatory health and safety program in the health sector. 
The broad societal context influenced their project in that recently introduced government 
legislation ―allowed employers to reframe or dismantle existing contracts, close all or 
parts of hospitals and lay off workers‖ (459).  Under these circumstances, labour did not 
trust management‘s motivations for adopting the project and accordingly did not act 
cooperatively.  In an OHS intervention in a newspaper setting, Rosecrance and Cook 
(2000: 261) observed that worker and manager committee members were initially 
skeptical about each other‘s motivations for participating as there was a history of 
acrimony between the two.  In Rosecrance and Cook‘s study, over time, as ergonomic 
changes were made, relations within the committee improved and labour and 
management came to an understanding that the committee‘s activities served both 
groups‘ interests.  In the above cases, the OHS programs were seen at least initially as a 
mechanism by which management could further its interests at the cost of workers‘.  In 
the cases examined in the dissertation, labour-management relations did not pose a hurdle 
to the teams‘ functioning.  Although the trust between union and management at Courier 
Co. was low and there were lay offs at Furniture Co., which may have made the union 
suspicious of whether recommendations from the ECT would result in elimination of 
tasks and jobs and ultimately to laying off more workers, in neither of the settings was 
there evidence that the PE program was seen as threatening to workers‘ interests.  
Another possible reason that organized labour did not get involved in the PE 
programs was because ergonomics was not defined as a central issue, such as wages, or 
as a threat to other issues that the union was invested in and thus not an issue they 
wished, or had the capacity to, invest energy and resources.  Studies on joint health and 
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safety activity highlight that union representatives‘ activities may be shaped by the 
leverage workers have (Walters et al., 1995).  Frost (2000), in a study of a workplace 
restructuring, concluded that union involvement was contingent on labour‘s power in the 
organization.  In his examination of a workplace change program, Vallas (2003), 
evaluating the influence unions had, suggests we need to look beyond whether a union is 
present in a setting; we need to ascertain whether they were actively involved in program-
related activities and if so what specifically their role was.    
In the present analysis, if the worker representatives had acted as formal entities 
working on behalf of their fellow workers, and had they recognized the PE program as a 
key part of protecting workers‘ health, they may have advocated for the extension of the 
program in their collective agreement. They may have also sought to set-up a union-
based ergonomic training program in which workers were educated about MSD hazards 
(e.g., Becker and Morawetz, 2004; Rosen, 2005).   Additionally, the union could have 
offered ―politically-active representation,‖ in the words of Hall et al. (2006), and 
confronted management on a range of concerns about the program such as management‘s 
failure to adequately support the initiative.  As politically-active representatives they may 
have sought to mobilize workers to report any MSD-related pain they were suffering, 
requested the Ministry of Labour to evaluate employees‘ exposure to MSDs, and possibly 
even refused to perform tasks that were exposing employees to MSDs.    
Future research may want to examine the relationship between unions and 
participatory health and safety programs in greater depth with a wide variety of unionized 
settings.  An obvious question is, ―why it is in some settings do unions participate 
actively in OHS programs, whereas in others they do not?‖  Investigations of this topic 
 280 
may enable us to understand the conditions under which unions become actively involved 
in OHS matters.  For instance, we could get a better sense of how union participation in 
OHS programs is influenced by contract negotiation, economic transformations, and the 
regulatory environment.  An additional line of inquiry would explore differences between 
non-unionized employees and their unionized counterparts in regard to participation in 
OHS programs.  Are there conditions under which non-unionized workforces effectively 
act to participate in OHS programs? And if so, what are these conditions? 
While the dissertation research was carried out in workplaces with organized 
labour, the vast majority of Canadians are employed in non-unionized settings.   Indeed, 
in Canada, in 2004, 30.6 percent of employees were unionized and this percentage has 
declined 7 percent since 1981 (Krahn et al., 2007: 364).  Workplaces with organized 
labour may likely have different dynamics than non-unionized settings and by 
researching both we may develop a more comprehensive understanding of OHS 
programs.
30
  Non-union settings may pose challenges to PE program functioning.  There 
is evidence that non-unionized workers are often less likely to report MSDs (Morse et al., 
2003) and have more difficulty advancing the OHS agenda than their unionized 
counterparts (Walters, 2006), both of which may hinder the effective functioning of PE 
programs.  It is difficult to overestimate the importance of power differences in 
workplaces and the influence these may have on the activities of worker representatives 
in participatory OHS programs, such as PE.  In a non-union setting, workers may have 
been even more reluctant to come forward, or participate at all, than the worker 
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 Polanyi et al., (2005:106-107) point out that researchers need to ensure that understandings of how 
interventions‘ unfold are based on studies that involve populations that are representative of the workforce.  
This includes looking at both unionized and non-unionized workplaces.  
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representatives in Furniture Co. and Courier Co.  Typically, workers in non-unionized 
settings have fewer protections regarding job security than those in unionized settings and 
this is likely a source of reluctance to request health concerns be addressed.  In these 
settings, to ensure there is sufficient participation for the PE program to function, 
interventionists will need to devote particular energy attending to concerns workers may 
have that discussing OHS matters with management will not negatively affect their 
employment status and will be considered by management.   
8.6  GENDER AND WORKPLACE PARTICIPATORY PROGRAMS 
Understanding the dynamics of organizations and the functioning of 
organizational programs within them can be improved by taking into account the role that 
gender plays.  While the significance of gender was not explored in this dissertation, it is 
definitely a topic worthy of examination.  Organizations often create and maintain 
policies and practices that channel women into different occupations than men, and 
different jobs within those occupations  (e.g., Messing et al., 1992) and obstruct women‘s 
pathways to advancement.  Additionally, if we look at other studies on teamwork such as 
the research by Ollilainen and Calasanti (2007) and Ollilainen and Rothschild (2001) we 
can see that gender influences task allocation on these teams.  A finding in these studies 
was that men and women‘s expectations about what tasks were best suited to males and 
females influenced the division of labour, the form that participation took and, 
importantly, limited meaningful participation.  For instance, in Ollilainen and Calasanti‘s 
(2007) research into self-managing teams, they noted that women in their study typically 
undertook tasks that required interpersonal skills and this had the effect of reproducing 
women‘s inferior status and failed to achieve the participative goals of the team ethos.   
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One topic that may have been explored in the dissertation is the relevance of 
gender to the division of labour within the ECTs.  In both settings, there were both female 
and male workers; however, in Courier Co., the workforce, especially among couriers, 
was predominantly male.  There were few female managers in the companies.  Those 
women who filled management positions were generally health and safety and human 
resource personnel.  Indeed, only one female manager representative, who came on to the 
ECT in Courier Co. in its last days, was a production manager.  The ECTs‘ composition 
generally reflected the make up of the workforce in the settings, although the two worker 
representatives in Furniture Co. were women.  Notably, during the fourth year of the PE 
program in Furniture Co., these women were laid off and were replaced by male worker 
representatives.  In both settings, the minutes of the ECTs‘ meetings were recorded and 
then circulated by women.  And, once the ergonomist-facilitator had left the setting, 
female team members were often responsible for preparing meeting agendas.  As I did 
not follow this line of inquiry I cannot say with any certainty as to why these 
responsibilities rested with female ECT members.   
With the above in mind, one might ask, did the ECTs‘ female members carry out 
tasks that are assumed to be better suited for women?  For instance, were there 
assumptions among team members that female members would take on some tasks 
because they were better at secretarial work?  Are female members expected to carry out 
tasks such as surveying workers in the facilities because they are seen as possessing 
better interpersonal skills?  Both minute taking and surveying workers are important parts 
of participatory ergonomic interventions but they lack the influence of a position such as 
chair of an ECT.  Future studies should examine the influence of gendering processes on 
 283 
OHS programs with an eye to how gender may affect the functioning of bodies, such as 
ECTs, and also how it influences equality. 
8.7  EVALUATING THE PARTICIPATORY ERGONOMIC PROGRAMS’ 
OUTCOMES
31
    
I have had the opportunity to listen to and to give presentations on participatory 
ergonomics several times in the past five years.  During these occasions I have often felt 
unease when an audience member asks the ―success question,‖ which is some variant of 
―So do these programs work?‖  It is a loaded question.  In this section I discuss the 
sources of my unease which are rooted in the (a) the various criteria for evaluating 
program outcomes, (b) the difficulties researchers have had determining success or 
failure even when a single group of ―objective‖ criteria are used, and (c) the potential 
consequences of labelling these endeavours as unqualified failures or successes.    
In reflecting on the PE programs‘ outcomes one can look at a range of 
dimensions.  Success and failure is not a simple dichotomy (Cole et al., in press). 
Evaluating whether the interventions were successful may mean examining a range of 
dimensions including: the number of changes made, whether they were ‗genuinely‘ 
participative, and the extent to which biomechanical outcomes (i.e., the amount they 
reduced biomechanical loadings) or eventual health outcomes (i.e. reductions in worker 
reports of pain) changed.  Ergonomists, ECT members, management, and non-ECT 
workers may use different criteria for assessing success or failure.  Moreover, there are 
no definitive answers about whose criteria are best.  Workers may rely on what their 
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 I was hesitant to include a section regarding the relative success or failure of the PE programs as the 
dissertation‘s focus is on the process of change rather than on outcomes.  In the end, I included the section, 
but I do not definitively state whether they were a success or not.  This determination, I think, is left to the 
reader. 
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bodies tell them as to whether they experience less pain or exertion.  Management might 
look at the number of hours devoted to the process, costs of changes and whether injury 
numbers were reduced.   One consequence of this is that satisfactorily meeting the 
evidentiary requirements of one group may not convince others of the success of a PE 
program, due to different ―cultures of evidence‖ (Cole et al., 2003).   
Using different criteria one can come up with a different answer regarding the 
relative success or failure of these interventions.  A number of observations about the 
ECTs argue against judging the programs as a failure.  If one evaluated the PE 
interventions based on whether they educated workers about musculoskeletal hazards and 
encouraged them to view the workplace through an ergonomic lens, then the 
interventions could be seen as successful.  The ECTs received training and effectively 
identified musculoskeletal hazards with the assistance of workers from the facilities and 
the ergonomist-facilitator.  The ECTs also effectively designed solutions, though this 
varied over time in Furniture Co.  With regard to participation, worker representatives 
were very involved in both hazard identification and solution building, although generally 
uninvolved at the implementation stage.  So, in terms of involvement, one could point to 
these outcomes of the PE programs as a partial success.  In each of the settings, the ECTs 
implemented a number of changes and in both settings, the feedback the ECT received 
was that workers liked the changes and they lessened physical demands. 
Conversely, there are a number of indicators that could be judged to demonstrate 
relative failure.  The companies invested large sums of money so that the ECTs could be 
trained, meet, and then make changes to the workplace.  This meant scheduling workers 
off their regular duties, tying up skilled trades‘ personnel, and expending money on 
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purchasing products or services to make changes.  This was done to make what many 
observers might consider a modest number of changes over a lengthy period of time.  In 
other words, based on a rough set of economic criteria, the PE programs might be judged 
quite inefficient.  Moreover, in an analysis of the changes in Courier Co. little or no 
impact on health outcomes was found despite the changes made (Rivilis et al., 2006).   
An important consideration in evaluating success is who decides whether the 
projects were a success or failure.   Even when one steps away from the fact there are 
numerous sets of criteria by which to assess PE programs there are problems with 
evaluating relative success or failure.  A few recent studies indicate that even when 
interventions make changes they fall short of having a positive health impact.  In a recent 
randomized control trial of PE programs in 60 kitchens in which 402 changes were made, 
Haukka et al. (2008) found little improvement in reported health outcomes.  Similarly, 
Wells et al. (in press) reports on a series of studies in which PE programs integrated both 
worker and management perspectives in making physical changes but in which intensity 
of biomechanical changes and health impacts were limited.  Success, at least based on the 
measures used in these studies, remained elusive.  Difficulties in producing the desired 
health outcomes may have to do with how the programs are evaluated, timeframes and 
the scope of change required to effect improvements amongst employees (Wells et al., in 
press). 
A final consideration regarding labelling programs a failure or success concerns 
the potential consequences of doing so.  Researchers may gain little if they adopt an ―all 
of nothing style‖ in their critiques of OHS programs such as PE programs.  By this, I 
mean that the larger project of protecting workers may not benefit from sweeping 
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criticism, which fails to take into account some of the improvements that new health and 
safety programs may foster, or from focus on a narrow definition of success.  
One of the criticisms of many workplace OHS programs is that they fail to 
achieve their promise.  Moir (2005) has explored the ideological underpinnings of PE 
programs, and notes that depending on someone‘s values s/he will have very different 
valuations of PE.  She notes (22), ―a spectrum of social visions [exist] from equity and 
industrial democracy to productivity and efficiency.  At either end of the spectrum 
ideologists would likely challenge each other‘s intent.  From the right:  ‗Idealism doesn‘t 
get the job done.‘  From the left: ‗Tinkering is not real change.‘‖  Both of these 
statements could be applied to the PE projects investigated in the dissertation.  However, 
these assessments gloss over the impacts of the programs and do not recognize that in 
both cases the PE programs yielded changes and these affected workers.  Moreover, by 
clinging to values in the way Moir describes, we may miss an opportunity to examine 
what aspects of a program worked and what did not: we lose a nuanced picture of the PE 
programs.    
Different groups have different stakes in workplace programs and stating that a 
program is a success or failure can be used by groups as an argument to bolster claims 
that these programs universally do not function well, that funding should be cut, that 
participatory endeavours do not lead to valuable workplace change.  Sociologist Joel Best 
(2001: 10), discussing the pessimism sociologists seem to write with as they describe 
social policy and progress, notes the problems of telling stories in negative language and 
failing to recognize social progress as positive when it is warranted:  
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Pronouncing social progress as trivial and social policies as 
ineffective may not be the best way to encourage commitment to 
new policies and further progress.  In particular, liberal activists 
and social scientists whose rhetoric denies that there has been 
social progress should not be surprised when conservatives use 
lack of progress (i.e., clams that nothing works, that social 
programs have made things worse) as a justification for opposing 
new social policies. Pessimism and paranoia seem at least as 
likely to foster disillusionment and despair as they are to inspire 
any sort of enthusiasm for further reform.  Sociologists need to 
acknowledge social progress and to stop fearing that that 
acknowledgement will somehow make things worse. 
A different but no less serious problem emerges when these programs are deemed 
successful without reflecting on what that label means or completely telling the story of 
change.  The fact that the ECTs‘ change making was inefficient and fraught with 
obstacles are important elements of a full description of these programs.  Considering the 
fact that some ECT representatives only had marginal involvement and that the teams 
never did really gain independence from management might lead one to conclude that the 
PE programs were not wholly successful in achieving participation.  Another way of 
looking at the latter point is that usually design and implementation of change requires 
the involvement of numerous constituents from different social worlds, which will 
require arrangement making (Broberg and Hermund, 2004; Garrety and Badham, 1999; 
Strauss, 1993).  Given this, perhaps the better question is not whether there were 
obstacles but rather what obstacles arose, how did they shape the change-making process, 
were they overcome, and if so, how?    
Easy answers exist for responding to the ―success question.‖ However, both yes 
and no responses, unless contextualized and qualified, are fraught with problems such as 
those, which I have touched on above.  When asked, ―Do PE programs work?‖ perhaps 
the best answer we can give at present or one least likely to produce anxiety is, ― These 
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programs can work.‖  ―They can work under certain circumstances.  It depends what you 
intend to achieve and how success is measured.‖ 
8.8  A DIFFERENT KIND OF HAZARD MAPPING
32
: LESSONS FOR 
PRACTITIONERS   
This dissertation contributes to the growing literature on participatory ergonomics 
in several ways.  It explores in detail the significance of contextual factors to the manner 
in which programs operate.  In so doing, it enhances our understanding of the barriers 
that PE interventions encounter as well as the actions that may help to overcome those 
barriers in order to establish and maintain effectively operating programs.  In the 
following section I discuss the implications of the dissertation‘s findings for (a) the 
nature of making change and (b) the techniques that interventionists may use as they 
endeavour to make change.  
The dissertation has implications for discussions about the nature of change.  As 
Collins (1998:83) asserts we need to be sceptical of simple models of change because ―a 
failure of these approaches to analyse social factors in any real depth, treating the 
problems of organization and change as if they involved the combination of molecules of 
cookery ingredients rather than the skilled interaction of humans, we might refer to these 
approaches as change formulae or ‗recipes.‘‖  One of the main insights from this 
dissertation is that change making is complex, a point that practitioners would do well to 
keep in mind despite their understandable desire for simpler solutions.
33
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 Hazard mapping is a technique often used by health and safety practitioners to identify and inventory 
potential workplace dangers.  In this section the hazards I refer to are those difficulties that emerge out of 
social activity that may impinge upon the operation of a PE program. 
33
 In my own experience, in several venues presenting to practitioners, they have expressed their want of a 
magic bullet to enable them to make programs work – something which, I argue, does not exist. 
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In emphasizing the complexity of change, the dissertation makes clear that this 
complexity derives in good measure from the fact that implementing ergonomic change 
programs is a ―social activity,‖ involving a group of actors with different and sometimes 
competing interests.  In a discussion of ―methods,‖ which they define as programs to 
foster participatory design, Garrety and Badham (1999: 288) rightly suggest that  
[t]he idea that human factors experts will eventually be able to 
develop methods that will remove the politics from sociotechnical 
change is an illusion.  As long as there are several people 
involved – and there usually are – there will be negotiation, 
persuasion, and lobbying.  Exclusion, manipulation, deception, 
and conflict are always possible.   
Garrety and Badham go on to note that methods are not ―useless.‖  Methods, they 
argue, are integral and can provide people with opportunities to collaborate and in this 
way may help to overcome barriers among diverse groups.  I would agree with Garrety 
and Badham and add that lists of prerequisites, which are often used in PE (e.g., Haines et 
al., 2002), are useful as well.  Nevertheless, these aids need to be employed with the 
recognition that programs are contextually bound and that organizational change involves 
power and conflicting interests.  Moreover, the fact that change is emergent means that 
factors that are unforeseen at the intervention‘s outset will shape the use of these methods 
– in some cases rendering them meaningless, in other cases acting to facilitate their use.     
A key outcome of the analysis is that some of the activities that Star (1991) would 
refer to as ―invisible work‖ are revealed.  Rendering these activities visible increases the 
likelihood that practitioners can get a more complete picture of the nature and extent of 
the activities that need to be undertaken in order to establish and sustain a PE program 
and the circumstances that influence that program.  I note two features of change making 
that practitioners may want to keep in mind.  First, the hidden work tasks involved in 
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articulation work were revealed.  Articulation involved making and maintaining 
arrangements among actors from multiple social worlds who had discordant, and 
sometimes conflicting, interests and perspectives regarding how the PE programs should 
function.  Second, the difficulties associated with workplace personnel‘s differential 
access to resources were highlighted.  These differences in access translated into some 
groups being better able to shape the PE programs than others.
34
  During interventions, 
practitioners should be aware of the need to forge and maintain agreements among actors 
and be mindful of the differences in power among groups.  Further, they need to find 
ways to avoid problems that can arise from eroding agreements and unequal power 
sharing in the workplace, such as difficulties securing permission to implement changes.   
Another feature of the PE process that we need to rethink concerns what 
personnel should be involved in PE program teams and what they should be doing.  
Practitioners should plan on including certain key actors in their change initiatives but 
also continuously examine who might need to be involved as the program unfolds and 
perhaps changes how it functions.  Plenty of papers recommend what personnel need to 
be involved in PE programs (St. Vincent et al., 2006; Vink et al., 2008).  Frequently, the 
required personnel include worker representatives, management personnel, and technical 
personnel, such as mechanics and engineers.  Recently, Vink et al., (2008) drawing on 
interview data, attempted to specify the responsibilities of those involved in ergonomics 
interventions.  Although considering the personnel who should be involved in PE and the 
tasks that generally rest with them are important for program design and change 
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 Other researchers, such as Badham (2006), Badham and Ehn (2000), Collins (1998), Dawson, (2005) and 
Garrety and Badham (1999), have talked about similar issues though not in reference to PE programs.   
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implementation stages, they require re-visiting in any particular program.  The lack of 
discussions about how to address personnel needs as PE programs evolve over time, 
particularly the unavailability of personnel integral to the PE, is a gap in the literature to 
which this dissertation has responded.  In the programs examined here, when key actors 
were unwilling to participate or their involvement was limited by their workload, other 
strategies were pursued.   
Considerations of the personnel required to enable PE program functioning should 
recognize that people ultimately act in a social context, which can be enabling or 
constraining.  By thinking of context and the obstacles that workers and managers may 
encounter, we get a sense of what factors may hamper or enable their participation.  
Considering the hindrances labour and management can face may also motivate us to 
think about what recourse there is if representatives from either group are unavailable?  If 
the situation arises in which workers are unable to be freed from their regularly scheduled 
jobs to participate in ergonomic activities, how will a practitioner address this?   
As the activities of people in committees such as ECTs are reconsidered we need 
to reflect on the responsibilities and challenges they face. What is the distribution of the 
tasks?  What does worker representatives‘ participation entail in practice?  Are there 
barriers to participation? If so, can they be removed?  What sort of effects, if any, are 
representatives‘ abilities having on their team‘s functioning? What influence is the 
productivity of the group having on members‘ perspectives?   
Talk of reconceptualizing how we think of PE program implementation broadens 
our understanding of program functioning but does not put techniques into 
interventionists‘ hands.  A full-blown discussion of how lessons learned from 
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interventions such as those I examined should be translated for practitioners but is 
beyond the dissertation‘s scope.  Therefore, I will only offer some brief comments here.  
One way interventionists may be able to improve intervention outcomes is to 
reconsider their responsibility in the implementation process.  That is, interventionists 
need to realize they have an active role to play in program change.  As Strauss (1993) 
suggests, projects do not unfold ―automatically,‖ they do so according to the actions of 
interested parties.  Interventionists are one such interested party and to potentially 
improve PE program success they need to adopt interactional strategies and forge 
arrangements as the ECT members did.   According to Badham (2006), if organizational 
change is considered as involving the straightforward implementation of ready-made 
solutions then the role of change agents is a relatively passive one.  Conversely, if 
implementation is considered as a social activity then the change agent is recast as an 
actor playing a much more complex, involved role.  Features of organizational change, 
such as its conflictual and emergent nature, mean that the change process is better led 
than managed.  Key to Badham‘s argument is that these programs are not ―pre-given‖ to 
be shepherded by managers.  Rather, organizational change is socially constructed and 
requires the activities of well-oriented, socially adept leaders to put them into action.  
Badham (2006: 242) points out,  
The leader of changing institutions is one who seeks to socially 
construct and temporarily achieve a degree of cooperative 
endeavour from and within a complex and often highly 
conflictual social setting, explicitly recognizing its limited role as 
one influencing factor in an ongoing process that is not under 
control nor the only essential source of meaning for 
organizational personnel.   
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A redefinition of the role that interventionists play, similar to the one that Badham 
suggests, could be integrated into the array of skills which ergonomists and other health 
and safety practitioners should develop and maintain.   
Practitioners may also be assisted by the publication and dissemination of ―failure 
stories.‖ In contrast to success stories, which often gloss over the difficulties that change 
programs typically encounter these would discuss change in all its messiness.  From these 
―complete‖ accounts, practitioners can take up the lessons learned by those who have 
attempted projects.  Part of this, congruent with the dissertation‘s theoretical lens, would 
be to treat organizational change as something that is carried out by individuals as a 
collective activity and which frequently involves contestation, negotiation, and usually a 
degree of accommodation. 
Another step that could be taken to improve PE program outcomes is for 
interventionists to incorporate an examination of organizational power and inequity.    
One way to do this is to use tools such as ―power maps,‖ which Noy (2008:4) defines as,  
strategic tools by which actors within political fields (or other 
fields) assess the social terrain in which they exist, and how they 
can best move forward their personal or their organization‘s 
agenda within the terrain.  Power mapping… identifies key actors 
within a particular field of action, defines the power that these 
actors have in relation to particular decisions or resources, and 
assesses the relationships of these actors with each other and with 
oneself.  
Tools such as power mapping can give interventionists, whether they are lay individuals 
or ergonomists, a means of identifying the hindrances they face in change making and 
developing plans for their circumvention.      
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Finally, an additional exercise that may be used by interventionists is to send out 
hypothetical recommendations for change to management in an intervention‘s early 
stages.  This exercise to ―test the waters‖ would enable PE interventionists to identify 
trouble spots prior to requesting management‘s endorsement of a change.  The first step 
would be for a change team to send a hypothetical recommendation to management.  
Next, the team would follow the path of the recommendation, documenting what 
personnel needed to be included and identifying any hiccups that hindered the progress of 
the change.  It would also describe what information those who needed to be involved 
required, such as arguments regarding return on investment.  The final step of the process 
would be to create a flow chart that team members could use in their change making 
activities.  Importantly, this chart could be adjusted over time if new challenges arose.  
The practice would flush out problems in the implementation process and enable efforts 
to respond to them.  Another consequence of the exercise could be that all team members, 
not just managers, learn about what is involved in implementing a change.  In the end, 
this practice would be what Strauss et al., (1985: 155-160) refers to as a ―standard 
operating procedure,‖ which may decrease the amount of alignment work that is required, 
at least for as long as the organizational context remained sufficiently unchanged.    
One could suggest that conceiving of the change agent in the way I have above 
relies on assumptions of voluntarism and underplays the role of structure.  Following the 
negotiated order framework some topics are non-negotiable and what is negotiable at one 
point in time may not be later.  I concede that even if there were more recognition of 
structure and the complex nature of change and if interventionists adopted more explicit 
leadership practices, actors‘ abilities to construct goals and objectives will continue to be 
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shaped by organizational and societal conditions.  Admittedly, the problems that 
occupational health interventions may face are tied to structural constraints, such as 
employers‘ economic imperatives and regulatory climate.   
Nevertheless, raising awareness among interventionists and those with whom they 
collaborate may improve their chances to make changes, design intervention programs 
that account for obstacles, and enhance intervention outcomes.  In this regard it is 
important to note that activities, in Hall‘s (1997) words, ―are shaped by conditions but 
outcomes are not determined.‖  To create a more facilitative context in which 
interventionists can attempt to address MSDs, changes may also need to be made at the 
policy level and workers may need to be given more authority over health and safety.  As 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, in the province of Ontario, no specific legislation 
currently exists that governs exposure to MSD risks, though in 2005 the province 
launched a campaign to reduce the prevalence of MSDs.
35
  Enacting regulations 
concerned specifically with MSDs may influence managers to take MSDs more seriously 
and give bodies such as ECTs and innovations such as ergonomic programs more 
leverage in negotiations for workplace improvements.   
8.9  FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
The dissertation‘s findings suggest that examining both the structures and micro-
dynamics that shape OHS programs enables us to delineate the numerous activities that 
bodies, such as ECTs, undertake to achieve their goals.  We need to be attentive to the 
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  The Ontario government launched a ―sprains and strains campaign‖ in 2005 intended to curb the 
prevalence of MSDs.  There is also a guide available to business and workers concerning MSD prevention, 
entitled, ―MSD Prevention Guideline for Ontario‖ (Occupational Health and Safety Council of Ontario, 
2007).  There is however, no specific MSD legislation.  
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influence of factors internal and external to organizations, such as the differences in 
power between workers and management, and among organizational subunits and their 
varying access to resources.    
The negotiated order framework and critical theory were useful for examining the 
PE interventions.  Further work regarding OHS or PE interventions may endeavour to 
theorize the relationship between interventions and the organizational and societal 
conditions.  An important consequence would be that explanations of PE program 
outcomes are not related only to the idiosyncrasies of a setting such as the specific 
concerns of a manager.  Theorizing the relationships between context and program would 
have the effect of embedding the discussions of program outcomes within the broader 
economic and political conditions.  Use of the negotiated order perspective as it attends to 
interaction amidst circumstance could be used to further our understanding of not only 
what individuals in bodies such as ECTs are doing to make changes but also what 
organizations are doing to move forward policy changes to support such work.  
Investigations with an eye to interactional strategy could provide insights into what deals 
are being made, what allies are being sought, and, in general, what tactics are being taken 
up by individuals and organizations trying to make changes. Differences among PE 
processes in large, resource-rich companies and smaller businesses (Eakin, 2000) could 
also be compared.  Findings of such research could serve to build theory around what 
actors are doing in participatory OHS projects and also assist practitioners in learning 
what works in what contexts in the pursuit of change. 
Another research track that may offer fruitful insights into how OHS programs 
function is to compare programs across jurisdictions that differ in their policies regarding 
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OHS.  For instance, are there differences in the support that management would provide 
in an organization in British Columbia, which has MSD regulation, compared to an 
organization in Ontario where no such legislation exists?  Such comparisons may yield 
insights into the ways that variations in regulatory environment affect the enactment and 
maintenance of OHS programs.   
My approach in the research was to let events unfold as naturally as possible, 
without trying to influence the OHS programs.  In contrast to this ―traditional‖ approach, 
others, such as Beirne (2008), Neumann et al., (2008), McLoughlin et al., (2000), 
Broberg and Hermund (2004), Jensen (2002) have suggested taking an action research 
orientation, whereby researchers assist those in the setting aiming to make changes.  An 
avenue for future research would be to adopt an action researcher role and support the 
interventions. One could draw on tools such as power mapping to assist workplace 
partners with overcoming the challenges that are faced during OHS interventions.  This 
process would involve iteratively examining the organizational landscape and adjusting 
activities to the emergent and processual nature of change and in particular to the actions 
of management and other stakeholders.      
The analysis presented here investigates one approach to addressing occupational 
health hazards: participatory ergonomics.  The adoption of other types of health and 
safety programs, such as wellness programs, seems to be on the rise in many jurisdictions 
(Frick and Wren, 2000).   Nichols and Tucker (2000) suggest that some of these 
programs individualize risk and seek behavioural changes in workers rather than work 
environment to address hazards.  An avenue of potential research would be to critically 
analyze OHS programs and policies to improve our comprehension of how workers are 
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experiencing health in changing workplaces and under changing economic and social 
conditions.  In particular, do OHS programs grant workers more control over health and 
safety or diminish it?  One might examine whether these programs are supplanting, 
hindering, or enhancing the role of the three rights (to know hazards, refuse unsafe work, 
and participate in OHS management) that constitute the internal responsibility system.  
8.10  CONCLUSION  
Establishing and maintaining workplace programs is a complex process.    
Although goals and tools to reach those goals may be outlined, rarely is it clear to actors 
in the planning stage how a program will function in practice.  Consequently, actors will 
have to work to make concrete the agreements and arrangements necessary for the 
program to reach its goals.  Forging such agreements and arrangements is fraught with 
challenges as actors have different, and sometimes conflicting, interests and ideas about 
how programs should operate, and even whether they should operate.  The functioning 
and the longevity of the program are not predetermined.  Moreover the arrangement 
making required to establish and maintain these programs is affected by local and broader 
social structure.  As Strauss (1988:176) noted, a large part of the work that actors do will 
be around arrangement making.   
What we wish to know, following the processual model, is how 
organizations manage to achieve the degree of articulation they 
do, and what their members must do to maintain it.  We also wish 
to know what happens when that degree of articulation is 
estimated differently by different participants, with different 
stakes and influences in the definitions.  
Answering the questions that Strauss poses needs to be recognized as part and 
parcel of the approach to comprehending organizational change to improve workplace 
conditions and ultimately employee health. 
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APPENDIX  
APPENDIX A – INFORMATION LETTER AND CONSENT FORM 
 
Dear Furniture Co. Employee,   
I would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview.  The 
interview is a fundamental component of my Doctoral research at the University of 
Waterloo in the Department of Sociology under the supervision of Dr. Nancy Theberge 
concerning the ongoing ergonomics initiative at Furniture Co.  The purpose of the 
interview is to examine how you feel about the ergonomics change initiative and get a 
better sense of the workplace in general.  
Work related injuries have serious consequences for individuals both on and off the job, 
and they also account for a major cost to employers due to lost time and worker 
compensation costs. According to ergonomics literature, participative ergonomics 
initiatives can reduce injury. However, less is known about how these ergonomics‘ 
interventions work. The purpose of this dissertation research is to analyze some of these 
factors and attempt to answer what means are effective as well as what factors lead to a 
sustained ergonomics initiative. The best way to understand these influences is from the 
point of view of those most affected by these changes – the employees.      
Participation in this interview is completely voluntary. The interview is expected to take 
about an hour of your time.  You may decline to answer any question, and you may stop 
the interview at any time. A decision to participate or not, will not effect your job status.   
All the information you provide will be held in the strictest confidence. Although 
Furniture Co. and [the union] jointly support this initiative, neither party will have access 
to the information collected in the interviews. Only myself and the research team will 
view the data in raw form. Further, all information will be locked in a filing cabinet with 
access limited to myself and for data in electronic copy on a password protected disk. 
You will not be identified in any thesis, report or publication resulting from this study. 
There are no known risks to you as a participant and nothing you say will affect your job 
status.  
With your agreement, I would like to audiotape our interview to facilitate data collection 
and to ensure the accuracy of the interview data.   
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I hope that the results of my study will benefit organizations directly involved in the 
study, other ergonomics initiatives not involved in this project as well as the broader 
research community. This research study has been reviewed by, and received ethics 
clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.   
If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation, please contact 
Dr. Susan Sykes, the Office of Research Ethics at (519) 888-4567 ext. 6005.   
If you have any questions regarding the research itself, please contact either Nancy 
Theberge at (519) 888-4567 ext. 3534 or by e-mail at theberge@uwaterloo.ca, or myself, 




Shane Dixon M.A. 
Department of Sociology  
University of Waterloo 
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APPENDIX B – CONSENT OF PARTICIPANT AND CONSENT TO USE 
INTERVIEW EXCERPTS 
I agree to participate in a short interview being conducted by Shane Dixon, a Ph.D. 
student in the University of Waterloo‘s Department of Sociology who is working under 
the supervision of Dr. Nancy Theberge and in co-operation with the Ergonomic Initiative 
in Injury Prevention. I have read the information presented in the participant information 
letter about the procedures and risks involved in this study. I have received satisfactory 
answers to my questions related to this study.  If I have additional questions at a later 
date, I can contact Dr. Nancy Theberge at 519-888-4567 ext. 3534, or email 
theberge@uwaterloo.ca. I am aware that I may withdraw from the study without penalty 
at any time by advising the researchers of this decision.   
 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  I understand that if I have any comments 
or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact Dr. Susan Sykes, 
Director, Office of Research Ethics at (519) 888-4567 ext. 6005.  
 
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this 
study. 
 
________________________  ______________________ 
Print Name  Signature of Participant 
 
________________________   
Dated   
 
I have read the information in the participant information form and agree, of my own free 
will, excerpts of the audiotaped interview, with the understanding that the quotations will 
be anonymous, may be included in the thesis and/or publications to come from this for 
research purposes only. 
 
________________________  _______________________ 
Print Name  Signature of Participant 
 




APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Begin with information letters and consent letters and introductory statement. 
What is your job? How long have you been in this job?   
How did you come to be involved with the change team? 
How long have you been involved with the change team?  
 
THE ERGONOMIC PROCESS 
What, in your own words, is your understanding of ―ergonomics?‖   
The initiative/group followed particular process, the blueprint [at this point I showed the 
interviewee the blueprint]. What do you think of this process as a means of reducing 
work-related injuries? Was it effective? 
Did the blueprint match your experience of making change? Did the group follow the 
blueprint as it attempted to make changes? 
Were there things done by the team in the course of making change that weren‘t included 
in the blueprint? 
Were there any parts of the blueprint you think should have been changed? 
Whose interests were represented by the ergonomic intervention? That is, who benefits 
from the changes that are made?  
 
ECT MEMBERSHIP 
There are representatives from different parts of the facility (management/labor) on the 
team. Do you think the correct positions were represented on the team?   
Attendance – were people able to get to the meetings? Why/ Why Not? 
Can you take me through the process you typically go through when needing time off for 
an ergonomic task? 
Who was involved in that?   
Does your work schedule allow for enough time to accomplish ergonomic tasks? 
Will moving the schedule help?
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RELATIONS WITHIN THE ECT 
Who took a leadership role(s) within the ECT? 
What sorts of things did they do that made them a ―leader‖? 
What role did you see… Ergonomist-facilitator playing? OHS manager playing? Yourself 
playing? 
Were there others who played key roles? 
What are your thoughts about the organization of the meetings (who sets the agenda, 
levels of participation, flow of the meeting [did the team stay on or stray off topic?] etc.)  
Did you feel you had enough input in the meetings?   
Do you think the tasks were distributed evenly among team members?    
PROBE – Typically, What sorts of tasks were you responsible for? 
PROBE -- Was there any reason (s) you were responsible for those tasks? 
PROBE – Were there certain tasks workers did and certain ones that change team 
members did? And if so, Why? [Were some tasks better suited to some people and some 
tasks better suited to others?] 
Did you feel you had the authority to make decisions? If not you, than who? 
Was the managerial-worker hierarchy that exists outside of ergo ―flattened‖ in the 
meetings? 




What types of risk-of-injury problems were examined in the ergonomics work? (courier 
tasks, dockworker tasks) 
What was the basis (identify some of the elements that influence) for deciding what 
would become a change project and what wouldn‘t?  
PROBE (e.g., cost; need to show results; severity of problem (e.g., NIOSH/Snook 
calculations, injury reports) – what constitutes risk?) 
PROBE – We had suggestions from workers. Some were taken on and others weren‘t. 
What were some factors that lead to turning a suggestion into a change project?  
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Was it type of injury, cost of a change, same as above?  
What are some good reasons for examining a suggestion or risk area?  
What was the difference(s) between health and safety and ergonomics issues? 
There were ―quick fixes‖ and ―full process‖ changes. How did the group decide what was 
a quick fix and full process change?  
 
ERGONOMIC TOOLS  
Checklists and one-minute surveys were used to examine potential risk-of-injury  
problems. Did you have a chance to survey [or do a checklist] anyone?  
How did that go? 
Were these tools useful?   
Snook and NIOSH equations were used to investigate areas of risk… 
What was your experience using them? 
What role did they play in the process? [Why bother doing a Snook or a NIOSH?] 
Solution-building (e.g., ―brainstorming sessions‖) was used to identify potential solutions 
to ergonomics problems. Was this a useful way of coming up with solutions?   
Documentation was used in the ergonomic process….  
What do you think its purpose was? 
Who was the documentation for? 
Where was it sent? 
What was it intended to do and did it achieve that purpose?  
Was it used as ―proof‖ to corporate?  
Did you ever have to fill out any documentation? If so, what was it? 
Once completed, where did you send it/who did you give it to then?  Why there?   
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MAKING CHANGE /ACQUIRING SOLUTIONS 
OK, after the group investigated a potential change area and came up with a solution, it 
tried to ―get that solution‖ (order it or have the garage or local people fix it) so the ECT 
could implement it….These are questions about that part of the process. The ―post-
solution and pre-implementation‖ stage….  
 
MAKING CHANGE (FORM)  
Once the group identified a solution, what was the process for making change?  
Were you involved in this part of the process  
Why/why not?  
Who was involved in making changes that required communication with senior 
management?  
Is there any particular reason why they were involved (and not someone else)? 
PROBE Were there obstacles to this (e.g., time consuming)? – Why do think that was?  
Do you see any way of doing this differently?  
What role did worker team reps play in this? 
Could a worker phone up and request something fixed/ get information about a solution? 
If so has it ever been done? 
 
MAKING CHANGE (CONTENT)  
BEFORE going to senior management and requesting an ergonomic change be made, 
what elements (e.g., proper investigation, consultation with workers to be effected) 
needed to be included in that request to ensure the request was successful? 
Were there things, besides the results of Snook, NIOSH and one-min surveys that needed 
to accompany a request for change?  
PROBE -- What role, if any, did quantification play in this relationship? 
Documents were sometimes submitted to management to make requests.  Do you know 
what completing that documentation involves? 
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A few times the team ran into obstacles (e.g., receiving the incorrect cart or the AFAR 
dragging on for an extended period).  
What do you make of that? 
Are there ways around this? 
What does corporate ―need to hear‖ (what pieces of information) in order to make 
change? 
 
RELATIONS WITH THE ORGANIZATION 
Some questions about the relationship between the team and the organization… 
What was the level of support among the different groups in the company for the 
ergonomics process?  
Level of support from… workers outside the change team? …. local management? 
….senior management (corporate)? 
PROBE – What were the ways in which this support/lack of support was demonstrated?  
Were there times when you doubted management‘s commitment?  
What power/authority does the ergonomic group have to influence management? 
Why\why not?  
Are there any particular people who need to be involved in this initiative?  
Can worker reps do this alone? 
Have non-change team members discussed the ergonomics program with you?  
What types of things have they mentioned?  
 
COMMUNICATION / PARTICIPATION  
ERGONOMIC AWARENESS  
A few methods were used to raise awareness (shift meetings, ergo board) about the 
ergonomic process, were these effective? 
Among the depot‘s workers  
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Among the larger organization  
What other means might have been used? 
Several times, team members had to gather input from those in the workforce (using e.g., 
checklists, one-minute surveys). What was the reception to these information-gathering 
tasks by people outside it?  
Were these effective? 
Did these documents cover all of the people‘s concerns/views? 
The group worked independently of workers until they reached a solution… What did 
you think of that?  
Were there other ways people gave their input to the team?  
Was this process participatory? [Did it involve workers from outside?] 
 
OUTCOMES 
What was the effect of the ECT on… 
Risk of injury/quality of job 
Have you learned ergonomic knowledge? Have workers outside of the team? 
Have you learned organizational skills? (e.g., organizing meetings)  
Have you learned about the bureaucratic structure (e.g., ―selling a request‖ – any more 
aware how the bureaucracy works at this company)? Who do you need to go to get things 
accomplished? 
Appreciation for other people‘s jobs (including management) 
Has ergo effected the communication within the facility between labor and management 
[worker groups] 
Has trust between management and labor been effected?   
Is there trust for the ECT?  
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SUSTAINABILITY 
What elements are most important to sustainability? (keeping this initiative/ergo group 
going).   
Are there barriers to sustainability? 
How could these barriers be overcome to achieve sustainability?  
To achieve sustainability, do changes need to be made to this process?  
PROBE -- And if so, could you identify some. 
Recently, it was noted the ergo group was ―stalled.‖ – What is your opinion of that? If it 
was, what were some indicators that it was stalled? How could it be fixed? 
What will happen when the ergonomist-facilitator leaves the change team?  
Why? 
Transfer of leadership – has that happened? 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
Is there anything else you wanted to add about the ergonomics process or the workplace 
in general?  
